UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6300
JEAN BERNARD GERMAIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MONICA METHENY, RN; CORIZON CORPORATION; R.N. DAWN HAWK,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:12-cv-01882-JFM)
Submitted: August 23, 2013 Decided: August 30, 2013
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jean Bernard Germain, Appellant Pro Se. Lisa J. Russell, Larry
Michael Waranch, WARANCH & BROWN, LLC, Lutherville, Maryland,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jean Bernard Germain appeals the district court’s
orders granting summary judgment to the Appellees, dismissing
his civil rights complaint and denying his motion for
reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
granting summary judgment. Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605,
607 (4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment shall be granted when
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only
if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A district court should grant summary judgment unless
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party
on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). An otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment will not be defeated by the existence of
any factual dispute; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248.
“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
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a mere scintilla of evidence in support of” the nonmoving
party’s case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d
645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate
medical care, an inmate must allege acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to constitute deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976). First, he must objectively show that the deprivation
suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A sufficiently
serious medical need is one that requires medical treatment.
Brice v. Virginia Beach Corr. Cntr., 58 F.3d 101, 104 (4th Cir.
1995). Then, the inmate must show that the defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent
to a serious medical need if he knows of and disregards “an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Odom v. South
Carolina DOC, 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The prison official must be aware of
facts from which an inference is derived that a serious risk of
harm exists. Even if the official is aware of such facts, the
official can avoid liability by responding reasonably to the
risk, “even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that Germain
failed to show that there was a genuine dispute as to a material
fact, particularly that the Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical need. Accordingly, we
affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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