PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JOEL FRANCIS; ANTHONY ROMANO;
KEVIN CLARK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
RODNEY GIACOMELLI; DAVID ENGEL; No. 08-1908
STEPHEN MCMAHON; CARL
GUTBERLET; RALPH TYLER; MARTIN
O’MALLEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(1:07-cv-03034-WDQ)
Argued: September 23, 2009
Decided: December 2, 2009
Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and
Mark S. DAVIS, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Davis joined.
2 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
COUNSEL
Neal Marcellas Janey, Sr., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appel-
lants. Kathryn Widmayer Sullivan, BALTIMORE CITY
DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland; Matthew
Wade Nayden, BALTIMORE CITY SOLICITOR’S OFFICE,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
OPINION
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we evaluate the legal sufficiency of a com-
plaint, applying the standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937 (2009) — i.e., whether the complaint on its face
states plausible claims upon which relief can be granted.
Following highly public exchanges between Baltimore City
Mayor Martin O’Malley and Baltimore City Police Commis-
sioner Kevin Clark about Clark’s performance as Commis-
sioner, Mayor O’Malley terminated Commissioner Clark’s
employment, as well as the employment of two of his top dep-
uties, Joel Francis and Anthony Romano. Mayor O’Malley
explained in a press conference that the eroding perception of
Commissioner Clark’s leadership had made it "impossible"
for Clark to remain Commissioner. Implementing the termina-
tion, the Mayor and Baltimore City Solicitor Ralph Tyler dis-
patched members of the Baltimore Police Department to the
Commissioner’s offices to retrieve from the Commissioner
and his deputies their badges, police identifications, firearms,
computers, and other official property, and to escort them
from the building.
Commissioner Clark promptly filed suit against Mayor
O’Malley and the City Council of Baltimore in state court,
FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 3
seeking reinstatement and damages, based on an alleged vio-
lation of § 16-5(e) of the Code of Public Local Laws of Balti-
more City (governing the removal of Police Commissioners)
and breach of contract. The Maryland Court of Appeals ulti-
mately concluded that, despite Commissioner Clark’s contract
with the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, which autho-
rized the Mayor to discharge the Commissioner without
cause, Clark had not been discharged in accordance with Bal-
timore City Public Local Law, which required cause. See
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Clark, 944 A.2d 1122
(Md. 2008).
In addition to his state suit, Commissioner Clark and his
deputies commenced this action, alleging that the Mayor, the
City Solicitor, and several members of the Baltimore City
Police Department violated their constitutional rights by seiz-
ing property from the Commissioner and his deputies and by
seizing them and removing them from Police Department
offices. Commissioner Clark and his deputies alleged that the
defendants’ conduct amounted to unreasonable searches and
seizures and to a deprivation of due process because they
were not given notice and an opportunity to be heard before
being removed from their positions. Finally, Commissioner
Clark and Francis, who are African-American, alleged that
their firings were racially motivated, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.
By order dated July 16, 2008, the district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), ruling that the complaint did not state
plausible claims for relief and that, with respect to Commis-
sioner Clark’s allegations that Mayor O’Malley denied Clark
due process, the Mayor was entitled to qualified immunity.
Reviewing the district court’s ruling de novo, we conclude
that based on the facts alleged in the complaint—taken in con-
text and as true—the complaint fails to articulate any claim
for relief "that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
4 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). We also conclude
that Mayor O’Malley, against whom the allegations of due-
process violations were directed, is entitled to qualified
immunity. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
The facts in this case are stated in two pages of the com-
plaint, but additional background facts and context are pro-
vided by further allegations sprinkled throughout the
complaint, as well as by allegations of the same events made
in the state court complaint. While we evaluate only the alle-
gations of the complaint in this federal case when considering
the district court’s ruling dismissing it, we nonetheless under-
stand them in the context of the facts alleged in the state court
complaint and restated by the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Clark, 944 A.2d 1122, which the plaintiffs concede is the
proper context in which to consider plaintiffs’ allegations in
this case. When questioned by the court during oral argument,
plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that the events described in the
complaint were the same events underlying the state court liti-
gation.
