FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 18 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIANG LIN, AKA Qiang Lin, No. 11-73322
Petitioner, Agency No. A070-122-451
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 6, 2013**
Pasadena, California
Before: THOMAS, SILVERMAN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Diang Lin petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
decision denying his motion to reopen proceedings. We deny the petition.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and history of the case, we need not
recount it here.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
To show grounds for reopening, Lin must establish prima facie eligibility for
asylum. See Feng Gui Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2009). To show
prima facie eligibility, Lin must establish that his violation of China’s family
planning policy would be punished in the local area in a way that would give rise
to an objective fear of future persecution. See In re J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196,
199 (BIA 2007). Lin argued that he satisfied this standard because he and his wife
have two children and that, “if we are sent back to China, one of us will be forced
to undergo sterilization, and we will both be heavily fined.”
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by determining that Lin has not made
an adequate showing that he would be forcibly sterilized. The BIA cited Matter of
H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209 (BIA 2010), which held that family
planning policies in Fujian province are likely to be enforced by fines and
economic penalties rather than by forced sterilization. See id. at 213-14; see also
id. at 215 (“Even if we accept that the policy in the town to which the respondent
intends to return generally calls for sterilization after the birth of two children, the
respondent has not established that the treatment she may face if she refuses
sterilization would amount to persecution.”). The BIA’s conclusions are supported
by the record.
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The BIA also did not abuse its discretion by determining that, although Lin
might be fined for violating family planning policies, he did not make an adequate
showing that he would be subjected to economic harm amounting to persecution,
particularly given that he did not offer any evidence concerning his financial
situation. See In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 169 (BIA 2007) (“Not all . . . fines,
wage reduction, or loss of employment . . . will . . . meet or exceed the threshold
level of harm for . . . persecution.”).
To the extent that the BIA rejected Lin’s government documents solely
because they were not authenticated pursuant to regulation, this was error. See
Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179, 1182-84 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the
proposition that foreign government documents must be authenticated by official
certification pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6 and holding that a document can be
authenticated by any evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what
the proponent claims it is). Any error was harmless, however: although the BIA
deemed the documents unauthenticated, the BIA nonetheless considered the
documents and reasonably determined that they were inadequate to show that Lin
or his wife would be subjected to forced sterilization.
The BIA’s holding that Lin failed to meet his burden for relief was
supported by record evidence and is an “independent ground[] on which the BIA
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may deny a motion to reopen.” INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988). We
therefore need not address Lin’s other arguments.
PETITION DENIED.
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