United States v. $134,750 U.S. Currency

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1633

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

$134,750 U.S. Currency,

Defendant – Appellant,

AMANUEL ASEFAW,

Claimant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:09-
cv-01513-RWT)

Submitted: May 15, 2013 Decided: July 24, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Shedd joined.

S. Ricardo Narvaiz, LAW OFFICES OF S. RICARDO NARVAIZ, Silver
Spring, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; Christen A. Sproule,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

In this civil in rem action, claimant Amanuel Asefaw

appeals the district court’s order of forfeiture, entered after

a jury trial, of the defendant funds, $134,750 in United States

currency. The jury found that the funds were involved in or

traceable to financial transactions structured for the purpose

of evading a financial institution’s reporting requirements, in

violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2006). Asefaw argues that there

was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; that

the district court committed error in various evidentiary

rulings; and that the forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive

under the Eighth Amendment. Finding no reversible error, we

affirm.

I.

Under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act

of 1970 (“Bank Secrecy Act”), and regulations promulgated by the

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of the

Treasury, financial institutions are required to file reports

whenever they are involved in cash transactions of more than

$10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2012). 1 A

report also must be filed for multiple transactions in a single

1
During the relevant time period, this provision was
located at 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1) (2007).

2
business day that total more than $10,000, as long as the bank

has knowledge that the transactions are by or on behalf of the

same person. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.313(b). 2 It is a violation of

federal law for any person “to structure . . . any transaction

with one or more domestic financial institutions” for the

purpose of evading the reporting requirements. 31 U.S.C.

§ 5324(a)(3). Any property involved in or traceable to illegal

structuring is subject to criminal and civil forfeiture to the

United States. Id. § 5317(c).

On March 28, 2008, the United States seized, pursuant to a

seizure warrant, $114,750 from an account Asefaw held with

Citibank and $20,000 from an account he held with Chevy Chase

Bank. The government later filed a verified complaint alleging

that the defendant funds were traceable to structuring to avoid

currency reporting requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C.

§ 5324(a)(3), and seeking civil forfeiture under § 5317(c) and

18 U.S.C. § 981. Asefaw filed a claim to the defendant funds.

At trial, the government’s evidence showed that between

March 28 and April 4, 2007, in six business days, Asefaw made

eighteen separate cash deposits totaling $142,950, visiting at

least six different bank branches at three different banks and

2
This provision was previously located at 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.22(c)(2)(2007).

3
depositing large sums of cash, none exceeding $10,000, into at

least seven different bank accounts. He made ten deposits of

exactly $10,000. On multiple occasions, he made consecutive

deposits within a short window of time. For example, on April

3, he visited three different banks and made three separate cash

deposits ($10,000, $6,000, and $10,000) in less than thirty

minutes. Asefaw later used a series of checks and wire

transfers to move the deposited funds into two accounts with

Citibank and Chevy Chase Bank. The government’s expert witness,

IRS Special Agent Mary Ann Veloso, testified that, in her

opinion, this pattern of splitting large amounts of cash into

multiple deposits of $10,000 or less on the same day or

consecutive days is consistent with a pattern of structuring to

avoid reporting requirements.

In addition, the government called Jessica Cuevas, a

Citibank employee, who testified that in August 2007 she called

Asefaw and spoke to him about his currency transactions with

Citibank. Cuevas wrote an email after the conversation, stating

that Asefaw had admitted to depositing only $10,000 to avoid the

need for a currency transaction report (CTR). The email read:

I spoke with Mr. Asefaw today. The funds he deposited
were from himself since he’s self-employed. He did
mention he knew about the CTR and that’s why he only
deposited $10,000. I explained the importance of
structuring deposits and filling out a CTR. He was
very wary of the phone call and questioned the
reasoning. He was also adamant about the fact that he

4
 is a “self-employed hard worker” and is not “doing
anything illegal”. [sic] He even made a reference to
closing his accounts with us and moving his money
somewhere else because of the phone call.

The government also offered evidence that, in 2005, Asefaw

owned a grocery store that he registered with the IRS as a money

services business, a specialized type of business that conducts

regulated financial transactions and is subject to the Bank

Secrecy Act. During the same time period, he held an account at

Manufacturers and Trade Trust Company (“M&T Bank”). The

government offered evidence that between August and September

2005, at least four CTR’s were filed by M&T Bank for currency

withdrawals made by Asefaw. The government argued that Asefaw

was present when the reports were completed because he had to

provide his driver’s license.