As background, Commissioner Clark alleged in state court
that he was "induced" to leave his high-ranking and presti-
gious position as a Commander in the New York City Police
Department to become the Baltimore City Police Commis-
sioner. Clark entered into a contract with Baltimore City, enti-
tled "Police Commissioner Memorandum of Understanding,"
which provided that he would hold his appointment for a term
expiring June 30, 2008. He was thereafter confirmed as Police
Commissioner by the Baltimore City Council. The Memoran-
dum of Understanding between Commissioner Clark and Bal-
timore City provided:
Either party may terminate this contract at any time,
by giving forty-five (45) days prior written notice to
the other. Notwithstanding the above sentence the
FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 5
provisions of Section 2B [relating to additional com-
pensation/severance pay] remain in force.
After Commissioner Clark took office, he and Mayor
O’Malley exchanged letters and accusations relating to a
domestic relations problem involving Commissioner Clark
and Clark’s internal investigation into Baltimore City Police
Department activities, and the exchanges became public.
Mayor O’Malley thereupon terminated Commissioner Clark’s
employment, and City Solicitor Tyler provided Clark with a
letter of termination, dated November 10, 2004, which stated:
This notice is sent on behalf of the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore (the "City") pursuant to Sec-
tions 12 and 13 of the Memorandum of Understand-
ing ("MOU") between you and the City dated
February 19, 2003. This notice shall serve as the
City’s 45-day notice of termination of your employ-
ment. Thus, your employment shall terminate 45
days from today. However, as the Mayor announced
this morning, you have been relieved of all official
duties as of 8:30 a.m., November 10, 2004, and
therefore, your further access, if any, to Police
Department facilities, equipment, or documents will
be subject to the specific, prior authorization of Act-
ing or Interim Police Commissioner Hamm.
The complaint in this case focuses on the facts relating to
how Mayor O’Malley effected Commissioner Clark’s dis-
charge. It alleges that members of the Baltimore City Police
Department, "with the assistance of over 50 additional and
heavily armed members of the [Baltimore City Police Depart-
ment] including all S.W.A.T. Team members, broke into and
entered, and directed other members of the [Baltimore City
Police Department] to break into and enter, the executive
offices of Clark, Francis and Romano on the premises of the
[Baltimore City Police Department]. They ransacked desks,
credenzas and file cabinets. They seized and removed files,
6 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
papers, documents, computers and other personal property in
the lawful possession and custody of Plaintiffs." The com-
plaint also alleges that members of the Baltimore City Police
Department seized the plaintiffs themselves, ordering them
"to remove or surrender their weapons, badges, identification
cards and other items of personal property lawfully in the pos-
session of Plaintiffs during the periods of detention." Finally,
the complaint alleges that these acts "were committed either
on the instructions of defendants O’Malley and Tyler, or with
the knowledge and consent of defendants O’Malley and
Tyler, or were thereafter approved and ratified by defendants
O’Malley and Tyler."
Resting on these factual allegations, the complaint purports
to state four claims in four counts. Count I alleges that the
plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were vio-
lated insofar as the searches of the plaintiffs’ offices and the
seizures of the plaintiffs and their personal property were not
justified by any criminal charges or any warrant and were,
therefore, unreasonable. In Count II, Clark and Francis, who
are African-American, claim conclusorily that they were
removed from their offices and terminated from their posi-
tions because of their race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Romano, who is white, is not a party to this count. In Count
III, the plaintiffs complain that they were denied due process
insofar as their employment was terminated without prior
notice and a prior hearing. (Only Commissioner Clark appeals
the dismissal of this claim.) Finally, in Count IV, the plaintiffs
allege conclusorily that the defendants conspired to violate
their civil rights based on the acts otherwise alleged, in viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dis-
miss, and this appeal followed.
FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 7
II
Commissioner Clark and his deputies contend on appeal
that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
arguing that such a motion must be denied unless "‘it is clear
that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that
could be proved consistent with the [well-pleaded] allega-
tions’ in the Complaint," quoting from Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).1 They assert further
that it was error to dismiss a complaint alleging civil rights
violations unless it appears "to a certainty that the plaintiff[s]
would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which
might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged," quoting
from Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The defendants contend that "[b]ecause the Complaint in
this case is short on facts and long on legal conclusions, the
district court correctly granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6)," citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal
sufficiency of a complaint, Jordan v. Alternative Resources
Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2006), considered with the
assumption that the facts alleged are true, Eastern Shore Mkts,
Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir.
2000). And the legal sufficiency of a complaint is measured
by whether it meets the standards for a pleading stated in Rule
8 (providing general rules of pleading), Rule 9 (providing
rules for pleading special matters), Rule 10 (specifying plead-
ing form), Rule 11 (requiring the signing of a pleading and
stating its significance), and Rule 12(b)(6) (requiring that a
1
The standard that the plaintiffs quoted from Swierkiewicz, however,
was explicitly overruled in Twombly. 550 U.S. at 562-63 (noting that this
standard, first articulated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),
"has earned its retirement").
