UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4134
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM SEDRICK ROLLERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00230-RJC-1)
Submitted: July 31, 2013 Decided: August 26, 2013
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Executive Director, Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL
DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Sedrick Rollerson pleaded guilty, without a
plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). The
district court sentenced Rollerson to 180 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether
Rollerson’s sentence violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
because the district court increased the term of imprisonment
based on facts not proved beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to
the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), and whether the district
court erred in finding that Rollerson was an armed career
criminal. Rollerson was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Following a careful
review of the record, we affirm.
Counsel first questions whether Rollerson was
improperly sentenced beyond the statutory maximum based on facts
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, this argument is
foreclosed by the clear precedent of this court and the Supreme
Court. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-
27, 247 (1998); United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 283
(4th Cir. 2005).
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Counsel next questions whether the district court
correctly concluded that Rollerson qualified for the enhanced
penalties of the ACCA pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). We
review a district court’s determination of whether prior
convictions qualify as predicate convictions for purposes of the
ACCA de novo. United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186, 188 (4th
Cir. 2001). A defendant convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm who has three prior convictions for a
violent felony or serious drug offense is subject to sentencing
as an armed career criminal. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); USSG
§ 4B1.4. A violent felony is a “crime, punishable by a term
exceeding one year of imprisonment, . . . that . . . has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force
against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-
(ii). A serious drug offense is “an offense under the
Controlled Substances Act . . . for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i). Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that Rollerson has at least three qualifying
convictions, and that the district court properly determined
that Rollerson was an armed career criminal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Our
review of the record confirms that the district court
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substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11 in accepting Rollerson’s guilty plea, and ensured that his
plea was knowing and voluntary. We therefore affirm Rollerson’s
conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel
inform Rollerson, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Rollerson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Rollerson. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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