UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4885
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEMUEL LOTT, a/k/a Andrew Anthony Maylor,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District
Judge. (7:12-cr-00077-SGW-1)
Submitted: July 12, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Wayne D. Inge, LAW OFFICE OF WAYNE D. INGE, Roanoke, Virginia,
for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney,
Elizabeth G. Wright, Assistant United States Attorney,
Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lemuel Lott appeals from the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and imposing a thirty-seven-
month sentence. Lott asserts that his sentence is plainly
unreasonable because he argues that the district court should
not have imposed the sentence to run consecutive to his sentence
in his illegal re-entry case, allegedly did not apply the
relevant 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2013) factors
to the specific circumstances of his case, and failed to state
in open court the particular reasons for imposing Lott’s
sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release, we “take[] a more deferential appellate
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, we will affirm a supervised
release revocation sentence if it is not plainly unreasonable.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010).
The first step is to determine whether the sentence is
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th
Cir. 2006). Only if the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable will the inquiry proceed to the
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second step, which is to determine whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Id. at 438-39.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter
Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the applicable § 3553(a)
factors, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440, and has adequately explained
the sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in
as much detail as when imposing the original sentence.
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court states a proper basis for its
imposition of a sentence up to the statutory maximum. Crudup,
461 F.3d at 440.
We find that Lott’s thirty-seven-month sentence is
reasonable. A review of the record confirms that the district
court considered the advisory policy statement range and the
applicable § 3553(a) factors, and stated a proper basis for the
sentence imposed. See United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d
95, 105 (4th Cir.) (recognizing that the Court “will credit an
articulation [of the § 3553(a) factors] as ‘clear and
appropriate,’ when the reasons [given by the district court]
‘can be matched to a factor appropriate for consideration’ and
tailored to the defendant’s situation”) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 274 (2012).
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We conclude that the district court’s stated rationale
for Lott’s sentence was adequate. In this regard, a sentencing
court need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Thus, for each
sentence, the court “must place on the record an individualized
assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.”
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “This
individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy,” and
the district court must only “provide a rationale tailored to
the particular case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful
appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271
(4th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[w]hen imposing a sentence within
the Guidelines, . . . the explanation need not be elaborate or
lengthy”).
In this case, the district court made clear its
reasons for imposing Lott’s sentence and the § 3553(a) factors
it found relevant to the sentence. Moreover, the need for
explanation was diminished both by the fact that the district
court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence and the fact that the
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district court was conducting a sentencing on a revocation
matter. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (“[W]hen a judge decides
simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so
will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”); Thompson,
595 F.3d at 547 (“A court need not be as detailed or specific
when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing
a post-conviction sentence . . . .”).
We also reject Lott’s assertion that it was error for
the district court to refuse to run his revocation sentence
concurrent to his sentence in the re-entry case. As stated in
the advisory Guidelines policy statements regarding supervised
release, sentences for breaches of supervised release are meant
to sanction the abuse of the court’s trust inherent in those
violations, and not to punish the underlying offense conduct.
Therefore, these sentences are intended to run consecutively to
other sentences. Thus, “[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon
the revocation of probation or supervised release shall be
ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of
imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or not the
sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct
that is the basis of the revocation of probation or supervised
release.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(f) (2012).
Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s
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decision to run Lott’s revocation sentence consecutive to his
sentence in the re-entry case.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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