UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4865
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CLEVELAND LAQUINCY GRIFFIN, a/k/a Q,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:07-cr-00926-JFA-1)
Submitted: September 3, 2009 Decided: October 15, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Aileen P.
Clare, Research and Writing Specialist, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William Walter Wilkins, III, United States Attorney, John David
Rowell, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cleveland Laquincy Griffin pleaded guilty to
possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) (2006 & West Supp.
2009). Griffin was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment and
now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising two issues
but stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.
Griffin filed a pro se supplemental brief raising an additional
issue. * We affirm.
In the Anders brief, counsel first questions whether
the district court erred in accepting Griffin’s guilty plea.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through
colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and
determine that he understands, the nature of the charges to
which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The
court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for
the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th
Cir. 1991). The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure
*
We have considered the claim raised in Griffin’s pro se
brief and conclude the claim lacks merit.
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that the plea of guilt is entered into knowingly and
voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002).
Because Griffin did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Griffin]
must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and
that the error affected his substantial rights.” United
States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if
Griffin satisfies these requirements, “correction of the error
remains within our discretion, which we should not exercise
. . . unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
Our review of the transcript reveals full compliance with the
requirements of Rule 11, and we conclude that Griffin pleaded
guilty knowingly and voluntarily.
Counsel next questions whether the district court
erred in sentencing Griffin as a career offender. The district
court considered a prior conviction for failure to stop for a
blue light as a predicate offense for purposes of the career
offender designation under the advisory guidelines. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2008). We conclude that
this was error. See United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226
(4th Cir. 2009) (holding that failure to stop for a blue light
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under South Carolina law is not per se violent felony under the
Armed Career Criminal Act). However, Griffin had two other
prior offenses that qualified as predicates for career offender
purposes and, therefore, the district court properly designated
Griffin a career offender. Accordingly, this error did not
affect Griffin’s substantial rights. See Muhammad, 478 F.3d at
249 (providing standard for plain error review).
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Griffin, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Griffin requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Griffin. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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