UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6716
FRENCHIS GERALD ABRAHAM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
YVONNE MCDONALD, RN; JUDY RABON, RN; JON E. OZMINT,
Director; A. J. PADULA, Warden; DOCTOR MOORE; MARCUS A.
PRATT, LPN; DOCTOR BENOIR, MD; BENJAMIN F. LEWIS, JR., MD;
JENNIFER N. BOWMAN, MAT; SAMANTHA F. MCCOY, MAT; FRAN
CHAMBERS, LPN; MARIETTA DINGLE, Admin Asst,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (6:11-cv-00046-RMG)
Submitted: August 31, 2012 Decided: September 7, 2012
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frenchis Gerald Abraham, Appellant Pro Se. Samuel F. Arthur,
III, AIKEN, BRIDGES, NUNN, ELLIOTT & TYLER, PA, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Frenchis Abraham, a South Carolina inmate, filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), seeking relief on his
claim that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Abraham alleged that Defendants displayed deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs by preventing timely
and adequate treatment for his splenic cyst condition. Although
the magistrate judge recommended denying summary judgment, the
district court concluded that no issue of fact remained and that
based on the facts alleged, the acknowledged delay in Abraham’s
treatment did not cause him substantial harm. Because we
believe the substantial harm issue is not, in this case, subject
to resolution at the summary judgment stage, we vacate the
district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673
F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). A court must “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
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pain” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A serious medical need “is one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535
F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We conclude that Abraham’s cysts, causing repeated
instances of abdominal pain, vomiting, difficulty eating,
difficulty urinating, and blood in the urine, constituted a
serious medical condition. Moreover, doctors initially
diagnosed the problem and prescribed treatment in 2009; no
significant treatment occurred until 2011.
To show a defendant’s deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need, a prisoner must allege the defendant knew
of and disregarded “the risk posed by” that need. Id. “[A]n
inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” does not
satisfy the standard, and thus mere negligence in diagnosis or
treatment is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. Such indifference can be
displayed, however, through the response of prison doctors and
other institutional personnel to an inmate’s medical needs,
including ignoring an inmate’s serious condition or delaying
medically necessary treatment. Id.
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“A delay in treatment may constitute deliberate
indifference if the delay exacerbated the injury or
unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” McGowan v. Hulick,
612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (vacating and remanding
summary dismissal of complaint alleging three-month delay in
dental treatment); see Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738-39 (4th
Cir. 2009) (finding claim of delay in administering prescribed
medical treatment stated an Eighth Amendment claim).
In granting summary judgment in this case, the
district court reasoned that Abraham did not suffer substantial
harm from the acknowledged delay in treatment for his splenic
cyst. However, we perceive a genuine issue of fact as to
whether Abraham did, in fact, suffer such harm. Abraham
regularly reported to medical staff abdominal pain, vomiting and
blood in his urine. Abraham also reported being unable to eat.
In his filings in the district court, Abraham complained of
“chronic and serious pain” that significantly affected his daily
activities, such as “trouble swallowing food, [bowel trouble,]
and trouble urinating.” Additionally, Abraham continued to have
pain following an aspiration procedure, prompting a doctor to
order another CT scan. Abraham’s cysts were pervasive,
ultimately requiring that he undergo more extensive surgery.
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Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment
and remand for further proceedings. * We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
*
We express no opinion on the claims of immunity asserted
by Defendants below, as the district court has not yet addressed
the issue of immunity.
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