8 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
This appeal reduces to the single question of whether the
complaint in this case meets these standards.
Even though the requirements for pleading a proper com-
plaint are substantially aimed at assuring that the defendant be
given adequate notice of the nature of a claim being made
against him, they also provide criteria for defining issues for
trial and for early disposition of inappropriate complaints. See
5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, § 1202, at 88 (3d ed. 2004). Overlooking the
broad range of criteria stated in the Federal Rules for a proper
complaint, some have suggested that the Federal Rules, when
adopted in 1938, simply created a "notice pleading" scheme,
pointing for support to Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief," and Rule 8(d)(1), which provides
that "[n]o technical form [for stating allegations] is required."
But the "notice pleading" characterization may itself be too
simplistic, failing to recognize the many other provisions
imposing requirements that permit courts to evaluate a com-
plaint for sufficiency early in the process. Rule 8 itself
requires a showing of entitlement to relief. Rule 9 requires that
allegations of fraud, mistake, time, place, and special damages
be specific. Rule 11 requires that the pleading be signed and
provides that the signature "certifies" (1) that the claims in the
complaint are not asserted for collateral purposes; (2) that the
claims asserted are "warranted"; and (3) that the factual con-
tentions "have evidentiary support." And Rule 12(b)(6) autho-
rizes a court to dismiss any complaint that does not state a
claim "upon which relief can be granted." The aggregation of
these specific requirements reveals the countervailing policy
that plaintiffs may proceed into the litigation process only
when their complaints are justified by both law and fact.
In recent years, with the recognized problems created by
"strike suits," see 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 9
Procedure, § 1296, at 46 & n.9,2 and the high costs of frivo-
lous litigation, the Supreme Court has brought to the forefront
the Federal Rules’ requirements that permit courts to evaluate
complaints early in the process. Thus, in Iqbal, the Court
stated that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’" 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id. It requires the plaintiff to articulate facts,
when accepted as true, that "show" that the plaintiff has stated
a claim entitling him to relief, i.e., the "plausibility of ‘entitle-
ment to relief.’" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To emphasize the Federal Rules’ requirements for stating
claims that are warranted and therefore form a plausible basis
for relief, the Supreme Court has held that a complaint must
contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To discount such unadorned con-
clusory allegations, "a court considering a motion to dismiss
can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. This approach
recognizes that "naked assertions" of wrongdoing necessitate
some "factual enhancement" within the complaint to cross
"the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2
A "strike suit" is an action making largely groundless claims to justify
conducting extensive and costly discovery with the hope of forcing the
defendant to settle at a premium to avoid the costs of the discovery. See
id.; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1572 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a strike
suit as one "based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or
as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement").
10 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
At bottom, determining whether a complaint states on its
face a plausible claim for relief and therefore can survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion will "be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not
‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,’" as
required by Rule 8. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
The Court noted that even though Rule 8 "marks a notable
and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-
pleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors
of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than con-
clusions." Id.
With these principles in hand, we now turn to the complaint
in this case to determine whether, on its face, it states a plausi-
ble claim for relief.
III
Count I of the complaint, where the plaintiffs most fully
articulate a claim, alleges that members of the Baltimore City
Police Department, under the direction of Mayor O’Malley
and City Solicitor Tyler, "broke into and entered" the Police
Commissioner’s offices, seized personal property, and "de-
tained, held in custody and seized" the Police Commissioner
and his deputies while ordering them to "surrender their
weapons, badges, identification cards" and similar property —
all without the benefit of criminal charges or a warrant. The
complaint concludes that this conduct violated the plaintiffs’
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against unreason-
able searches and seizures.
Considered in their context, these allegations describe the
conduct of Mayor O’Malley taken in furtherance of his deci-
sion to terminate the plaintiffs’ employment, directing mem-
FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 11
bers of the Baltimore City Police Department to seize police
department property and escort the plaintiffs from the police
building. The plaintiffs’ complaint filed in state court some-
what fleshes this out, asserting that members of the Baltimore
City Police Department ordered the plaintiffs to surrender
their firearms and to clean out their desks of personal belong-
ings and escorted them out of the building in relieving them
of their commands. And after they were physically removed,
the Mayor announced to the public:
For the good of this department and for crime reduc-
tion, I have relieved Commissioner Clark of his
command effective as of 8:30 this morning. . . .
