129 Nev., Advance Opinion 27
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
THE STATE OF NEVADA, No. 60298
Appellant,
vs. FILED
JERMAINE XAVIER FREDERICK,
Respondent. APR 2 5 2013
Appeal from a district court order granting respondent's post-
conviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge.
Reversed.
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B.
Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District
Attorney, and Elizabeth A. Mercer, Deputy District Attorney, Clark
County,
for Appellant.
Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and William M. Waters, Deputy Public
Defender, Clark County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
In this appeal, we consider whether Eighth Judicial District
Court Rule (EDCR) 1.48, which allows justices of the peace to serve as
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district court hearing masters, violates the Nevada Constitution. We
conclude that it does not.
Article 6, Section 8 of the Nevada Constitution grants the
Legislature sole authority in determining the jurisdiction of justice courts.
Through NRS 3.245, the Legislature has delegated to district courts the
authority to designate district court hearing masters and to this court the
authority to approve the duties that may be assigned to those hearing
masters. Under this delegated authority, EDCR 1.48 allows justices of the
peace to act in a separate capacity as district court hearing masters, which
includes the taking of felony pleas. Thus, when a justice of the peace who
has been appointed as a hearing master performs the duties set forth in
EDCR 1.48(k), she is acting pursuant to her authority under EDCR 1.48,
not as part of her jurisdiction as a justice of the peace.
BACKGROUND
The Nevada Constitution authorizes the Legislature to set
forth the jurisdiction of the state's justice courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6.
The Legislature has granted justice courts jurisdiction over
misdemeanors. NRS 4.370(3). This leaves district courts with jurisdiction
over felonies and gross misdemeanors. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1)
(providing that district courts "have original jurisdiction in all cases
excluded by law from the original jurisdiction of justices' courts"); see also
NRS 193.120 (setting forth three classifications of crimes—felony, gross
misdemeanor, and misdemeanor).
Although a crime that is classified as a felony or gross
misdemeanor cannot be tried in the justice court, the Legislature has
authorized justice courts to conduct preliminary examinations in those
cases. NRS 171.196(2). But the Legislature made clear that "[i]f an
offense is not triable in the Justice Court, the defendant must not be called
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upon to plead." NRS 171.196(1). Even when a defendant charged with a
felony or gross misdemeanor waives a preliminary examination in the
justice court, he may enter his plea only in the district court. Id.
To help alleviate the workload of district court judges, the
Legislature amended NRS 3.245 to permit the chief judge of a district
court to appoint one or more "masters" who, in turn, are authorized "to
perform certain subordinate or administrative duties" for the district court
judges. 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 47, § 1, at 409. The amendment also
authorized this court to approve the duties that these masters may
perform. Id. To utilize hearing masters as authorized under the statute,
the Eighth Judicial District Court presented EDCR 1.48 to this court,
which approved the rule. See DCR 5 (indicating that local rules for
district courts must be approved by supreme court); In the Matter of the
Amendment of Eighth Judicial District Court Rules (EDCR) Regarding
Changes to the Rules in Compliance With NRS 3.245 to Provide for the
Appointment of Criminal Masters, ADKT No. 363 (Order Amending EDCR
1.30 and Adopting EDCR 1.48, May 11, 2004).
Among other things, EDCR 1.48 sets forth (1) who may be a
master, and (2) the duties that a master may perform. As for who may be
a master, EDCR 1.48 provides:
A criminal division master must be a senior judge or justice,
senior justice of the peace, justice of the peace, district judge
serving in the family division, or a member of the State Bar of
Nevada who is in good standing as a member of the state bar
and has been so for a minimum of 5 continuous years
immediately preceding appointment as a criminal division
master.
EDCR 1.48(b) (emphasis added). As for the master's duties, EDCR 1.48
provides a list of 17 duties, one of which includes:
3
Conducting arraignments and accepting pleas of guilty, nobo
contendere, and not guilty, including ascertaining whether the
defendant will invoke or waive speedy trial rights.
EDCR 1.48(k)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, under EDCR 1.48, a justice of
the peace may be appointed as a criminal division master in the Eighth
Judicial District Court and, in that capacity, may accept a defendant's
guilty plea to an offense that is triable in the district court. Pursuant to
EDCR 1.48, Eighth Judicial District Court Chief Judge Jennifer Togliatti
appointed Justice of the Peace Melissa Saragosa as a district court master
to accept pleas in cases where the defendant has waived a preliminary
examination.
The State charged respondent Jermaine Frederick with both
misdemeanor and felony crimes stemming from a domestic violence
incident. After his initial appearance, Frederick appeared for a
preliminary hearing in the Las Vegas Justice Court, with Judge Saragosa
presiding.
