UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6544
SHERMAN A. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
LIEUTENANT SHELTON; SERGEANT WILFORD FOX; SERGEANT
ALPERSTEIN; OFFICER NATHAN MCMILLIAN; OFFICER ANDERSON;
OFFICER ANTAIUS GRAY,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:11-ct-03127-FL)
Submitted: August 30, 2013 Decided: September 23, 2013
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sherman A. Thompson, Appellant Pro Se. Kimberly D. Grande,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sherman A. Thompson, a North Carolina inmate, appeals the
district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The only undisputed
facts are that, on March 16, 2010, Thompson set fire to the
mattress in his cell and had to be extracted from the cell.
Beyond this, the accounts of the events detailing Thompson’s
removal from his cell and afterward diverge.
According to Thompson, after he was taken from his cell in
full restraints, he was
struck[] in face once and took into the sallyport to
where I was punched by officer Mr. Nathan McMillian in
which I was knocked to the ground. Once on the ground
I was kicked and stomped over and over to which head
stomped against the floor. The head stomping injuries
consist of swelling knots on head and serious weeks of
headaches. . . . I was later kicked so hard up the
buttocks that I later had hemorrhoids in which
buttocks was bleeding and buttocks is still being
treated for hemorrhoid pains. And I was stomped and
kicked unconscience [sic] and I was pent [sic] down by
three other officers to which was in sergeant office
out the sight of hallway camera. . . .
Sergeant Mr. Wilford stomped and kicked me as he
was in the sallyport area going to the hall. Sergeant
Mr. Wilford Fox injured my left wrist seriously which
he tore open skin to which I have a physical seen
injury do [sic] to the handcuffs tearing open wrist.
I was taken to the sergeant office and stomped
and kicked unconscience [sic] as well by this officer
and punched over and over and blood was coming out of
ear to which it was a buzzing in my ear for a week or
more. Officer Sergeant Mr. Wilford Fox kick plaintiff
two times in groin to which the injury is plaintiff
has serious trouble urine [sic] and while still on
floor in sergeant office, I was kick up the buttocks
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so hard that my buttock was bleeding to which I have
hemorrhoids and still have daily pains in buttock and
scrotum to which lady nurse refuse to look at on march
16, 2010.
The Defendants present a very different version of the
events that day. According to affidavits submitted in support
of their motion for summary judgment, Thompson assaulted custody
staff when they attempted to remove him from his cell. Officers
McMillan and Fox “each took hold of one of [Thompson’s] arms,
but he resisted their attempts to get control of him. Both
Defendants used the bent wrist come along to escort [Thompson]
off the cellblock.” At his prison disciplinary hearing,
Thompson was found guilty of setting a fire that endangered
others’ lives and assaulting prison staff.
Thompson alleges that security cameras recorded the events
of March 16. However, in response to the district court’s order
to produce those recordings, Defendants stated that the events
were not videotaped.
Thompson was twice seen by a nurse the day of the
extraction. According to his medical records, when Thompson was
first seen, his right eye was red and the skin on his upper back
and neck were red, though no swelling or bruising was noted.
Approximately two hours later, Thompson was seen again and his
right eye was then swollen and “very red.” Superficial
abrasions were noted on his right lower arm and under his left
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leg cuff. The abrasions were cleaned and bandaids applied. He
complained of a headache and was prescribed ibuprofen. The
following day, Thompson was interviewed by a social worker who
stated in his report that Thompson “was grateful to the officers
who rescued him.”
On March 21, Thompson submitted another sick call request,
stating that “I need to have my head looked at do [sic] to being
stomped many times in head. I also was kicking in the growing
[sic] many times and has pains in abdominal area.” On March 26,
Thompson was seen by a nurse who noted that his “head pain
resolved, no problem last 2 days,” and that his “testicular pain
. . . recently resolved,” but “complained of lower right sided
. . . pain.” In his last sick call request contained in the
record, dated April 17, Thompson sought treatment for “sores in
mouth and throat” and stated that he is “also having ongoing
headaches do [sic] to officers stomping my head into the floor
many times.”
Thompson’s response to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment states, under penalty of perjury, that he did not
refuse the Defendants’ instruction and “provoked no attack.” He
then repeated, under oath, the assertions made in his original
complaint regarding the use of force.
Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that
the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because there
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was a need for force and the amount of force used was
reasonable, given the “de minimis nature of [Thompson’s] injury,
as well as the lack of evidentiary support for plaintiff’s
allegations regarding the assault.” Thompson appeals.
We review a district court’s summary judgment determination
de novo, drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Webster v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 685 F.3d 411, 421 (4th Cir. 2012). We
find, based on our review of the record, that Thompson presented
sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment and, therefore,
we vacate the district court’s order.
Although “[a]n express intent to inflict unnecessary pain
is not required” to make out an excessive force claim under the
Eighth Amendment, an inmate must show that the defendant
inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering. Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Both objective and subjective
considerations factor into our inquiry. “Specifically, Eighth
Amendment analysis necessitates inquiry as to whether [a] prison
official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind
(subjective component) and whether the deprivation suffered or
injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious
(objective component).” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761
(4th Cir. 1996); see Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir.
2008).
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Where, as here, an inmate claims that a prison official
used excessive force against him, the subjective component
demands that the inmate demonstrate that officials applied force
wantonly; that is, “maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm” rather than as part of “a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). “When
evaluating evidence to determine whether it is legally
sufficient to satisfy the subjective component, a court may
allow an inmate’s claim to go to the jury only if it concludes
that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
claimant, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the
infliction of pain.” Stanley v. Hejirika, 134 F.3d 629, 634
(4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). Factors relevant
to this determination include “the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force
that was used,” the extent of the injury, the threat reasonably
perceived by the responsible official, “and any efforts made to
temper the severity of a forceful response.” Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 320-21.
Satisfying the objective component in the context of an
excessive force claim, on the other hand, demands only that the
force used be “nontrivial.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39
(2010). As the Supreme Court has instructed, “contemporary
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standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or not
significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citation
omitted). Nevertheless, a plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a
serious injury is not irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment
inquiry. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. Indeed, the extent of the
injury may suggest that “‘the use of force could plausibly have
been thought necessary’ in a particular situation” or “provide
some indication of the amount of force applied.” Id. (quoting
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). As a result, “[a]n inmate who complains
of a [mere] ‘push or shove’ that causes no discernible injury
almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.”
Id. at 38 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).
According to the version of events sworn to by Thompson and
supported at least in part by his medical records, a jury could
infer that the officers wantonly administered significant force
to Thompson in retaliation for his conduct rather than for the
purpose of bringing him under control. Therefore, we conclude
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants, and we vacate its judgment and remand
for further proceedings.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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