UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4902
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM HENRY REID, JR., a/k/a Hamza Jameel Saddiq,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (7:97-cr-00748-HMH-1)
Submitted: April 16, 2009 Decided: May 18, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Maxwell B. Cauthen, III,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Henry Reid, Jr., appeals from the district
court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a
twenty-four-month prison term. On appeal, Reid’s counsel has
filed an Anders * brief, stating that there are no meritorious
issues for appeal, but questioning the decision to revoke Reid’s
supervised release and the appropriateness of the sentence
imposed. Although informed of his right to do so, Reid has not
filed a pro se supplemental brief. After a thorough review of
the record, we affirm.
After considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, a district court may revoke a term of supervised
release upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated a condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (2006). Appellate courts review the decision to
revoke supervised release for an abuse of discretion and the
factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error.
See United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir.
2003).
Here, the district court did not clearly err in
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Reid used and
trafficked in illegal drugs. Although Reid denied that the
*
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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drugs found in his home belonged to him, he fled from police
officers, tested positive for drugs, and was found with digital
scales on his person. Thus, given the contrary evidence, it was
not clearly erroneous for the district court to reject Reid’s
testimony. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Reid violated a condition of his
supervised release.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. See United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first
assesses the sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing]
generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we
employ in our review of original sentences, . . . with some
necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature
of supervised release revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39. If
we conclude that a sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm
the sentence. Id. at 439. Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we “decide
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors that it is permitted to consider in a
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supervised release revocation case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e);
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Such a sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up
to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. A sentence
is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously
unreasonable. Id. at 439.
Because the district court failed to provide any
explanation for why it imposed a twenty-four-month sentence or
what sentencing factors it considered, the sentence is at least
arguably both substantively and procedurally unreasonable.
However, we easily conclude that Reid’s sentence was not
“plainly unreasonable” because the sentence was within the
recommended Guidelines range and (due to the maximum statutory
sentence) was well below the originally calculated Guidelines
range. Moreover, the district court essentially found that Reid
committed perjury at his revocation hearing, and the record does
not contain any basis on which to conclude that the imposed
sentence is clearly or obviously unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
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further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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