were material to the disposition of the motion and included specific
citations to the complaint and to exhibits attached to the motion. NRCP
56(c). Although appellant opposed the summary judgment motion, as
explained below, the district court properly concluded that she failed to
demonstrate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. NRCP 56(e).
First, although appellant alleged that respondent qualified as
a debt collector under the Federal Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA)
15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012) et seq., and NRS 649.370 (stating that violations of
FDCPA are violations of Nevada law and give rise to independent state
claims), the FDCPA excludes the servicing of mortgages. See 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6); Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985).
Additionally, respondent demonstrated that it was the successor holder of
the promissory note based on its possession of the endorsed-in-blank note
and its agreements with the beneficiary of the deed of trust. See Edelstein
v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 128 Nev. , 286 P.3d 249, 258, 260 (2012).
Thus, as the note holder, respondent was collecting its own debt and
servicing its own mortgage note, and the district court properly entered
summary judgment. See Perry, 756 F.2d at 1208 (holding that the FDCPA
defines a debt collector as a party collecting debts owed to another, which
does not include a party attempting to collect an obligation it owns).
Second, although appellant asserted that respondent engaged
in unfair lending practices, as the successor holder of the note, respondent
did not make a loan to appellant, and could not be held liable for unfair
lending practices under NRS 598D.100(1)(b). Thus, the district court
properly entered summary judgment on that cause of action.
Third, appellant's claim for quiet title was properly resolved
on summary judgment, as severance of the note and deed of trust is not
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
fatal to the security interest created by the deed of trust. See Edelstein,
128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d at 260 (permitting severance and independent
transfer of deeds of trusts and notes without impairing the ultimate
enforceability of the instruments after reunification).
Finally, appellant's cause of action seeking a declaration that
the notice of default was null and void was properly rejected as a matter of
law. As noted in the order resolving appellant's related appeal arising
from a district court order dismissing a petition for judicial review in a
foreclosure mediation matter, respondent rescinded the underlying notice
of default. See Brunson v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Docket No. 56899
(Order Vacating Judgment and Remanding, November 15, 2011). Thus,
this cause of action is moot and judgment against appellant was therefore
proper. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order.
It is so ORDERED.'
Hardesty
PC*4)1
Parraguirre
"We have considered appellant's other arguments on appeal and
conclude that they lack merit, and thus, do not warrant reversal.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
cc: Hon. Steven P. Elliott, District Judge
Terry J. Thomas
Houser & Allison, APC
Washoe District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) 1947A