UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4160
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMARA D. JOHNSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Solomon Blatt, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (9:11-cr-02288-SB-2)
Submitted: August 14, 2013 Decided: August 27, 2013
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Rhett
DeHart, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamara D. Johnson pled guilty, without a written plea
agreement, to possession, with the intent to defraud, of fifteen
or more counterfeit or unauthorized access devices in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3) (2006). The district court sentenced
Johnson to forty-eight months’ imprisonment. Johnson’s counsel
has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the district court
complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when it accepted Johnson’s
guilty plea and whether Johnson’s sentence is reasonable.
Johnson was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, but he did not do so. We affirm.
Because Johnson did not move to withdraw his plea in
the district court, the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing is
reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Massenburg, 564
F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that, in guilty plea
context, defendant meets burden by showing reasonable
probability that he would not have pled guilty but for Rule 11
omission). Our review of the guilty plea hearing transcript
leads us to conclude that the district court substantially
complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Johnson’s
guilty plea and that the district court’s minor omissions did
not affect Johnson’s substantial rights. Critically, the
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transcript reveals that the district court ensured the plea was
supported by an independent basis in fact and that Johnson
entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily with an understanding
of the consequences. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d
114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we discern no plain
error in the district court’s acceptance of Johnson’s guilty
plea.
Turning to counsel’s challenge to Johnson’s sentence,
we review for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This
review requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In
determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the
district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory
Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for
an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, or failed to explain sufficiently the selected
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51.
If the sentence is free of significant procedural
error, we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.
When, as here, the sentence is within the properly calculated
Guidelines range, we apply a presumption on appeal that the
sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Mendoza-
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Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a presumption
is rebutted only if the defendant shows “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the district court correctly calculated
and considered the advisory Guidelines range, heard argument
from counsel, and gave Johnson the opportunity to allocute. The
district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and explained
that the within-Guidelines sentence of forty-eight months’
imprisonment was warranted in light of Johnson’s history and
characteristics. Counsel offers no argument to rebut the
presumption on appeal that Johnson’s within-Guidelines sentence
is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Johnson.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Johnson, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Johnson requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Johnson.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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