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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-10748
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-02914-ODE
BETH ADAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
BSI MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AMERICA, INC.,
BSI AMERICA PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(July 17, 2013)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Beth Adams appeals the district court’s order rendering summary judgment
in favor of Defendants BSI Management Systems America, Inc., and BSI America
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Professional Services, Inc., (collectively, BSI) on her Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) claim. After thorough review, we affirm.
I.
BSI hired Adams in 2009 as a Supply Chain Security Program Manager.
According to the job posting, Adams was “responsible for assessing, documenting
and incorporating multiple country level compliance programs into a single
compliance system for international supplier assessments.” Adams reported
directly to Dan Purtell, the Senior Vice President of BSI’s Supply Chain Solutions
Group.
BSI terminated Adams in April 2011 for inadequate performance. Adams
later sued, alleging that BSI violated the FLSA by failing to pay her overtime.
Following discovery, BSI moved for summary judgment.1 The district court
rendered summary judgment in favor of BSI, concluding that Adams was
“employed in a bona fide . . . administrative . . . capacity” and therefore exempt
from the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). This is
Adams’s appeal.
1
Adams also moved for summary judgment. But because her sole contention on appeal is that
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BSI was in error, she has abandoned any
argument that the district court should have rendered summary judgment in her favor. See Univ.
of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1280 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that where
a party does not “plainly and prominently” raise an issue on appeal, we deem the issue
abandoned (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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II.
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de
novo, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is
appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When
the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must show affirmatively
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion with
credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted
at trial.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th
Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in original).
Upon making this showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must
produce “significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable
issue of fact” to avoid summary judgment. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The FLSA requires employers to pay covered employees at an overtime rate
if they work more than 40 hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). But
employees who are “employed in a bona fide . . . administrative . . . capacity” are
exempt from the overtime-pay requirement. Id. § 213(a)(1). An employee
employed in a bona fide administrative capacity is one: (1) who is paid a salary of
at least $455 per week; (2) “[w]hose primary duty is the performance of office or
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non-manual work directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer or the employer’s customers;” and (3) “[w]hose
primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with
respect to matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). The employer bears
the burden of proving an exemption applies, and we construe FLSA exemptions
narrowly. Abel v. S. Shuttle Servs., Inc., 631 F.3d 1210, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011). It
is undisputed that here the first requirement of the administrative-employee
exemption is satisfied — the parties agree that Adams was paid a salary of
$92,000, which easily satisfies the minimum salary requirement. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.200(a)(1). The parties dispute the other two elements.
Adams first asserts that her job did not satisfy the second prong of the
administrative-employee exemption, characterizing her duties as merely
“work[ing] on the ‘production’ end of the business to ensure that [BSI’s]
product . . . was built in a timely matter.” But her own deposition testimony belies
that argument. Adams testified that, during her first year at BSI, she spent the vast
majority of her time running a project for one of BSI’s clients, which entailed
creating project tasks, putting together a project plan, and ensuring that the client’s
expectations were satisfied. She later headed another project, on which she
organized and managed the creation of BSI’s supply-chain-security solution for
one of BSI’s clients. She also conducted client meetings, marketed for BSI, served
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as the primary contact with prospective clients, and spent significant time
researching industry trends. These duties directly related to the management or
general business operations of BSI and its customers. See id. §§ 541.201(b)-(c)
(noting that bona fide administrative employees perform tasks such as marketing,
research, ensuring legal and regulatory compliance, and acting “as advisers or
consultants to their employer’s clients or customers”). Adams’s baseless
characterization of her duties is insufficient to overcome BSI’s evidence that
affirmatively establishes the administrative exemption’s second prong.
Additionally, Adams’s own testimony shows that she exercised independent
discretion and judgment on matters of significance and therefore satisfied the third
prong. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3). “In general, the exercise of discretion and
independent judgment involves the comparison and the evaluation of possible
courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision after the various possibilities
have been considered.” Id. § 541.202(a). Adams testified that her main tasks were
running two projects for BSI and that, in conjunction with those projects, she was
responsible for “coming up with the task, activities that needed to take place, [and]
tasks that needed to be performed,” including “taking the lead in organizing and
managing” the projects. The very nature of these activities requires the exercise of
independent discretion and judgment on matters of significance.
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Adams argues on appeal that she reported to Purtell and “followed his
directions and orders explicitly,” but the evidence to which she cites does not
support this assertion. She also contends that she did not exercise discretion and
independent judgment because her role in directing subordinates was similar to that
of other employees. But under the FLSA regulations, an administrative employee
need not perform different tasks than her co-workers to exercise discretion. 29
C.F.R. § 541.202(d). BSI has therefore met its burden of demonstrating as a matter
of law that the third prong of the exemption is satisfied and that Adams was
“employed in a bona fide . . . administrative . . . capacity,” and Adams has not
submitted evidence that could rebut that showing. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of BSI is
AFFIRMED.
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