FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-30208
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00016-WFN-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JERAD JOHN KYNASTON, AKA Jared
J. Kynaston, AKA Jerad J. Kynaston; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Wm. Fremming Nielsen, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 8, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: KLEINFELD, M. SMITH, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Reviewing de novo, we hold that the Leon good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies. United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1135–36 (9th
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Reasonably well-
trained officers, relying upon the Spokane County District Judge’s authorization,
would not have known that the search was illegal. United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d
831, 835 (9th Cir. 1994).
The affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official
belief in probable cause was objectively unreasonable. At the time the affidavit
was prepared and the search warrant was executed, Wash. Rev. Code Section
69.51A.20 provided that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede
Washington state law prohibiting the acquisition, possession, manufacture, sale, or
use of cannabis for nonmedical purposes.” Wash. Rev. Code Section 69.50.401(1)
prohibited the manufacture of marijuana and the possession of marijuana with
intent to manufacture or deliver. Thus, the manufacture of marijuana for non-
medical purposes was still a crime under Washington law. Nothing in the record
indicates that officers had evidence that the house and grounds to be searched were
the site of a medical marijuana grow. The probable cause affidavit stated that an
officer smelled the odor of growing or freshly harvested marijuana near the house
to be searched, that officers observed marijuana stems and leaves in the house, and
that the house’s electricity consumption was extremely high. It established at least
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a “colorable argument” for the existence of probable cause. United States v.
Crews, 502 F.3d at 1136.
The warrant was not so facially deficient that executing officers could not
reasonably presume it valid. It stated the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, and was not unconstitutionally overbroad. See, e.g., United States v.
Huggins, 299 F.3d 1039, 1044 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). It alleged a reasonable nexus
between evidence of a crime and the property to be searched. See, e.g., United
States v. Grant, 682 F.3d 827, 838–40 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Crews, 502
F.3d at 1136-37.
It was not necessary for the Government to introduce evidence explaining
why the officers believed that they had probable cause. United States v. Clark, 31
F.3d at 835 (“Although we state the [Leon exception] in terms of ‘good faith,’ the
Supreme Court has ‘eschew[ed] inquiries into the subjective beliefs of law
enforcement officers.’ Consequently, the inquiry is one of objective
reasonableness; we must decide whether a reasonably well-trained officer would
have known that this particular search was illegal despite the magistrate judge’s
authorization.”) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23).
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Because the Leon good faith exception applies, the fruits of the search
should not be suppressed. The district court’s orders to the contrary are reversed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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