At the close of the government’s case, Asefaw, who was

representing himself, moved the court for judgment as a matter

of law. The court denied the motion. Asefaw then took the

stand and testified that he “had no idea about this law” and

that he never intended to make the banks fail in their reporting

duties. He testified that he had opened multiple accounts to

take advantage of favorable interest rates and promotions.

During the time when he was making deposits and moving money

around, he testified that he “thought it was a legitimate

5
personal interest because nobody said anything to [him]” or told

him he was breaking a law.

Following three days of trial, the jury returned a verdict

for the government, finding by a preponderance of the evidence

that the funds seized from Asefaw’s accounts were involved in or

traceable to transactions structured for the purpose of evading

a financial institution’s reporting requirements. Asefaw made

no post-trial motions. The district court then entered a final

order of forfeiture against the seized funds.

Asefaw timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

Asefaw first argues that the government failed to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that he was aware of the

reporting requirements and intentionally structured his deposits

to evade them. However, Asefaw never filed a post-verdict

motion renewing his motion for judgment as a matter of law under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). As a result, we are

foreclosed from considering his challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich,

Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 400-01 (2006); Helping Hand, LLC v.

Baltimore Cnty., MD, 515 F.3d 356, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2008).

6
 III.

We next address Asefaw’s contention that the district court

erred in allowing the government to present certain evidence.

We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion, Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298,

310 (4th Cir. 2006), keeping in mind that evidentiary errors

which are harmless cannot be grounds for granting a new trial or

setting aside a verdict, 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61;

Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 235 (4th Cir.

1999) (en banc) (abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace,

Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003)). An error is harmless

if we can say “with fair assurance, after pondering all that

happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole,

that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.”

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); see also

Taylor, 193 F.3d at 235 (adopting the Kotteakos harmless error

standard in civil cases).

A.

Asefaw first argues that the evidence of prior CTR’s from

M&T Bank and his registration of a money services business

should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

Because Asefaw did not raise this objection at trial, plain

error review applies. See In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619,

631 (4th Cir. 1997) (adopting in civil cases the plain error

7
standard articulated in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

732 (1993)). Under that standard, we may exercise our

discretion to correct an error not raised below only if: (1)

there is an error; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects

substantial rights; and (4) we determine, after examining the

particulars of the case, that the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings. Id. at 630-31 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).

Rule 403 provides that the district court “may exclude

relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, . . . [or]

misleading the jury.” Asefaw argues that the evidence of prior

CTR’s was unfairly prejudicial and misleading because all the

evidence showed was that at some point he presented a driver’s

license during the cash transactions, not that he was actually

present when the CTR’s were completed. Similarly, he argues

that the evidence of his money services business was prejudicial

and misleading because the government failed to prove that every

person who registers a money services business knows about the

reporting requirements.

At most, however, these arguments suggest that the

probative value of this evidence was not strong, not that it was

plainly prejudicial or misleading. But even evidence that has

minimal probative value may be admitted under Rule 403 so long

8
as it is relevant and there is no danger of unfair prejudice or

confusion. That is the case here. The evidence that Asefaw

previously owned a money services business and had been involved

in transactions that required a CTR tended to prove that he had

prior exposure to currency transaction reporting requirements.

Asefaw had the opportunity to rebut the evidence and point out

its limitations at trial, and there was nothing prejudicial or

misleading about it. Thus, the district court committed no

error by admitting it.

B.

Asefaw next argues that the district court abused its

discretion by allowing the testimony of Agent Veloso, Cuevas,

and two other bank employees, Paul Schallmo and Courtney Smiley,

because the government failed to timely disclose their

identities to him prior to trial. He contends that their

testimony should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 37(c)(1).

Under Rule 37(c)(1), a party who fails to provide

information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) is

not allowed to use that information or witness to supply

evidence at trial unless the failure “was substantially

justified or is harmless.” Two disclosure requirements in Rule

26(a) are relevant here. First, “[a]bsent a stipulation or a

court order,” each party must disclose to the other party the

9
identity of any witness the party may use to present expert

testimony at least ninety days before trial. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2). Second, unless the court orders otherwise, at least

thirty days before trial, each party must provide to the other

party and file a pretrial disclosure listing the name of each

witness that will testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).

Asefaw first contends that Agent Veloso’s testimony should

have been excluded because the government did not disclose her

identity to him until forty-eight days before trial. The

parties dispute whether Asefaw raised this objection at trial,

and thus whether plain error review should apply. We need not

reach that issue, however, because we conclude that the

government’s disclosure was timely under the district court’s

scheduling order. The scheduling order set the deadline for

expert designations as February 27, 2012. The government

disclosed its intent to designate Agent Veloso as an expert

witness on February 22, 2012. Because the government’s

disclosure was timely under the court’s order, it also satisfied

Rule 26(a)(2). As a result, the district court did not err when

it allowed Agent Veloso to testify.

