UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4919
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD CALLOWAY, a/k/a Terry Jacob Smith,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:11-
cr-00257-RWT-1)
Submitted: July 26, 2013 Decided: August 20, 2013
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elita C. Amato, LAW OFFICE OF ELITA C. AMATO, Arlington,
Virginia, for Appellant. David Ira Salem, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Calloway pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (2006), and one count of possession and brandishing a
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924 (2006). Calloway’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious arguments for appeal but raising
for the court’s consideration whether Calloway’s sentence was
unconstitutional because of the court’s consideration of the
facts, how it applied the Guidelines or how it applied the 18
U.S.C. § 3553 (2006) sentencing factors. Calloway was notified
of the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief, but did
not do so. The Government did not file a brief. We affirm.
We review Calloway’s sentence for reasonableness,
applying a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We begin by reviewing
the sentence for significant procedural error, including
improper calculation of the Guidelines range, failure to
consider sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failure to
adequately explain the sentence imposed. Id. at 51. Once we
have determined that the sentence is free of significant
procedural error, we must consider the substantive
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reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the
totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the
sentence is within the appropriate Guidelines range, we apply a
presumption on appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010).
Such a presumption is rebutted only when the defendant
demonstrates “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes–Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that
there was no procedural or substantive error in the imposition
of Calloway’s sentence. Further, the district court adequately
explained the basis for the within-Guidelines sentence based on
the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and we conclude that Calloway
has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Calloway’s convictions and sentence. This
court requires counsel to inform Calloway, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Calloway requests that a petition be filed
but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Calloway. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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