UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2328
ALLORA, LLC,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
and
DONALD A. GARDNER ARCHITECTS, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMBRIDGE BUILDERS OF JOHNSTON COUNTY, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
BRYAN VANDERPOOL; TOMMY DEES; CAMBRIDGE BUILDERS, INC.;
GROVER THOMAS DEES, JR.; WILLIAM C. DEES, by and through
Denise S. Dees and Grover T. Dees as Representatives of the
Estate of William C. Dees,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:08-cv-00590-H)
Submitted: June 13, 2013 Decided: July 9, 2013
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Thad Adams, III, Lance A. Lawson SHUMAKER LOOP & KENDRICK,
LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark W. Bakker,
Wallace K. Lightsey, WYCHE, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
This appeal presents a challenge to an award of attorneys’
fees in a copyright infringement case. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment.
I.
As relevant here, Allora, LLC, sued Cambridge Builders of
Johnston County, Inc. (“CBJC”), in the Eastern District of North
Carolina for infringement of a copyrighted home design. 1
Following the grant of summary judgment in its favor on the
question of liability, Allora proceeded to trial against CBJC on
the sole issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict awarding
Allora $99,565.00 -- the profits deemed attributable to CBJC’s
improper use of Allora’s architectural plan.
Allora then moved the district court for $308,269.57 in
attorneys’ fees and costs. The court determined that an award
was appropriate, but it found some of the rates and hours
requested “to be a bit excessive under the circumstances of this
case,” arriving at an award of $209,027.62 -- $208,667.25 for
1
While another plaintiff, several defendants, and numerous
claims were involved in this litigation below, the only issue
before this court on appeal relates to the award of fees and
costs pertaining to the listed entities and claim.
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reasonable fees and $360.37 for certain costs. 2 CBJC appeals
only the fee component of the award.
II.
The Copyright Act provides as follows:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its
discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or
against any party other than the United States or an
officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this
title, the court may also award a reasonable
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs.
17 U.S.C. § 505. We review an award of attorneys’ fees under
the Copyright Act for an abuse of discretion. Diamond Star
Bldg. Corp. v. Freed, 30 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 1994). Factual
findings may be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous.
Id.
As an initial matter, we have no doubt that the district
court properly concluded that Allora constitutes a “prevailing
party” eligible to receive a fee award under the Copyright Act
in the first place. The Supreme Court has defined “prevailing
party” in the fee-shifting context to mean a “party in whose
favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of
damages awarded.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
2
The court later issued another order awarding Allora an
additional $3,295.14 in costs.
4
Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As the district court stated:
Allora defeated the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and prevailed on its own motion for partial
summary judgment, the court finding no genuine issue
of material fact that Allora owned a valid copyright
in the [contested] design and that CBJC copied the
plan without Allora’s authorization. At a jury trial
solely on the issue of damages, Allora once again
prevailed, obtaining an award of almost $100,000 in
actual damages and disgorged profits notwithstanding
CBJC’s evidence and arguments that it had not profited
from the infringement.
Allora plainly satisfies the definition of a prevailing party.
Next, the district court correctly identified this
circuit’s four-prong standard for determining whether fees
should be awarded to a prevailing party in a copyright case.
Specifically, a court ought to consider “(1) ‘the motivation of
the parties,’ (2) ‘the objective reasonableness of the legal and
factual positions advanced,’ (3) ‘the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence,’ and (4) ‘any other relevant factor presented.’”
Diamond Star, 30 F.3d at 505-06 (quoting Rosciszewski v. Arete
Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 1993)); see also Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994).
Noting that it had “carefully considered all relevant
factors,” the district court found Allora’s motivations “pure”
and its legal and factual positions “reasonably sound.” By
contrast, the court reasoned that CBJC’s “utter failure to
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consider settlement, even after the court’s summary judgment
ruling,” shows that it “may not have been acting in good faith
in continuing to litigate.” The court also characterized a
number of CBJC’s contentions as “questionable” and, finally,
noted the “egregious nature” of the underlying infringement. We
have no reason to believe the district court’s characterization
was anything but sound.
Finally, as for the amount of a fee award under the
Copyright Act, the district court again cited and applied the
correct legal principles. In particular, “[t]he most useful
starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,” Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983) -- an approach to fee determination
known as the “lodestar” method. Numerous considerations may
prove pertinent to arriving at a final figure, among them:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill
required to properly perform the legal services
rendered; (4) the attorney’s opportunity costs in
pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the
outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations
imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount
in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation and ability of the attorney;
(10) the undesirability of the case within the legal
community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship between
attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards
in similar cases.
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Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., 560 F.3d 235, 243-44 (4th Cir.
2009).
The district court proceeded through the relevant factors
with care, delivering a fair assessment of how each weighed in
calculating the ultimate award. For example, although the court
noted that “copyright law is a complex area,” it also stated
that “this particular case was not especially complex or novel
in light of the blatant nature of the infringement.” Moreover,
the court did not blindly grant Allora’s motion seeking over
$300,000 in fees and costs but, rather, adjusted the award
downward -- to approximately $200,000 -- in order to render the
judgment “reasonable” with respect to both the expended hours
and the assigned rates.
In conclusion, the district court applied the lodestar
method in a sound manner under the circumstances of this case,
and we accordingly find no abuse of discretion. The trial judge
was familiar with both the pre-trial and trial proceedings and
was thus in the best position to determine a reasonable award
amount -- including with respect to CBJC’s primary arguments on
appeal, which relate to the degree of success obtained by Allora
and the adequacy of the evidence supporting the fee petition.
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III.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that a “request for
attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Notwithstanding appellant’s attempt
to make this matter exactly that, we find no error in the
district court’s careful assessment of what constitutes a
reasonable award in this case. The judgment is therefore
affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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