IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-20420
Summary Calendar
SHERRILYN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-95-4797
September 18, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sherrilyn Williams appeals the district court's order
dismissing with prejudice her claims against her former employer,
Travelers Insurance Company. We find no error and affirm.
I
Williams initially filed this suit in Texas state court and
alleged three causes of action under Texas law: wrongful
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
termination in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim, termination based on gender discrimination, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Invoking diversity jurisdiction,
Travelers removed the matter to federal district court. Williams
did not make a formal motion for a remand to state court and did
not challenge the federal court's authority to hear a matter
arising under a state workers' compensation statute until more than
three months after removal.
In connection with two pre-trial conferences, the court
requested the parties to submit documents to support their factual
assertions. Williams claimed in her original petition that her
personnel file "did not contain any complaints or incidents which
would necessitate disciplinary action or the termination of her
employment." The court discovered, however, that Williams's file
contained a series of memoranda in which Travelers notified
Williams that her performance was inadequate. More than five
months before termination—and more than three months before the
injury at the heart of Williams's workers' compensation
claim—Travelers issued a "final warning," which stated that
Williams would be fired if she continued to fall below standards in
specific areas.
Based on the contents of Williams's personnel file, the court
dismissed the suit with prejudice. The court explained in its
brief opinion that Williams's claims had been "disproved
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absolutely" and that poor performance, rather than Williams's
workers' compensation claim, was the basis of her termination.
II
As a preliminary matter, Williams argues that federal courts
lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that arise under state
workers’ compensation laws. It is true that “[a] civil action in
any State court arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of
such State may not be removed to any district court of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1445(c) (1994). This statute, however,
speaks simply to the parties’ procedural rights rather than to the
jurisdictional reach of the federal courts. St. Paul Ins. Co. v.
Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1994); Williams v. AC Spark
Plugs, 985 F.2d 783, 786-88 (5th Cir. 1993). Perhaps the plaintiff
could have taken advantage of her procedural right to a remand to
the Texas state court system if she had moved for a remand within
thirty days of Travelers’s notice of removal. See 28 U.S.C.A. §
1447(c) (1994). But because she failed to act within the thirty-
day period, she waived her opportunity to have a state court hear
her complaint. The federal district court had diversity
jurisdiction and did not overstep its authority in ruling on
Williams’s lawsuit.
Williams further contends that the dismissal violated Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c), which requires summary judgment motions to be served
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at least ten days before a hearing. In this case, the court
entered its dismissal three days after its March 19 request for
employment documents. Although the court’s order did not specify
whether Williams had failed to state or claim or had instead failed
to present adequate summary judgment evidence, we view the
dismissal as the result of a failure in the pleadings under Rule
12(b)(6). Williams’s complaint stated that “her personnel record
did not contain any complaints or incidents which would necessitate
disciplinary action or the termination of her employment.” The
most casual reading of the personnel file demonstrates that this
assertion is false. Williams has not contested the authenticity of
the documents furnished by Travelers. Instead, she characterizes
the documents as summary judgment evidence to which she had
inadequate opportunity to respond. But her complaint itself
introduces the file as the basis of her suit, and a court can
properly consider such documents on a motion to dismiss, even when
the opposing party actually submits them to the court. See Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consolidated Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (expressing concern that “a plaintiff with a
legally deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by
failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied”),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1042 (1994); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum,
Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Kramer v.
Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991)) (allowing a
court to inspect SEC documents outside of the pleadings in ruling
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on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Branch v.
Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.) (“[D]ocuments whose contents
are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party
questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading,
may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.”), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994). The personnel
records reveal that Williams cannot possibly prevail on her theory
that her workers’ compensation claim caused Travelers to fire her.
The district court properly reached the conclusion that Williams’s
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
Finally, Williams asserts that the court failed to address her
claims for gender discrimination and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court’s order and opinion made no specific
reference to these claims. We are satisfied, however, that the
court committed no error in dismissing them. In light of the
personnel record, Williams has alleged no facts that suggest
outrageous conduct, severe emotional distress, or gender as a
causal element in Travelers’s decision to terminate her employment.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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