A criminal defendant has the right to represent himself so
long as the district court finds "that [he] is competent and that the waiver
of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent," Hymon v. State, 121
Nev. 200, 212, 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005); "a criminal defendant's ability
to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-
representation," Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 341-42, 22 P.3d 1164, 1172
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Gardner gave the
district court timely notice that he wished to represent himself at trial.
After conducting a canvass pursuant to Faretta V. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975), the district court denied Gardner's request because it concluded
that his limited legal knowledge and memory problems would make him a
"sitting duck" for the experienced prosecution. The district court made no
findings as to whether Gardner's waiver was knowing, voluntary, or
intelligent. We conclude that the district court erred by denying Gardner's
request for self-representation based upon the stated grounds. Although
Gardner frequently displayed trouble understanding the law and legal
terminology, this did not compel the conclusion that he was incapable of
understanding the significance of the waiver of counsel and the risks of
self-representation—the relevant consideration under Faretta. See Graves
v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124, 912 P.2d 234, 238 (1996) ("Faretta makes clear
that the defendant's technical knowledge is not the relevant inquiry. . . .
[T]he judge need only be convinced that the defendant made his decision
with a clear comprehension of the attendant risks." (citation omitted)).
The error requires reversal. Hymon, 121 Nev. at 212, 111 P.3d at 1101
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("Denial of [the right to self-representation] is per se reversible error.").
Accordingly, we grant rehearing and we
ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order.'
Gibbons
Saitta
cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
'In light of this order, we decline to reach the remainder of the
claims raised on appeal or in Gardner's petition for rehearing, except to
comment that although we find the district court's practice of directly
inquiring into the race of potential jurors when resolving a Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), challenge appropriate, we disapprove of
limiting individuals' responses and requiring them to state their race as
either black, white, or Asian.
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