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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14713
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:05-cr-00011-RAL-EAJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TERESA SULLIVAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(August 20, 2013)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Teresa Sullivan appeals her sentence of 10 months of imprisonment
following the revocation of her supervised release. Sullivan argues, for the first
time on appeal, that the district court erred by issuing a summons to appear at a
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revocation hearing based on a report by a probation officer instead of a petition
filed by the United States and that she did not receive adequate notice of the
alleged violations of her supervised release. We affirm.
We review for plain error objections to the revocation of supervised release
not made in the district court. See United States v. Gresham, 325 F.3d 1262, 1265
(11th Cir. 2003). Under that standard, a defendant must prove that the alleged
error is plain and affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. “It is the law of
this circuit that, at least where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not
specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no
precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United
States v. Lejarde–Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).
The district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by issuing a summons to
Sullivan based on a report by her probation officer that she had committed new
offenses. The probation officer had a duty to notify the district court that Sullivan
had violated the terms of her supervised release by committing a new offense. See
18 U.S.C. § 3603(2), (8)(B), (10). And based on that report, the district court had
the authority to issue the summons. See United States v. Feinberg, 631 F.2d 388,
391 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Whenever the district court having jurisdiction over a
probationer acquires knowledge from any source that a violation of the conditions
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of probation may have occurred, the court may then on its own volition inquire into
the matter . . . .”).
Sullivan received adequate notice of the grounds for revoking her supervised
release. Sullivan received a copy of the report by the probation officer. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486–87, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2603 (1972). That
report stated that Sullivan had committed two new offenses of “Uttering Forged
Bills, Checks, Drafts, or Notes . . . on July 9, 2011,” and of “Attempted Grand
Theft . . . on July 9, 2011.” Sullivan complains that the report failed to cite the
state statutes that she allegedly violated, but those citations were unnecessary to
provide her adequate notice. See United States v. Evers, 534 F.2d 1186, 1188 (5th
Cir. 1976) (holding that a petition stating that the basis of revocation was “Arrest
and possession of marihuana on November 24, 1974” provided adequate notice).
The probation officer’s report stated that Florida authorities had charged Sullivan
with criminal offenses in two cases, and Sullivan admitted to the district court that
she understood the charges against her. Again, the district court committed no
error, plain or otherwise.
We AFFIRM the revocation of Sullivan’s supervised release.
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