Frederick's counsel informed the court that Frederick had
entered into a plea agreement with the State wherein Frederick would
plead guilty to one misdemeanor charge and one felony charge. Frederick
then waived his right to a preliminary examination. He pleaded guilty to
a misdemeanor charge of battery constituting domestic violence, and
Judge Saragosa sentenced him on that charge. Immediately thereafter,
she conducted a plea colloquy on the felony charge, determined that
Frederick's plea was voluntary, and accepted his plea to the felony charge.
Frederick was then bound over to district court where he received an 18-
to 72-month prison sentence.
Subsequently, Frederick filed a motion in the district court to
withdraw his felony plea on the ground that it was accepted by a justice of
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the peace who lacks jurisdiction to accept a felony plea. Without
explanation, the district court judge granted Frederick's motion. The
State then appealed.
DISCUSSION
At its core, this appeal involves a question of whether justices
of the peace may take felony pleas while serving as district court masters.
In answering that question, we address: (1) whether NRS 3.245 violates
the separation of powers doctrine, and (2) whether EDCR 1.48 falls within
the Legislature's grant of authority under NRS 3.245. These are pure
questions of law that we review de novo. State v. Hughes, 127 Nev. ,
, 261 P.3d 1067, 1069 (2011).
NRS 3.245 does not violate the separation of powers provision of the
Nevada Constitution
Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution prohibits the
Legislature from delegating certain functions to other branches of
government. Banegas v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 117 Nev. 222, 227, 19 P.3d
245, 248 (2001). However, the Legislature may delegate to other bodies
the power to make rules and regulations supplementing legislation as long
as "the power given is prescribed in terms sufficiently definite to serve as
a guide in exercising that power." Id. When the delegation is to the
judiciary, this court has held that the Legislature may only delegate
duties and powers that are traced back to and derived from the basic
judicial power and functions. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 20, 422
P.2d 237, 242 (1967). Such a delegation can include administrative or
ministerial powers so long as those powers are "reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of judicial duties." Id. at 24, 422 P.2d at 245.
With these principles in mind, it is clear that NRS 3.245 is a
proper delegation of power to the judiciary to set forth the specific duties
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of district court masters. The Legislature explicitly delegated to the
district court the authority to appoint masters for "criminal proceedings to
perform certain subordinate or administrative duties that the Nevada
Supreme Court has approved to be assigned to such a master." NRS
3.245. This enactment limits a district court master's powers to a
specified subset of responsibilities in a particular class of cases. While the
Legislature left the details for implementing NRS 3.245 to the courts, the
Legislature articulated the scope of the powers it delegated to the
judiciary with sufficient definition.
It is also clear that the powers delegated to the judiciary
pursuant to NRS 3.245 fall within the judicial function, which is defined
as "the exercise of judicial authority to hear and determine questions in
controversy that are proper to be examined in a court of justice."
Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242. We have described ministerial
functions as "methods of implementation to accomplish or put into effect
the basic function of each Department." Id. at 21, 422 P.2d at 243.
Examples of ministerial functions that can be traced back to or derived
from the basic judicial power and functions include regulating and
licensing attorneys and "prescribing any and all rules necessary or
desirable to handle the business of the courts or their judicial functions."
Id. at 23, 422 P.2d at 244. Similarly, allowing the judiciary to determine
the subordinate or administrative duties that may be assigned to masters
is a ministerial function that can be traced back to or derived from the
basic judicial power and functions (e.g., it relates to how the business of
the district courts and their judicial functions are handled).
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We conclude that NRS 3.245 is an appropriate delegation of
ministerial power to the judiciary, such that it does not violate Article 3,
Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution.
EDCR 1.48 falls within the Legislature's grant of authority under NRS
3.245
Having determined that the Legislature properly delegated
the power to promulgate EDCR 1.48 to the judicial branch, we now turn to
whether allowing justices of the peace to serve as district court hearing
masters, under EDCR 1.48, is within the scope of the Legislature's
delegation.
The State argues that EDCR 1.48 is proper because the
Legislature intended to expand the justice court's jurisdiction when it
amended NRS 3.245. We disagree, as there is no evidence that the
Legislature intended to expand, nor delegate the power to expand, the
jurisdiction of the justice courts. See Salaiscooper v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 117 Nev. 892, 899, 34 P.3d 509, 514 (2001) ("[T]he jurisdictional
boundaries of Nevada's justice courts are defined by the [L]egislature.").
Furthermore, NRS 171.196(1) unequivocally states that "[i]f an offense is
not triable in the Justice Court, the defendant must not be called upon to
plead." We must assume that the Legislature would have amended NRS
171.196(1) if it intended NRS 3.245 to permit justice courts to accept
felony pleas. See Hardy Companies, Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev. ,
, 245 P.3d 1149, 1156 (2010) ("The presumption is always against the
intention to repeal where express terms are not used." (quoting State v.
