UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5212
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EUGENE EDMONDS, JR., a/k/a Boo,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (3:04-cr-00339-RLW-1)
Submitted: November 18, 2010 Decided: November 24, 2010
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Elizabeth S.
Wilson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant,
Research and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Olivia N.
Hawkins, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eugene Edmonds, Jr., appeals from the twenty-four
month sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of his
supervised release. On appeal, Edmonds asserts that his
sentence is procedurally plainly unreasonable because the
district court failed to adequately explain its reasoning for
the sentence imposed. We affirm.
A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release should be affirmed if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry
takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for guideline sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In making our review, we “follow
generally the procedural and substantive considerations that
[are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . .
with some necessary modifications to take into account the
unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.”
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
A sentence imposed upon revocation of release is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
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Chapter Seven policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors that it is permitted to consider. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. A sentence imposed upon
revocation of release is substantively reasonable if the
district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. We will affirm if
the sentence is not unreasonable. Id. at 439. Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we “decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.”
Id.
When imposing sentence, the district court must
provide individualized reasoning. See United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The Carter rationale applies
to revocation hearings; however, “a court need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it
must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Because
Edmonds did not request a sentence different from the one
imposed, review is for plain error. See United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir. 2010).
We conclude that Edmonds failed to make the requisite
showings. The district court acknowledged that Edmonds had
potential but lacked discipline, and that he had been given
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other opportunities to improve his life. The court explicitly
noted the Guidelines range (eight to fourteen months) and the
statutory maximum when arriving at a sentence. In addition, the
court recommended that Edmonds receive vocational training,
educational opportunities, and drug rehabilitation.
Because Edmonds’ sentence is reviewed for plain error,
he must also show that there is a reasonable probability that
the claimed irregularity in sentencing affected his substantial
rights and that any error affected the fairness and integrity of
the judicial system. Edmonds’ assertion of error illustrates
essentially a disagreement with the district court’s conclusions
that his behavior constituted continuing serious breaches of his
release conditions. Edmonds cannot show that his substantial
rights were affected or that the sentencing error was so
egregious that it called into question the fairness of the
sentencing system.
Accordingly, we affirm Edmonds’ sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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