UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4399
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT JAMES PEARSON WHITE, a/k/a RJ,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:11-cr-02303-CMC-1)
Submitted: June 13, 2013 Decided: July 11, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeffrey M. Brandt, ROBINSON & BRANDT, P.S.C., Covington,
Kentucky, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Julius N. Richardson, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant–Appellant Robert James Pearson White pled guilty
to engaging in a conspiracy to distribute drugs in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. On appeal, White contends that
the district court erred in denying his motion to compel the
government to withdraw its Notice of Enhanced Penalty in
accordance with his plea agreement. We conclude that the
district court did not clearly err in determining that White
failed to provide the substantial assistance the agreement
required, and thus affirm.
I.
White was indicted on three counts of drug-related crimes
and agreed to plead guilty to one. Relevant to this appeal,
White’s plea agreement provided that in exchange for him
providing substantial assistance, the government would move to
withdraw the Notice of Enhanced Penalty it had filed, which
increased White’s sentence to mandatory life imprisonment. The
agreement also provided that White’s failure to pass a polygraph
to the government’s satisfaction would void the government’s
obligations under the agreement.
At sentencing, the government reported that it would not
move to withdraw the Notice of Enhanced Penalty because White
had failed a polygraph test and had not provided substantial
2
assistance. White filed a motion to compel the government to
withdraw the notice. The district court denied White’s motion
and imposed a life sentence. White timely appealed.
II.
This Court reviews the district court’s denial of the
motion to compel for abuse of discretion. See Wells v. Liddy,
186 F.3d 505, 518 n.12 (4th Cir. 1999). We review whether a
party has breached a plea agreement under a bifurcated standard,
reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error
and the application of principles of contract interpretation de
novo. United States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2001).
III.
On appeal, White contends that the government unreasonably
declined to withdraw the Notice of Enhanced Penalty because, at
the plea hearing, it had stated or strongly suggested that White
had provided substantial assistance. But the government had not
obligated itself to withdraw the Notice of Enhanced Penalty at
the plea hearing. Rather, the government stated that it
anticipated White would qualify for the withdrawal if he
continued cooperating, which included, as White acknowledges,
passing a polygraph test. At sentencing, the government stated
that White had failed to provide substantial assistance, largely
3
because he had failed a polygraph test. And there is no dispute
that White falsely answered at least one question during the
polygraph. Nothing in the record suggests the district court
erred in determining that White’s failure to pass the polygraph
provided a legitimate, objectively reasonable basis for the
government’s dissatisfaction with White’s performance under the
plea agreement.
White also contends that that the plea agreement was a
contract of adhesion containing unconscionable terms. Although
the plea agreement afforded White a favorable result, he was
under no obligation to accept it. United States v. Mezzanatto,
513 U.S. 196, 209-10 (1995) (“The plea bargaining process
necessarily exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty . . .
but we have repeatedly held that the government ‘may encourage a
guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the
plea.’”). Further, we reject White’s argument that the terms of
the plea were unconscionably applied to him. White fails to
identify precedent—nor could we find any—for holding the
polygraph provision was unconscionably applied.
IV.
In sum, the district court properly denied White’s motion
to compel specific performance of the plea agreement.
AFFIRMED
4