UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4978
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAFAEL HERNANDEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00309-WO-5)
Submitted: September 24, 2013 Decided: October 1, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rafael Hernandez-Rodriguez pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2006). The district court sentenced Hernandez-Rodriguez to 121
months’ imprisonment, and he timely appeals.
Counsel for Hernandez-Rodriguez has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
(1) whether the district court erred in denying Hernandez-
Rodriguez’s motion to suppress evidence found in a traffic stop
of his vehicle; and (2) whether Hernandez-Rodriguez’s sentence
is substantively reasonable. Hernandez-Rodriguez, informed of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, has not done so.
Finding no merit to either issue raised by counsel, we affirm.
In the first issue, Hernandez-Rodriguez seeks to
challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop of a vehicle
driven by Hernandez-Rodriguez that resulted in the discovery of
a quantity of cocaine. Hernandez-Rodriguez did not, however,
enter a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(a)(2), by which he could have preserved this issue for
appeal. A knowing and voluntary guilty plea forecloses all
antecedent, nonjurisdictional defects “not logically
inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and
2
which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is
validly established.” Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2
(1975); see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973);
United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he defendant who has pled guilty has no non-jurisdictional
ground upon which to attack that judgment except the inadequacy
of the plea or the government’s power to bring any indictment at
all.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The legality of the
traffic stop underlying this conviction and whether Hernandez-
Rodriguez was “in custody” as that term is defined in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are just such antecedent,
nonjurisdictional issues, and Hernandez-Rodriguez is therefore
entitled to no relief on his first claim.
Counsel next challenges the substantive reasonableness
of Hernandez-Rodriguez’s sentence of 121 months’ imprisonment,
the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. We
review the sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007). A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
court properly calculates the defendant’s advisory Guidelines
range, gives the parties an opportunity to argue for an
appropriate sentence, considers the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, does not rely on clearly erroneous facts, and
sufficiently explains the selected sentence. Id. at 49–51. Our
3
review of the sentencing transcript pursuant to Anders convinces
us that Hernandez-Rodriguez’s sentence is procedurally
reasonable.
As to substantive reasonableness, the 121-month
sentence, at the bottom of Hernandez-Rodriguez’s properly-
calculated Guidelines range, is entitled to a presumption of
reasonableness, United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295
(4th Cir. 2012), which Hernandez-Rodriguez has not rebutted.
See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (“A defendant can only rebut the presumption by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted)). The district court therefore
did not abuse its discretion and imposed a reasonable sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
remainder of the record in this case and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform
Hernandez-Rodriguez, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Hernandez-Rodriguez requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
4
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hernandez-Rodriguez.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
5