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Donnelly, 20 Nev. 214, 217, 19 P. 680, 681 (1888))). 1 The Legislature
provided no limitations with regard to who may serve as a master. 2
By allowing justices of the peace to be appointed as district
court masters, EDCR 1.48 merely permits individuals who are qualified
based on their judicial experience to be appointed to serve as district court
masters. The fact that justices of the peace might also serve as district
court masters is only incidental to their roles as justices of the peace and
is not an unconstitutional judicial expansion of the justice court's
jurisdiction. 3 To this extent, we disagree with our dissenting colleagues'
misapprehension that EDCR 1.48 permits justices of the peace to serve as
district court masters by virtue of their positions as justices of the peace.
1 For the same reasons, we reject the State's argument that the
Legislature delegated the determination of the justice courts' jurisdiction
to the judicial branch, thereby allowing each district court to determine its
own jurisdiction in relation to each justice court.
2While the Legislature did not specifically address the possibility of
justices of the peace serving as masters, there were repeated discussions
regarding the wide degree of deference the Legislature should give the
judiciary in setting forth the rules. See, e.g., Hearing on A.B. 133 Before
the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 72d Leg. (Nev., March 6, 2003) (statement
of then-Judge Hardesty asking for flexibility in allowing the judiciary to
determine the rules for masters); Hearing on A.B. 133 Before the
Assembly Judiciary Comm., 72d Leg. (Nev., March 11, 2003) (statement of
Assemblyman John Oceguera) ("I feel that the Supreme Court would be in
a position to take care of their own rule-making process, and I think they
have done so in the past. I don't have any problem making rules for them;
however, I think, in this case that they should make the rules for the
masters.").
3 Thepractice of justices of the peace serving in dual judicial roles is
not unprecedented in Nevada. For example, NRS 5.020(3) allows justices
of the peace to simultaneously serve as municipal court judges.
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In reaching this conclusion, we distinguish this case from our
recent opinion, Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 Nev. , 287 P.3d 305
(2012). In Hernandez, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of a
Clark County ordinance requiring the chief judge of the local township to
appoint a justice of the peace to preside over inquests involving police
officer-involved deaths. Id. at , 287 P.3d at 308. They argued that the
ordinance violated Article 6, Section 8 of the Nevada Constitution because
"only the Legislature has the authority to determine, by law, the
jurisdictional limits of the justices of the peace." Id. at , 287 P.3d at
314. In response, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) contended
that "a justice of the peace is acting as a presiding officer of an
investigatory body outside the purview of the justice court and is not
acting with the authority of a justice court magistrate." Id. at n.6, 287
P.3d at 314 n.6. We rejected the ACLU's contention, stating:
The ACLU has pointed to no authority that allows
an entity other than the Legislature to assign
duties to the justices of the peace, judicial or
otherwise; nonetheless, justices of the peace are
appointed as presiding officers of the inquest by
virtue of their positions as justices of the peace.
Id.
Hernandez is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the
Legislature in NRS 3.245 expressly provided for the appointment of
district court masters and gave the judiciary the authority to determine
who may serve as a district court master. In contrast, the Clark County
ordinance at issue in Hernandez usurped the Legislature's authority by
expanding the official duties of a justice of the peace without a grant of
Legislative authority to do so. Id. at , 287 P.3d at 316. Second, unlike
Clark County's ordinance, which required justices of the peace to preside
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over inquests "by virtue of their positions as justices of the peace," EDCR
1.48 does not expand the jurisdiction of justice courts or assign duties to
justices of the peace. Hernandez, 128 Nev. at n.6, 287 P.3d at 314 n.6.
EDCR 1.48 does not permit justices of the peace to take felony pleas by
virtue of their positions as justices of the peace, but merely allows a justice
of the peace to be appointed to the separate role of a district court master.
Accordingly, in this case, Judge Saragosa did not take Frederick's felony
plea by virtue of her role as justice of the peace. Instead, she was acting in
her role as an appointed district court master under EDCR 1.48.
In conclusion, the Legislature granted this court the broad
authority to set forth rules providing for the appointment of district court
masters, and this very court approved EDCR 1.48 following a public
hearing. Public Hearing on ADKT No. 363 Before the Nevada Supreme
Court (Nov. 18, 2003). Given that this court did not usurp the
Legislature's power as the county ordinance did in Hernandez, we
respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleagues' opinion that our
conclusion vitiates our prior holding in Hernandez.4
4 The dissent also makes note of the fact that Judge Saragosa took
the felony plea in the same courtroom and in the same robes in which she
took the misdemeanor plea. Beyond the incidental convenience afforded to
the process, we do not see the particular relevance of this fact to the
question of whether EDCR 1.48 allows a justice of the peace to serve
separately as a district court master.
