FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-30164
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:10-cr-05268-BHS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT REVELS, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 8, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: KLEINFELD, M. SMITH, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Robert Revels appeals his conviction and sentence for aiding and abetting
unarmed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Revels advances four challenges to his conviction and sentence. First,
Revels argues that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. There
is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Here, based on the evidence adduced by the
government, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of aiding and
abetting unarmed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Revels was found
possessing money stolen from the bank ten minutes after the robbery. An
eyewitness testified that he saw Revels in the garage where two other black males
were in a car that rapidly fled the area when police converged on it. Revels’ DNA
was found on the ski mask that was wrapped around the Beretta. On these facts
and others, a rational trier of fact could find Revels guilty of aiding and abetting
unarmed robbery.
Second, Revels argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress, because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. “Probable
cause to arrest exists when . . . under the totality of circumstances known to the
arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair
probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.” United States v. Lopez,
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482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Here, the tracking device led the police to Revels, who was walking
alone on a bridge approximately two miles from the robbery site. He was the only
person in the vicinity, and he matched the general description of the person who
robbed the bank. He was also dressed in only shorts and a sleeveless basketball
jersey on a cold March day, which could suggest that he had discarded another
layer of clothing. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable
cause to arrest Revels.
Third, Revels argues that the district court erred in concluding that his
conviction under California Vehicle Code § 2008.2 (1996), felony vehicle evasion,
is a crime of violence for purposes of determining whether Revels is a career
offender pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.1(a).
Examining Indiana’s felony vehicle evasion statute, the United States Supreme
Court held that “[f]elony vehicle flight is a violent felony . . . .” Sykes v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2277 (2011). The California statute under which Revels
was convicted is materially similar to the Indiana statute at issue in Sykes. The
district court was therefore correct in reasoning that Revels’ prior conviction for
felony evasion was a crime of violence.
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Fourth, Revels argues that the district court erred in determining that Revels
was not entitled to an acceptance of responsibility adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1. On appellate review, “as long as we can determine that the district court
considered the defendant’s objections and did not rest its decision on
impermissible factors, no specific explanation of reasons is required for denying a
defendant a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.” United States
v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the district court
considered Revels’ conduct and determined that although “through his presentation
of a serious defense he all but admitted involvement, this does not rise to the level
of acceptance of responsibility,” and Revels never ultimately accepted
responsibility for the crime. It is clear the district court did not rest its decision on
impermissible factors. The substance of that decision, in turn, “is a factual
determination we review for clear error.” United States v. Wilson, 392 F.3d 1055,
1061 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court did not clearly err in its factual assessment
of Revels’ conduct.
AFFIRMED.
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