UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4874
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ADAM LEE KERN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:08-cr-00014-FPS-JES-1)
Submitted: June 11, 2009 Decided: July 2, 2009
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brendan S. Leary, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Wheeling,
West Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, United States
Attorney, David J. Perri, John C. Parr, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Adam Lee Kern entered a conditional plea of guilty to
possession of firearms by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), reserving the right to challenge the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Kern was
sentenced to sixty-three months’ imprisonment. Finding no
error, we affirm.
On appeal, Kern’s counsel contends that the district
court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We review the
factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress
for clear error and the court’s legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 (2009). The evidence is construed
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.
United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006).
At the motion hearing, Shaun R. Curran, a trooper with
the West Virginia State Police, testified that a multi-state
search had been conducted in an attempt to locate Kern. Curran
was aware of several confirmed warrants that had been issued for
Kern’s arrest, including a federal warrant involving Kern’s
flight to avoid prosecution. Kern was additionally under
investigation for alleged “sexual misconduct” with his two pre-
teen step-daughters.
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Several confidential sources informed law enforcement
officers that a man, woman, and two children fitting the
description of Kern’s family had been observed for several weeks
coming and going from a farm in Tyler County, West Virginia. ∗
Sources were unclear as to the owner of the property but
“believed it was an heirship.” Based on this information,
officers went to the farm on January 11, 2008, to execute the
outstanding arrest warrants. Kern was arrested and two
firearms, which had been within Kern’s reach, were seized.
Counsel argues, as he did in the district court, that
under Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), it was
improper for law enforcement officers to enter a third-party
residence to effectuate Kern’s arrest without a search warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances. Yet, despite counsel’s
assertions to the contrary, Steagald is not dispositive in this
appeal as it did not address the issue of “whether the subject
of an arrest warrant can object to the absence of a search
warrant when he is apprehended in another person’s home, but
rather whether the residents of that home can complain of the
search.” Steagald, 451 U.S. at 219.
∗
Kern’s mother, Anita Lynn Kern, testified that the farm
was owned by multiple family members and used as a family
vacation home. No one had permanently lived at the farm since
the late 1960’s. Family members were all permitted to use the
farm and a key was hidden on the property for this purpose.
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“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are two
distinct Fourth Amendment interests implicated by the entry of
law enforcement officers into a third-party’s residence for the
purpose of executing an arrest warrant. Steagald, 451 U.S. at
216. First, the individual named in the arrest warrant has an
“interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure.” Id.
Second, the third-party homeowner has an “interest in being free
from an unreasonable search of his home.” Id.
When a warrant has been issued authorizing the arrest
of a suspect, law enforcement officers have “the limited
authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when
there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton, 445
U.S. at 603. Once an arrest has been made, officers are
permitted to search “the arrestee’s person and the area within
[the arrestee’s] immediate control.” Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Whether Kern was a resident at the farm or an
overnight guest is inconsequential to the resolution of this
appeal because Kern was properly arrested pursuant to valid
warrants and the firearms seized were in an area within his
immediate control. If Kern was a resident, Payton permitted
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officers to enter the farm to effect his arrest. The same is
true if Kern was an overnight guest as the privacy interest
conveyed by this status, see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
98-99 (1990), placed him within the confines of Payton. Nor may
Kern complain that the entry onto the property to effect his
arrest violated a third-party homeowner’s right to be free from
an unreasonable search as “Fourth Amendment rights are personal
rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be
vicariously asserted.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34
(1978) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus,
we conclude the district court did not err in denying the motion
to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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