UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4606
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JERONZA THORNE,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00448-RJC-1)
Submitted: February 11, 2009 Decided: March 16, 2009
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Steven Slawinski, Ann L.
Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina;
Dana Owen Washington, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeronza Thorne pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The
district court sentenced Thorne to seventy-two months’
imprisonment, and Thorne timely noted his appeal. On appeal,
counsel for Thorne has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he raises two
potential errors for review. * Finding no error, we affirm.
Thorne first questions whether the district court
erred in counting his two prior felony sentences separately for
guidelines calculation purposes because the offenses were
consolidated for sentencing. The record reveals that Thorne’s
September and October 2000 offenses were separated from his
June 5, 2001 offenses by his arrest on January 7, 2001. “Prior
sentences are always counted separately if the sentences were
imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening
arrest.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(a)(1)
(2007). Accordingly, the district court did not err in counting
Thorne’s offenses separately in calculating his criminal history
*
Thorne was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief. He has elected not to do so. The Government
declined to file a brief.
2
category. See United States v. Huggins, 191 F.3d 532, 539 (4th
Cir. 1999).
Thorne next questions whether the district court erred
in enhancing his base offense level by two levels because the
firearm was stolen. Thorne claims he was unaware that the
firearm was stolen. Even if true, however, this argument offers
Thorne no comfort as Application Note 8(B) to USSG §
2K2.1(b)(4), which provides the two-level enhancement for a
stolen firearm, contains no scienter requirement; it applies
even if the defendant did not know or have reason to know the
firearm was stolen. USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4); see, e.g., United
States v. Martin, 339 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the
district court did not err in enhancing Thorne’s base offense
level two levels.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Thorne’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Thorne, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Thorne requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Thorne.
3
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4