Asefaw next argues that the district court should have

excluded the testimony of Cuevas, Schallmo, and Smiley because

the government failed to disclose them as witnesses until the

10
trial began. 3 The government does not dispute that it failed to

disclose its witnesses to Asefaw before trial as required by

Rule 26(a)(2), but instead argues that the district court did

not abuse its discretion by allowing the undisclosed witnesses

to testify because the omission was harmless under Rule

37(c)(1).

The district court has “broad discretion” to determine

whether a disclosure violation is substantially justified or

harmless under Rule 37(c)(1). S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v.

Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592, 597 (4th Cir. 2003). We

have said that this discretion should be guided by an analysis

of five factors: (1) the surprise to the party against whom the

evidence would be offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure

the surprise; (3) the extent to which allowing the evidence

would disrupt the trial; (4) the importance of the evidence; and

(5) the nondisclosing party’s explanation for its failure to

disclose the evidence. Id.

The district court overruled Asefaw’s objection without

discussing the Southern States factors, reasoning that Asefaw

was not entitled to relief because he had never submitted an

3
In his opening brief, Asefaw also contends that the
government failed to disclose the identity of another bank
employee witness, Martha Wallis. However, at trial, Asefaw
admitted that he knew before trial that she would testify.

11
interrogatory asking the government to identify “persons having

knowledge of facts pertinent to the case.” We disavow this

reasoning. Rule 26(a)(3) imposes an affirmative obligation to

file and disclose to the other party, at least thirty days

before trial unless the court orders otherwise, the names of the

witnesses who will be presented. That obligation exists whether

or not the other party has requested a witness list. Thus, the

government’s failure to disclose its witnesses violated Rule

26(a)(3). Rather than overruling Asefaw’s objection to the

undisclosed witnesses outright, the district court should have

proceeded to analyze whether the government’s omission was

substantially justified or harmless under Rule 37(c)(1). We do

not reach that question ourselves. Instead, assuming arguendo

that the testimony from undisclosed witnesses should have been

excluded, we conclude that any error committed by the district

court in allowing them to testify did not affect Asefaw’s

substantial rights.

First, the testimony of Smiley and Schallmo was largely

cumulative and therefore added little to nothing to the

government’s case. Neither witness had any personal knowledge

of Asefaw’s transactions, and their testimony was limited to

introducing and authenticating bank records that documented some

of them. These same transactions were also described by Agent

Veloso in her testimony, and Asefaw did not dispute any of them.

12
Thus, there is no reason to believe that the jury’s verdict

would have been any different if the testimony of Smiley and

Schallmo had been excluded.

Of course, the evidence presented by Cuevas was not merely

cumulative; her email provided the only direct evidence that

Asefaw admitted intent to evade the reporting requirements.

Nevertheless, the powerful nature of the circumstantial evidence

in this case demonstrates that any error in allowing Cuevas to

testify was harmless. Over six business days, Asefaw deposited

more than $100,000 in at least eighteen separate cash deposits,

repeatedly taking large sums of cash and splitting them up into

sums of $10,000 or less, often within a short period of time.

He made ten deposits of exactly $10,000, and not once did his

deposits exceed the $10,000 threshold that triggers reporting

requirements. Asefaw never explained why, if he was unaware of

the reporting requirements, he structured his deposits in this

way. This gaping hole in his testimony reinforced the already

powerful nature of the circumstantial evidence, practically

requiring the conclusion that his purpose was to evade the

reporting requirements. Cuevas’s testimony, in essence, was

icing on the cake.

In sum, even excluding the testimony of Cuevas, Schallmo,

and Smiley, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s

finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Asefaw

13
intentionally structured his deposits to evade the reporting

requirements. As a result, we can fairly say that any error in

allowing the undisclosed witnesses’ testimony did not

“substantially sway” the jury’s verdict, and thus, that any Rule

37(c)(1) error committed by the district court was harmless.

IV.

We turn now to Asefaw’s last argument, that the forfeiture

of the seized funds is unconstitutionally excessive under the

Eighth Amendment. Because Asefaw failed to raise this objection

at any point during the proceedings below, we may only disturb

the judgment below if the requirements of plain error review are

satisfied. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. The burden is on the

party challenging the constitutionality of the forfeiture to

demonstrate excessiveness. United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d

805, 816 (4th Cir. 2000).

