UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4054
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LYNN T. EDMONDS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00317-JAG-2)
Submitted: June 19, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia,
Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia;
Michael A. Jagels, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lynn T. Edmonds, Jr. appeals his eighteen-month sentence
for violating a condition of his supervised release. Edmonds
argues that the district court impermissibly considered the
seriousness of the release violations when the court imposed his
sentence. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the district
court’s judgment.
Edmonds was convicted in 2008 of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, and received a sentence of 71 months’
imprisonment 1 for that offense. His sentence also included a
four-year term of supervised release. As a condition of that
supervised release, the district court ordered that Edmonds
participate in an approved substance abuse treatment program.
Seven months after his release from prison, Edmonds’
probation officer filed a “petition on supervised release” (the
petition). The petition alleged that Edmonds had violated
several conditions of his supervision, resulting from: (1) his
commission of the felony offense of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon; and (2) his commission of three misdemeanor
offenses, including the sale and distribution of marijuana,
1
Edmonds’ sentence of imprisonment was eventually reduced
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), and he served a total of 47
months in prison.
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driving with a suspended license, 2 and leaving the judicial
district without receiving the permission of his probation
officer. The probation officer later filed an addendum to the
petition alleging that Edmonds also had “fail[ed] to
satisfactorily participate in a substance abuse treatment
program.”
The district court considered the petition and addendum at
a hearing held in January 2013. The court found Edmonds guilty
of two charged violations of supervised release, which resulted
from his acts of driving without a license and of failing to
satisfactorily complete a substance abuse treatment program.
The court found Edmonds not guilty of the remaining alleged
violations. The court held that there was insufficient evidence
to support the firearm and drug-related allegations.
Additionally, the court concluded that “there would be no
reason” for Edmonds to have known that he had left the judicial
district when he merely had traveled to a nearby town, and,
therefore, the court found Edmonds not guilty of the alleged
supervised release violation of leaving the judicial district
without permission.
2
At the violation hearing, defense counsel clarified that
Edmonds had been convicted of driving without a license, rather
than driving with a suspended license, as alleged in the
petition.
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Before imposing the sentence, the district court stated
that the violation for Edmonds’ failure to complete the
substance abuse treatment program was “very serious,” and
observed that Edmonds’ original offense was drug-related. The
court sentenced Edmonds to an eighteen-month term of
imprisonment (the revocation sentence), an upward variance from
the six-to-twelve month advisory range established by the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.
Edmonds concedes that the applicable standard of review on
appeal is for plain error, based on his failure to object in the
district court to the matters he raises here. We agree, and
therefore we review for plain error the district court’s
reference to the seriousness of the release violation. See
United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, Edmonds must establish that the district court
erred, that the error was “plain,” and that the error affected
his substantial rights. Id. at 200 (citing United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)).
To determine whether the district court erred, we consider
whether the revocation sentence is “plainly unreasonable.”
Bennett, 698 F.3d at 200; United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
436-38 (4th Cir. 2006). We first evaluate whether the sentence
was unreasonable, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
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original sentences,” making certain modifications to “take into
account the unique nature of supervised release revocation
sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. In doing so, we adhere
to “a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact
and the exercise of discretion.” Id. at 439 (citation omitted).
If we conclude that a revocation sentence is unreasonable, we
then consider whether the sentence was plainly, or clearly,
unreasonable. Id.
When imposing a revocation sentence, a district court is
directed to consider certain enumerated statutory factors that
also are required for consideration of sentences imposed in the
first instance. These factors include “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant,” the need for deterrence and to protect the
public, the defendant’s need for various correctional
treatments, any guidelines or policy statements issued by the
United States Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities with other defendants, and
restitution for victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
We note, however, that “some of the sentencing factors
listed in § 3553(a) applicable to original sentences are not
applicable to revocation sentences,” including “whether the
revocation sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense,
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promotes respect for the law, and provides just punishment for
the offense.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)) (internal alterations and quotation marks
omitted). We thus have emphasized that punishment for new
criminal conduct is not the primary purpose of a revocation
sentence. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-38 (citation omitted).
Rather, we view “the defendant’s failure to follow the court-
imposed conditions of supervised release as a breach of trust.”
Id. at 437 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted);
see also U.S.S.G. App’x § 3(b) (“[A]t revocation the court
should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while
taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the
violator.”).
Edmonds’ only contention on appeal is that the district
court procedurally erred when it “considered an unauthorized
statutory factor” in imposing his sentence, namely, the
seriousness of the supervised release violation. Edmonds points
to various statements the district court made at the violation
hearing, including the court’s statement that it considered
Edmonds’ failure to attend substance abuse treatment to be “a
very serious violation,” which was “very troubling.”
We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in
articulating its reasons for imposing the eighteen-month
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sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and § 3553(a)(1), the court
was permitted to consider “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”
The transcript of the violation hearing indicates that the
district court found Edmonds’ failure to participate in
substance abuse treatment “troubling” and “serious,” because
that condition of supervised release gave Edmonds “a chance to
take care of the [drug] problem that got him [to court] in the
first place.” This reasoning relating to the circumstances of
Edmonds’ release violation and to his personal characteristics
was plainly within the permissible factors set forth in Section
3583(e).
Moreover, the district court found that Edmonds exhibited a
lack of respect for his probation officer and the conditions of
supervision when Edmonds falsely told his probation officer that
Edmonds’ substance abuse counselor had allowed him to stop
treatment. These findings were proper, because they related
directly to Edmonds’ breach of the court’s trust and reflected a
central purpose of revocation sentences. See Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 437.
Finally, the district court entered an order following the
violation hearing memorializing its findings. The order
provided in part:
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The Court considered the policy statements in Chapter
Seven of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and
the factors in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) & 3583(e). Based
on the defendant’s breach of trust and his
misstatements to the Court and the probation officer
about his substance abuse treatment, the Court
SENTENCES the defendant to 18 months of imprisonment
with no supervised release to follow.
These stated findings further support our conclusion that the
district court relied on proper factors in imposing Edmonds’
revocation sentence.
District courts have “substantial latitude in devising
revocation sentences for those defendants who violate [the
court’s] orders governing their conduct during supervised
release.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438. In light of the record and
the deference owed to the district court, we affirm Edmonds’
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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