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Because Frederick's guilty plea was accepted by a lawfully
appointed district court master in accordance with EDCR 1.48, we reverse
the district court's order granting Frederick's motion to withdraw his
felony plea.
Parraguirre
J.
Gibbons
J.
Saitta
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HARDESTY, J., with whom PICKERING, C.J., and CHERRY, J., agree,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The Nevada Constitution gives the Legislature exclusive
authority to define the jurisdiction of our justice courts. Nev. Const. art. 6,
§ 8 ("The Legislature shall determine the number of Justices of the Peace
to be elected in each city and township of the State, and shall fix by
law . . . the limits of their civil and criminal jurisdiction . ."). See also
Salaiscooper v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 117 Nev. 892, 899, 34 P.3d
509, 514 (2001) ("[T]he jurisdictional boundaries of Nevada's justice courts
are defined by the [L]egislature."). NRS 4.370(3) limits the criminal
jurisdiction of the justice courts to misdemeanors, "except as otherwise
provided by specific statute." Going further, NRS 171.196(1) states, in
mandatory terms, "[i]f an offense is not triable in the Justice Court, the
defendant must not be called upon to plead." (Emphasis added.) Together,
the Constitution and statutes deny justices of the peace authority to
accept felony pleas.
The issue in this case is clear. Can the judicial branch,
pursuant to local district court rule, give a Nevada justice of the peace
authority over felony guilty pleas, when the Legislature has expressly
denied that authority?
NRS 3.245 empowers the district court to appoint masters to
hear plea negotiations in felony and gross misdemeanor cases. While the
majority maintains that NRS 3.245 permits justices of the peace to be
appointed as district court masters, they acknowledge that NRS 3.245
does not, by its terms, override the general and express prohibitions in
NRS 4.370 and NRS 171.196(1), respectively. Majority opinion ante at 7
(the Legislature did not "intend [1 to expand, nor delegate the power to
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expand, the jurisdiction of. . . justice courts" when it amended NRS
3.245). Indeed, nothing in the legislative history of NRS 3.245 suggests or
even implies anything to the contrary.
In the absence of any "specific" statutory provision to expand
the authority of a justice of the peace to accept felony pleas, the majority
turns to EDCR 1.48, which permits qualified judges to serve as masters
and claims that the local rule does not unconstitutionally expand the
jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. I disagree.
Through EDCR 1.48, the district court allows a justice of the
peace, by virtue of his or her status as a justice of the peace, to perform
the duties granted to masters under NRS 3.245. In doing so, the court
rule grants justices of the peace jurisdiction in felony cases that the
Legislature has expressly denied them. To this extent, EDCR 1.48
expands the justice of the peace's jurisdiction, and it is unconstitutional.
As this court recently held in Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, only the
Legislature can expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. 128
Nev. „ 287 P.3d 305, 316 (2012) (holding that "by providing for the
participation of justices of the peace in Clark County's inquest
proceedings[,] . . . the Clark County Board of County Commissioners has
unconstitutionally impinged on the Legislature's constitutionally
delegated authority"); see also Nev. Const. art. 6, § 8 ("The Legislature
shall determine . . . the limits of [a justice of the peace's] civil and criminal
jurisdiction. ."). As such, I conclude that the district courts cannot
expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace through a local rule
such as EDCR 1.48. To hold otherwise vitiates our holding in Hernandez.
The majority's reliance on a justice of peace's judicial
qualifications to serve as a master ignores the facts of this case. Frederick
2
appeared in justice court before Judge Saragosa for a preliminary hearing
on a misdemeanor charge and a felony charge, after entering into a plea
agreement with the State. Frederick pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor
charge and was sentenced by Judge Saragosa. Immediately thereafter,
wearing the same robes and sitting in the same courtroom, Judge
Saragosa conducted a plea colloquy on the felony charge and accepted
Frederick's plea. After accepting his plea, she bound Frederick over to
district court for sentencing.
In this instance, Frederick tendered his plea to a sitting
justice of the peace during the course of his criminal proceeding over
which the justice of the peace had only partial jurisdiction. It is
unreasonable to argue that Judge Saragosa transformed from justice of
the peace to master between the time Frederick entered his plea on the
misdemeanor and, a moment later, when he entered his plea on the felony
charge.
I take no issue with the Legislature's decision to delegate to
district courts the authority to designate district court hearing masters. I
also recognize the efficiency to be achieved by expanding the authority of
the justices of the peace to take felony-related pleas. However, the
Constitution vests the authority to make this decision in the Legislature,
not the courts.
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3
Accordingly, I must dissent.
, J
Hardesty
We concur:
P(
Pickering
, C.J.
J.
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