UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4995
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARLTON ANTONIO EDWARDS, Nini,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:03-cr-00316-REP-1)
Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June 5, 2012
Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Paul Gregorio, INNSBROOK LAW GROUP, P.C., Glen Allen,
Virginia, for Appellant. Jamie L. Mickelson, Assistant United
States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlton Antonio Edwards pled guilty to violating the
terms of his supervised release. The district court sentenced
him to a term of forty-six months’ imprisonment. Appellate
counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), in which he asserts there are no meritorious issues
for appeal but questions whether Edwards’ sentence is plainly
unreasonable. Edwards filed a pro se supplemental brief further
questioning his sentence. The Government declined to file a
brief. We affirm.
The district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus,
this court will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the governing statutory range
and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In reviewing a revocation
sentence, this court “follow[s] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations” used in reviewing original
sentences. Id. In this initial inquiry, this court takes a
more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than it does applying the reasonableness
review to post-conviction Guidelines sentences. United States
v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if this
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court finds the sentence unreasonable must the Court decide
whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered the policy statements
contained in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 440. The district court must adequately explain the sentence
chosen, though it need not explain in as much detail as when
imposing the original sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
Further, we may consider the district court’s statements
throughout the entire sentencing proceeding, and find the
court’s reasoning is “clear from the context.” Id. A sentence
is substantively reasonable if the district court states a
proper basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
We have carefully reviewed the sentencing transcript
in this case and conclude that the district court adequately
explained its reasons for the sentence it chose, including
Edwards’ history and characteristics, disrespect for the law,
refusal to be deterred from criminal conduct, and the need to
protect the public from Edwards’ further crimes. We further
detect no error in the district court’s decision to order
Edwards’ revocation sentence to be served consecutively to his
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other term of imprisonment. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.3(f) (2011).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s order revoking supervised
release and imposing sentence. This court requires that counsel
inform Edwards, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Edwards
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Edwards.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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