UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4110
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CURTIS LAKOY EDMONDS, a/k/a Rude Boy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:08-cr-00368-F-1)
Submitted: February 11, 2014 Decided: February 21, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, P.C., Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Curtis Edmonds was convicted by a jury of conspiracy
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012),
and three counts of distribution of five grams or more of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012), and
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Edmonds was initially sentenced to life
imprisonment on the conspiracy count and concurrent 360-month
sentences on the distribution counts. We affirmed. See United
States v. Edmonds, 679 F.3d 169, 175-77 (4th Cir. 2012) (Edmonds
I). The Supreme Court subsequently vacated our opinion in
Edmonds I and remanded for consideration in light of Dorsey v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). See Edmonds v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 376 (2012). Our reissued opinion concluded
that Dorsey did not affect our holding except as to the
mandatory life sentence that Edmonds faced on the conspiracy
charge; we therefore vacated the sentence and remanded for
consideration of the Fair Sentencing Act. United States v.
Edmonds, 700 F.3d 146, 147-48 (4th Cir. 2012) (Edmonds II). The
district court resentenced Edmonds in accordance with our
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mandate, and Edmonds now appeals, challenging the substantive
reasonableness of his 360-month sentence. *
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). In so doing, we first examine the sentence for
significant procedural error. If there is none, we consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into
account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. If the
sentence is within or below the Guidelines range, we presume on
appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Yooho
Weon, 772 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2013).
After a thorough review of the appellate record, we
conclude that Edmonds’ sentence is entitled to the presumption
of reasonableness that attaches to a within-Guidelines sentence.
Edmonds’ sentence was driven by his career offender status, and,
in sentencing Edmonds, the district court placed particular
emphasis on his long criminal history, noting that leniency in
the state court had been rewarded with further law-breaking,
which the court concluded required a lengthier sentence to deter
Edmonds and protect the public from his conduct. Therefore,
*
We note that the mandate rule forecloses reconsideration
of the 360-month concurrent sentences imposed on the
distribution counts. See United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278,
283 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing mandate rule).
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because the district court adequately explained the reasons for
its within-Guidelines sentence in terms of the factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), we conclude that its sentence is
substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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