UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4713
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALLEN LEON SAMMONS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:08-cr-00014-JPJ-PMS-1)
Submitted: July 9, 2013 Decided: July 16, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Nancy C. Dickenson,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Christine Madeleine Lee,
Research and Writing Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jennifer R.
Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Allen Leon Sammons, who finished serving a forty-eight
month sentence on his conviction to five counts of interstate
transmission of threats to injure another person, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006), now appeals the district court’s
order modifying the conditions of his supervised release to
include a geographical exclusion zone. We affirm.
Because “[d]istrict courts have broad latitude to
impose conditions on supervised release,” the conditions imposed
are reviewed “only for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). When modifying a defendant’s conditions of
supervised release, the sentencing court must consider several
of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006),
including “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant”; the need for
adequate deterrence; and the goal of public safety. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4)-(7).
The court must also ensure that any modification it
makes to a defendant’s supervised release conditions satisfies
the provisions applicable to the initial imposition of
conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). In pertinent part, any
special condition of supervised release must be “reasonably
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related” to the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) and
(a)(2)(B)-(D) and must involve “‘no greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to achieve the goals
enumerated in § 3553(a).” Armel, 585 F.3d at 186 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)).
Here, the district court imposed the geographical
exclusion zone upon Sammons based largely on several thinly-
veiled threats he made to various federal officials. Although
Sammons argues that the geographical exclusion zone is
unreasonable in scope and unnecessary because of his limited
history of following through on his threats, we disagree. The
circumstances of Sammons’ offenses, his history of taking action
in furtherance of carrying out his threats, and his failure to
demonstrate either that the district court’s rationale for the
zone was faulty or that the zone would be unduly burdensome for
him suggest that the imposed exclusion zone was reasonably
related to the pertinent factors and does not involve an
unreasonable deprivation of Sammons’ liberty. See Armel, 585
F.3d at 186. His argument that the district court abused its
discretion in imposing the zone is, as a result, unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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