Leadership involves the important element of per-
ception and when that perception of leadership is
eroded it makes it impossible for that leader to con-
tinue on.
The Mayor also announced that he had appointed Leonard
Hamm as "Acting Police Commissioner."
Taking the facts in the complaint as true, we agree with the
district court that Count I nonetheless fails to set forth a plau-
sible claim for relief. While the Commissioner and his depu-
ties conclusorily alleged that the searches and seizures
violated their constitutional rights because no charges had
been filed against them, nor had any warrant issued, their
complaint did not allege that the defendants were engaged in
a law-enforcement effort. Indeed, the facts show to the con-
trary, that the defendants’ actions against the plaintiffs were
employment actions based on the Mayor’s perceived right to
fire the Police Commissioner without cause, as stated in the
Memorandum of Understanding between Commissioner
Clark and Baltimore City.
In O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723-26 (1987), the
Supreme Court held that special needs authorize warrantless
searches involving public employees for work-related rea-
12 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
sons. Noting that public employees’ expectations of privacy
are diminished for legitimate work-related reasons, the Court
approved a balancing test under which government interests
are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id. at 717, 719-20. This reasonableness test impli-
cates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement,
which are related to law enforcement.
The plaintiffs’ complaint relies on the allegations that no
criminal charges had been filed and no warrant had issued in
order to state a violation of the Fourth Amendment. But this
assertion is both conclusory and erroneous, especially when
the complaint itself does not allege that the searches and sei-
zures were law-enforcement related. On the contrary, the
complaint suggests throughout that the searches and seizures
were taken in furtherance of Mayor O’Malley’s employment
action of firing Commissioner Clark.
Whether he was authorized to do so, the Mayor purported
to terminate the employment of the Police Commissioner and
his deputies, and in furtherance of that decision retrieved gov-
ernment property and escorted the plaintiffs from their
offices. The plaintiffs allege nowhere that these actions were
inconsistent with the Mayor’s efforts to terminate the plain-
tiffs’ employment. Indeed, it is common practice for an
employer to take the employer’s property away from dis-
charged employees and to deny them access to the place of
employment. While it is readily recognizable that Baltimore
City has an interest in protecting Baltimore City Police
Department property and in removing discharged employees
from the Department’s offices, the complaint fails to allege
any countervailing privacy interests that would outweigh the
City’s interests. Rather, the complaint relies simply on the
absence of any charges or any warrant, which is irrelevant in
the factual context of the complaint.
Commissioner Clark maintains that the Mayor did not have
authority to terminate the Police Commissioner’s employ-
FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 13
ment, an allegation with which the Maryland Court of
Appeals agreed in part, see Clark, 944 A.2d at 1131-35, but
that fact does not change the Fourth Amendment analysis.
The fact that the Court of Appeals determined that Clark’s fir-
ing was inconsistent with the Public Local Law of Baltimore
City does not alone support the claim that the searches and
seizures conducted in connection with the Mayor’s effort to
terminate Clark’s employment violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001)
(affirming the dismissal of a complaint alleging an illegal
Fourth Amendment seizure during questioning concerning
federal employment misconduct).
In short, we conclude that Count I does not on its face state
a plausible claim for relief.
IV
Count II of the complaint alleges that the defendants dis-
criminated against Commissioner Clark and Deputy Francis
because of their race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). But
the only factual allegations asserted in support of this count
are (1) that Commissioner Clark and Deputy Francis are
African-American males; (2) that the defendants are all white
males; and (3) that the defendants have never initiated or
undertaken the actions of terminating employment and physi-
cally removing the employee against white members of the
Police Department.
These allegations are not only conclusory and insufficient
to state a § 1981 claim, see Jordan, 458 F.3d at 345, they are
patently untrue, given that Deputy Romano, who is not
alleged to be within a protected class, complained of the exact
same treatment in every other count of the complaint, belying
any claim of discriminatory treatment.3 See Johnson v.
3
While the complaint alleges that the defendants "discriminated against
Plaintiffs on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,"
14 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
Caudill, 475 F.3d 645, 651 (4th Cir. 2007); Booth v.
Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2003). The allegations
in this count are nothing more than the sort of unadorned alle-
gations of wrongdoing to which Twombly and Iqbal are
directed. We thus conclude that Count II does not on its face
state a plausible claim for relief.
