UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4953
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LARANZO PATE,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:06-cr-00478-NCT-2)
Submitted: September 28, 2009 Decided: October 16, 2009
Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Randall
S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Laranzo Pate pled guilty to one count of possession of
a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1) (2006). He was sentenced as an
armed career criminal, based on four prior state convictions for
breaking and entering, to 200 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
Pate argues that the district court erred in sentencing him as
an armed career criminal and in enhancing his sentence based on
a finding that he possessed the firearm in connection with a
controlled substance offense. We affirm.
Pate first argues that the district court erred in
considering his four prior state convictions for breaking and
entering as predicate convictions for purposes of the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Specifically, he claims that,
because he was arrested for all four offenses on the same day,
they were consolidated for judgment, and sentence for the four
offenses was imposed on the same day, these prior offenses
should have been treated as a single event for purposes of the
ACCA.
Review of the district court’s interpretation of a
statute is de novo. United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332,
334 (4th Cir. 1995). “In the case of a person who violates [§]
922(g) . . . and has three previous convictions . . . for a
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
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occasions different from one another, such person shall be . . .
imprisoned not less than fifteen years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
“Convictions occur on occasions different from one another if
each of the prior convictions arose out of a separate and
distinct criminal episode.” Letterlough, 63 F.3d at 335
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A key
consideration is whether the time interval between the crimes
underlying the convictions allowed the accused sufficient time
to “make a conscious and knowing decision to engage in another”
crime. Id. at 337.
Here, Pate’s convictions were committed on occasions
different from one another as the four offenses occurred on
three separate days at four different residences and were not so
close in time that Pate did not have time to reconsider his
criminal actions. See United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278,
285 (4th Cir. 2005). Pate’s argument that the enhancement was
improperly applied because he was arrested and sentenced on the
same day for all four offenses is simply without merit. See
United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir. 1992)
(“Nothing in § 924(e) or the Guidelines suggests that offenses
must be tried or sentenced separately in order to be counted as
separate predicate offenses.”).
Pate next argues that the district court erred in
increasing his offense level for possessing a firearm in
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connection with his drug activity. ∗ This court reviews a
district court’s factual findings at sentencing for clear error
and its legal determinations de novo. United States v.
Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989).
In order for a one-level USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A)
enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with”
another felony to apply, the Government must prove that the gun
was possessed and that the gun was connected to another offense.
See United States v. Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1996)
(applying USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement where the defendant
possessed a firearm “in connection with” another felony
offense). Here, the .22 caliber rifle was found a few feet from
Pate, a set of hand scales, and Pate’s drugs, which were
packaged for sale. Pate admitted the firearm and drugs were
his, and as the district court noted, Pate sold crack cocaine
from the residence where the firearm was found just five days
prior to the execution of the search warrant. Accordingly, the
∗
Pate actually challenges his four-level USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)
enhancement. However, as the Government points out, the
§ 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement had no impact on Pate’s advisory
guidelines due to the district court’s finding that Pate was an
armed career criminal. Therefore, we consider only whether the
one-level increase Pate received for possessing a firearm “in
connection with” his drug offense, pursuant to USSG
§ 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), was erroneous.
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district court did not clearly err in applying the one-level
USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) enhancement.
Therefore, we affirm Pate’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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