UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4435
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TOBARUS O’NEAL ALSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00149-NCT-1)
Submitted: January 26, 2012 Decided: February 10, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tobarus O’Neal Alston pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). The
conditional plea preserved Alston’s right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his pro se motion to suppress. Alston was
sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. Alston’s attorney has
filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal, but alleging that the district court erred in denying
Alston’s motion to suppress. Alston has filed a pro se
supplemental brief, also challenging the denial of his motion to
suppress, as well as his sentence pursuant to the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The Government declined to file a
response. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, and its legal determinations de novo. United
States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009). The facts
are viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below. United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 628 (4th Cir.
2007).
Alston argued below, as he does on appeal, that the
police officer had no legal justification to initiate a traffic
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stop of his vehicle. An automobile stop is a “seizure” falling
under the Fourth Amendment’s protection. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). “Observing a traffic
violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer
to detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes to
perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.”
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008).
The district court denied the motion to suppress by
text order on two grounds: (1) Alston was represented by counsel
who did not adopt the motion; and (2) the motion was without
merit. As noted by the district court, Alston conceded that the
officer notified him that he stopped the vehicle because Alston
was driving without a valid license. Accordingly, we conclude
the district court did not err in denying Alston’s motion to
suppress.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and considered the claims Alston raises in his pro
se supplemental brief, and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Alston, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Alston requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Alston. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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