supporting a conclusion." Id. at 465-66, 186 P.3d at 882 (footnotes
omitted).
Pursuant to NRS 616C.475(5), an employer may cease paying
TTD benefits once the employer offers the injured employee light-duty
employment that satisfies the work restrictions imposed by the employee's
treating physician. Thus, by implication, if an employer revokes a light-
duty employment offer once the employee has accepted it, the employer
again becomes obligated to pay TTD benefits.
Here, it is undisputed that respondent offered appellant light-
duty employment, that appellant accepted this employment for two days,
and that appellant did not report for work on the third day. On appeal,
appellant contends that the appeals officer improperly denied her TTD
benefits because appellant reasonably believed that respondent had
revoked its offer of light-duty employment following the second day. Cf. 1
Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 5:8 (4th ed. 2007) ("[I]f the
offeror uses equivocal or inexplicit language, it may not be sufficient to
operate as a revocation. Whether it has that effect will ordinarily be a
question of fact, depending upon what a reasonable person in the position
of the offeree would have thought.").
For support, appellant relies on her supervisor's testimony
before the appeals officer in which he testified that he instructed appellant
to "go home and take care of herself' and that respondent would "try and
put her on light duty" at a later time. Appellant contends that this
testimony constituted evidence that she was reasonable in believing that
her supervisor, on behalf of respondent, had revoked the light-duty
employment offer.
We disagree. As an initial matter, the supervisor's statement
to appellant was equivocal in terms of whether he was rescinding the
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capable of working again. Moreover, testimony from respondent's
supervisor and office manager demonstrated that the office manager was
the person tasked with handling appellant's workers' compensation claim
and that the office manager would have been the person to revoke the
light-duty employment offer." Thus, the appeals officer did not clearly err
in determining that appellant was unreasonable in believing that her
light-duty employment offer had been revoked.
Because substantial evidence supports the appeals officer's
conclusion that respondent kept open an offer of light-duty employment,
the officer did not abuse her discretion in denying TTD benefits to
appellant. Dickinson, 124 Nev. at 465-66, 186 P.3d at 882; NRS
233B.135(3). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of
appellant's petition for judicial review.
It is so ORDERED.
Gibbons
J.
Saitta
'Appellant also testified that the office manager told her that there
was no light-duty work available for appellant to perform. According to
appellant, this statement also constituted a revocation of her light-duty
employment offer. The office manager, however, testified that there was
plenty of light-duty work available and that she never told appellant
otherwise. The appeals officer found that the office manager's testimony
was more credible, and we cannot reweigh this credibility determination.
Dickinson, 124 Nev. at 466, 186 P.3d at 882.
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4.41
cc: Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge
William F. Buchanan, Settlement Judge
Greenman Goldberg Raby & Martinez
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
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