V
In Count III, the plaintiffs allege that Mayor O’Malley and
City Solicitor Tyler "deprived Plaintiffs of their protected
property interest without due process as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment" because they were not given prior
notice and a prior hearing to challenge their dismissals.
The district court dismissed the claim on the ground that
Mayor O’Malley enjoyed qualified immunity insofar as it was
not well-established on November 10, 2004, that the plaintiffs
had any property interest in their employment. The court also
concluded that, with respect to City Solicitor Tyler, the only
allegation that could be made was that Tyler had "provided
legal advice to Mayor O’Malley on Clark’s termination" and
therefore he could not be responsible for the authority exer-
cised by Mayor O’Malley. Only Clark appeals this portion of
the district court’s ruling.
We agree with the district court. Mayor O’Malley fired
Commissioner Clark in accordance with the Memorandum of
Understanding, which provided that the Mayor could dis-
charge Clark without cause, thus indicating to the Mayor that
it only asserts that Clark and Francis "are African-American males," mak-
ing no similar assertion about Romano. In Count II, where Clark and Fran-
cis allege a more particularized § 1981 claim based on racial
discrimination, only Clark and Francis are plaintiffs. The complaint thus
fails to allege that Romano is a member of a protected class. The defen-
dants assert further in their brief, as they asserted in their motion to dis-
miss filed in the district court, that Romano is white, an assertion accepted
by the district court and not disputed by the plaintiffs.
FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 15
Clark had no assurances of continued employment so as to
give him a property interest in his employment. Although it
is true that the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided, over
three years later, that the Memorandum of Understanding was
subservient to the requirements of the Public Local Law of
Baltimore City, at the time that Mayor O’Malley fired Com-
missioner Clark, no law or decision had determined that the
contract between Clark and the City of Baltimore was not
enforceable.
Qualified immunity applies when the constitutional right
alleged to have been violated is not "clearly established."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). For a
right to be clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Preexisting law must
demonstrate the unlawfulness of the act to the government
official. Id. The denial of qualified immunity does not depend
on the "very action in question" having been found unlawful,
but it does require that "in the light of preexisting law the
unlawfulness must be apparent." Id. Moreover, we have held
that for purposes of qualified immunity, executive actors can-
not be required to predict how the courts will resolve legal
issues. See Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 578-79 (4th
Cir. 2003).
In this case, it could not have been apparent to Mayor
O’Malley that his firing of Commissioner Clark was not
authorized by law until the Maryland Court of Appeals
handed down its decision in Clark in March 2008, over three
years after he fired Commissioner Clark. Because his actions
were not clearly unlawful when performed, Mayor O’Malley
is entitled to qualified immunity.
VI
In Count IV, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants con-
spired to violate the plaintiffs’ civil rights, in violation of 42
16 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
U.S.C. § 1985. The count makes no other allegations and con-
tains no facts to support the conspiracy alleged.
To plead a violation of § 1985, the plaintiffs must demon-
strate with specific facts that the defendants were "motivated
by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
to [ ] deprive the plaintiff[s] of the equal enjoyment of rights
secured by the law to all." Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370,
1376 (4th Cir. 1995). Since the allegation in Count IV
amounts to no more than a legal conclusion, on its face it fails
to assert a plausible claim. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Goo-
den v. Howard County, Md., 954 F.2d 960, 969-70 (4th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (requiring plaintiffs alleging unlawful intent
in conspiracy claims under § 1985 to "plead specific facts in
a non-conclusory fashion to survive a motion to dismiss").
VII
Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the district court abused
its discretion in denying them an opportunity to amend their
complaint.
In their papers opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
the plaintiffs included the following concluding statement: "In
the event that this Honorable Court decides to grant all or part
of the Motion, Plaintiffs respectfully request leave to amend
or to file an amended complaint." The plaintiffs filed no sepa-
rate motion, and they attached no proposed amendment or
statement indicating how they might wish to amend their
complaint. Thus, their statement did not inform the court as
to what amendment was being sought.
Local Rule 103.6 of the District of Maryland requires that
a party requesting leave to amend provide a copy of the pro-
posed amendment to the court. By violating this Rule, the
plaintiffs failed to provide the district court with a means by
which to determine whether the amendment would cure the
defects in the initial complaint. In the circumstances, we con-
clude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fail-
FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 17
ing to give the plaintiffs a blank authorization to "do over"
their complaint.
Taking the facts alleged in the complaint in context and as
true, we conclude that the complaint does not state any claim
for relief that is plausible on its face. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED