UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2345
MAUREEN L. EDWARDS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORPORATION, d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:08-cv-01250-WDQ)
Submitted: July 9, 2009 Decided: July 27, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joyce E. Smithey, RIFKIN, LIVINGSTON, LEVITAN & SILVER, LLC,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Deborah K. St. Lawrence,
BROWN & SHEEHAN, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maureen L. Edwards appeals the district court’s order
dismissing her complaint, which alleged violation of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and state
employment law, and denying her motion for reconsideration. We
have reviewed the parties’ briefs and joint appendix and find no
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm primarily for the
reasons stated by the district court. See Edwards v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., No. 1:08-cv-01250-WDQ (D. Md. Sept. 18 & Nov. 20,
2008).
We briefly address Edwards’ assertion that the
district claim failed to address her contention that her
exhaustion of remedies was not required regarding her claim of
wrongful discharge. Even assuming that an ERISA wrongful
discharge claim does not require exhaustion of administrative
remedies, Edwards’ complaint does not raise this claim.
Instead, in Edwards’ ERISA claim in her complaint, she averred
only that GSK interfered with her right to retirement and other
severance benefits. Wrongful discharge was raised only as a
violation of state law. Moreover, we find the claim of wrongful
termination that Edwards now attempts to assert would have been
insufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (holding that to
survive a motion to dismiss, “[f]actual allegations must be
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enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
and the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face”).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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