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall

not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. A

punitive forfeiture of property violates the Excessive Fines

Clause of the Eighth Amendment if it is “grossly

disproportional” to the gravity of the offense. United States

v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998); see also United States

v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d at 815 (recognizing that “Bajakajian’s

14
‘grossly disproportional’ analysis applies when determining

whether any punitive forfeiture--civil or criminal--is

excessive”).

In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court considered the following

factors to determine whether the forfeiture was

unconstitutionally excessive: the nature and extent of illegal

activity and whether the defendant fit into the class of persons

for whom the statute was principally designed; the maximum

penalties that a court could have imposed for the offense; and

the harm caused by the offense. 524 U.S. at 337–39. There, an

international traveler was convicted of failing to report that

he was transporting more than $10,000 out of the United States

in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A). Id. at 325. The

Court concluded that the forfeiture of the full $357,144 he

attempted to transport would violate the Excessive Fines Clause.

Id. at 338. Noting that the defendant’s only offense was a

single reporting violation, the Court reasoned that the

defendant did not fit within the class of persons, such as money

launderers, drug traffickers, or tax evaders, for whom the

statute was principally designed. Id. at 337-38. In addition,

the maximum sentence that could have been imposed under the

United States Sentencing Guidelines was six months, while the

maximum fine was $5,000. Id. at 338. These penalties confirmed

“a minimal level of culpability,” ill-suited for the punitive

15
forfeiture of more than three-hundred thousand dollars. Id. at

338-39. Finally, the Court concluded that the harm caused by

the reporting violation was minimal because the government was

the only harmed party and the offense affected the government in

“a relatively minor way” by depriving the government of

information. Id. at 39. Thus, comparing the single reporting

violation with the forfeiture of $357,144 sought by the

government, the Court concluded that the forfeiture would be

grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense. Id. at

339.

In the years since Bajakajian was decided, we have applied

the same factors when evaluating whether a challenged forfeiture

is unconstitutionally excessive. In United States v. Ahmad, the

claimant, who operated a money exchange business, was criminally

prosecuted for his involvement in a complex operation involving

transfers of currency to individuals in Pakistan and importation

of surgical equipment from abroad. 213 F.3d at 807. Over a

series of years, the claimant, in an effort to avoid reporting

requirements, repeatedly structured deposits of cash received

from other individuals for transfer abroad, in violation of

§ 5324. Id. We concluded that the civil forfeiture of $85,000

traceable to his structuring offenses was not grossly

disproportional to the gravity of those offenses. 213 F.3d at

16
817. 4 Although the maximum authorized penalties mirrored those

in Bajakajian, the claimant’s “conduct . . . was not a single,

isolated untruth affecting only the government, but rather a

series of sophisticated commercial transactions over a period of

years that were related to a customs fraud scheme.” Id. In

addition, the claimant’s structuring “not only deprived the

government of important information, but also affected a

financial institution’s ability to comply with the law and

jeopardized the funds of other persons.” Id. at 817.

Similarly, in United States v. Jalaram, Inc., we held that

the criminal forfeiture of $385,390 in proceeds from a

prostitution ring was not grossly disproportional to the gravity

of the offense. 599 F.3d 347, 351, 356 (4th Cir. 2010).

Although the government had not identified any victims who

suffered harm from the offense, the criminal activity spanned

several months, generating hundreds of thousands of dollars in

illicit revenues, and was connected with other offenses such as

tax evasion. Id. at 356. Further, the maximum fine for the

offense was $350,000, indicating that Congress considered the

crime at issue “far more serious than the reporting offense in

4
We also held that the forfeiture of an additional
$101,587.43 was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of
the defendant’s customs fraud offenses. United States v. Ahmad,
213 F.3d 805, 819 (4th Cir. 2000).

17
Bajakajian.” Id. This legislative judgment, we noted, raises

“a significantly higher hurdle to show[ing] that the requested

forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of [the]

offense.” Id.

An application of the Bajakajian factors to this case leads

us to conclude that the forfeiture of the seized funds is not

grossly disproportional to the gravity of the structuring

violations. At the outset, we note that “judgments about the

appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first

instance to the legislature.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336

(citations omitted); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290

(1983) (instructing reviewing courts to “grant substantial

deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily

possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for

crimes”). Thus, “[t]here is a strong presumption of

constitutionality where the value of a forfeiture falls within

the fine range prescribed by Congress or the Guidelines.”

