UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5115
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALTARIK ALSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:07-cr-00266-D-1)
Submitted: August 27, 2009 Decided: October 2, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, P.L.L.C.,
Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding,
United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Altarik Alston pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2006). Alston was found to be an armed career
criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (2006), and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 4B1.4 (2007), and was sentenced to 186 months in prison.
Alston appeals, arguing that the district court erred in finding
that he possessed three violent felonies qualifying as predicate
offenses. Finding no error, we affirm.
Because Alston failed to raise this objection during
sentencing, this court’s review is for plain error. United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993); United States v.
White, 405 F.3d 208, 215 (4th Cir. 2005). Alston must establish
that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the
error affected his substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
A defendant is an armed career criminal when he
violates § 922(g)(1) and has three prior convictions for violent
felonies or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); USSG
§ 4B1.4(a). A violent felony is one that “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another,” “is burglary, . . . or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
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To determine whether an offense under state law falls
within the definition of a violent felony, this court uses a
categorical approach, which “takes into account only the
definition of the offense and the fact of conviction.” United
States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2002). The
particular label or categorization under state law is not
controlling. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590-91
(1990). For purposes of the ACCA, “a person has been convicted
of burglary . . . if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of
its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of
unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building
or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 599.
While a court normally may look only to the fact of the
conviction and the statutory definition, because some states
broadly define burglary to include places other than buildings,
the categorical approach “may permit the sentencing court to go
beyond the mere fact of conviction.” Id. at 602; Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16-17 (2005). An offense will
constitute burglary if the jury was required “to find all the
elements of generic burglary in order to convict the defendant,”
and “the indictment or information and jury instructions show
that the defendant was charged only with a burglary of a
building,” so “the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a
building to convict.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
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Under North Carolina law, “[a]ny person who breaks or
enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny
therein shall be punished as a Class H felon.” N.C. Gen Stat.
§ 14-54 (2007). For purposes of the statute, a building means
“any dwelling, dwelling house, uninhabited house, building under
construction, building within the curtilage of a dwelling house,
and any other structure designed to house or secure within it
any activity or property.” Id. We have consistently held that
a conviction under § 14-54 for breaking and entering qualifies
as generic burglary, and thus qualifies as a predicate violent
felony under the ACCA. See United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d
278, 284 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bowden, 975 F.2d
1080, 1085 (4th Cir. 1992). Despite Alston’s argument that
Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), and its progeny
require a different analysis to determine whether a prior crime
qualifies as a violent felony, the Supreme Court made clear in
Begay that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) still “covers a felony that is one
of the example crimes” specifically enumerated in the statute.
Id. at 1586. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not
err in applying this enhancement.
Accordingly, we affirm Alston’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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