UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4991
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARL LEROY AKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00222-CCE-1)
Submitted: July 9, 2013 Decided: August 1, 2013
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen F. Wallace, THE WALLACE LAW FIRM, High Point, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carl Leroy Akins appeals his conviction and sixty-
month sentence, following his guilty plea, to one count of
possession of a machinegun, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(o)(1), 924(a)(2), 2 (2006). Akins’ counsel filed a brief
in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 in accepting Akins’ guilty plea, and whether the
district court erred in sentencing Akins. Akins was notified of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done
so. Finding no error, we affirm.
Because Akins did not move the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule 11 hearing for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525-26
(4th Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Akins] must show
that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the
error affected his substantial rights.” United States v.
Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Our review of the
record reveals no error. The district court complied with Rule
11’s requirements, ensuring that Akins’ plea was knowing and
voluntary, that he understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that he committed
2
the offense to which he was pleading guilty. Accordingly, we
affirm Akins’ conviction.
We review Akins’ sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard, assessing it for procedural and substantive
reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2008).
This review requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. We
first assess whether the district court properly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), analyzed any arguments presented by
the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Id. at 49–51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76
(4th Cir. 2010). Once we have determined that there is no
procedural error, we must consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the
totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the
sentence is within the properly calculated Guidelines range, we
apply a presumption on appeal that the sentence is substantively
reasonable. See United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
216 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only if the
defendant shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
3
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. Moreover, Akins has failed to overcome the
presumption of reasonableness we accord his within-Guidelines
sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Akins, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Akins requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on his client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4