United States v. Malewicka, 664 F.3d 1099, 1106 (7th Cir. 2011)

(citation omitted).

Congress authorized a maximum criminal fine of $500,000 in

aggravated cases where a structuring offense involves more than

$100,000 in a twelve-month period. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3);

31 U.S.C. § 5324(d)(2); United States v. $79,650.00 Seized from

Bank of Am., 650 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2011). In such cases,

18
the maximum fine limitations of the Guidelines do not apply to

temper this legislative judgment. See U.S.S.G § 5E1.2(a)(4);

$79,650.00 Seized from Bank of Am., 650 F.3d at 387-88. Thus,

Asefaw’s structuring activities, which involved more than

$100,000 in less than twelve months, could have subjected him to

a criminal fine of up to $500,000, far in excess of the amount

forfeited. That the forfeiture amount falls within the fine

range authorized by Congress raises a presumption of

constitutionality. As a result, Asefaw “must clear a

significantly higher hurdle to show that the . . . forfeiture is

grossly disproportional to the gravity of [his] offense.”

Jalaram, 599 F.3d at 356. He has not done so.

First, Asefaw fails to demonstrate that he falls outside

the class of persons for whom the structuring statute was

principally designed. Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act, in

large part, out of concern that inadequate records maintained by

financial institutions “seriously impair[ed] the ability of the

Federal Government to enforce the myriad criminal, tax, and

regulatory provisions of laws which Congress had enacted.”

California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). “By

forcing financial institutions to [file CTRs], Congress hoped to

maximize the information available to federal regulatory and

criminal investigators.” United States v. St. Michael’s Credit

Union, 880 F.2d 579, 582 (1st Cir. 1989). “The overall goal of

19
the statute was to interdict the laundering of illegally

obtained and untaxed monies in legitimate financial

institutions.” Id. (citing Schultz, 416 U.S. at 26-30).

Through his structured deposits, Asefaw repeatedly

interfered with the reporting obligations of financial

institutions in just the way § 5324 was intended to prohibit.

By furtively introducing large amounts of unreported cash into

the financial system, Asefaw frustrated a primary objective of

the Bank Secrecy Act--to ensure the maintenance of bank records

necessary to the investigation and prosecution of criminal, tax,

and regulatory offenses. Moreover, while Asefaw was not charged

with money laundering or tax evasion, his structuring violations

“could have facilitated such conduct in just the way the statute

was designed to frustrate.” Malewicka, 664 F.3d at 1106.

Indeed, we do not have the benefit, as the Court did in

Bajakajian, of a finding by the trier of fact that his funds

“were not connected to any other crime.” 524 U.S. at 326.

Thus, it is not apparent that Asefaw falls outside the class of

persons for whom the statute is principally designed. See

Malewicka, 664 F.3d at 1105-06 (finding that defendant not

charged with other wrongdoing nevertheless fit within the class

of persons for whom the structuring statute was principally

designed because her structuring activities frustrated the

20
statute’s purpose and “could have facilitated [money laundering

or tax evasion]”).

Second, as noted above, the maximum criminal fine that

Asefaw could have faced is $500,000, far in excess of the

miniscule $5,000 maximum fine authorized in Bajakajian. This

distinction confirms that the structuring activities in this

case involve a higher level of culpability than the isolated

reporting violation at issue in Bajakajian. See Jalaram, 599

F.3d at 356 (concluding that the defendant’s crimes were more

serious than in Bajakajian, in part, based on the disparity

between the maximum fines authorized).

Finally, unlike in Bajakajian, we cannot say that the harm

caused by Asefaw’s illegal structuring was “relatively minor.”

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339. Asefaw’s conduct not only deprived

the government of information, it also affected the financial

institutions involved in his transactions, repeatedly

interfering with their reporting duties. See Ahmad, 213 F.3d at

817 (finding that the harm caused was not minimal, in part,

because the defendant’s structuring activities “implicated an

intermediary actor, the First Virginia Bank, and affected its

legal duty to report certain transactions”). Given Asefaw’s

repeated interference with the legal duties of multiple

financial institutions, the harm caused by his conduct is more

substantial than in Bajakajian.

21
 In sum, after weighing the nature of Asefaw’s structuring

violations, the maximum fine that could have been imposed, the

harm caused to the financial institutions, and the deference we

owe to the judgment of Congress concerning the appropriate

penalty, we conclude that the forfeiture amount is not grossly

disproportional to the gravity of Asefaw’s illegal activity. We

therefore do not find the forfeiture amount unconstitutionally

excessive.

V.

For the reasons explained above, the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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