UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-50135
Summary Calendar
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JUAN GRAJEDA; ESTELLA GRAJEDA, as Next Friends of
Marisabel Grajeda, a minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
THE YSLETA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants
THE YSLETA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas
(EP-94-CV-164)
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September 9, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*
Appellees Juan F. Grajeda and Estella Grajeda brought this
civil rights action on behalf of their daughter, Marisabel Grajeda,
against the Ysleta Independent School District and one of its
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
teachers.1 The case was settled for $210,000, but no agreement was
reached on the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. On January 19, 1996, the district court (Briones, J.)
awarded $94,860 to plaintiffs’ counsel. The school district
appeals the amount of this fee award.2
In this circuit, a district court calculating reasonable
attorneys’ fees must follow a two-step procedure. First, the court
must determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation and a reasonable hourly rate for the prevailing party’s
lawyers. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319,
323-24 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ---U.S.---, 116 S.Ct. 173,
133 L.Ed.2d 113; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433,
103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The hourly rate and
the number of hours are multiplied to determine the lodestar, a
presumptively reasonable fee award. See Watkins v. Fordice, 7
F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing City of Burlington v. Dague,
505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 2641, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992)).
The district court must then consider whether to adjust the
lodestar, upward or downward, in light of the twelve factors
identified by this court in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). As this court has explained,
1
The action was brought under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq., and 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
2
The court also awarded $16,550 to Marisabel Grajeda’s
attorney ad litem. That award is not at issue in this appeal.
2
the district court must consider the Johnson factors, but the
decision to adjust the award in light of those factors is
discretionary. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 330. In
any event, it is “important . . . for the district court to provide
a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40.
In this appeal, the school district claims that the district
court failed to employ the lodestar method, and further, that the
court failed to consider the Johnson factors. We review the
district court’s award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion
and its underlying factual determinations for clear error. Von
Clark v. Butler, 916 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted).
We find no clear error in district court’s determination of
hours reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel in this case. The
district court stated that its review of the entire record led it
to conclude that plaintiffs’ counsel had billed for unnecessary or
duplicative legal work. Consequently, the district court reduced
the number of hours claimed by counsel. Failing to order an even
greater reduction in the hours billed was not clear error.
However, we conclude that the district court failed to
properly complete its calculations according to the lodestar
method. The record does not indicate that the district court
determined a reasonable hourly rate for plaintiffs’ lawyers, nor
that it multiplied an hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably
3
expended. Moreover, the record is devoid of any indication that
the district court considered whether to adjust the fee award in
light of the Johnson factors.
Accordingly, we vacate the award of attorneys’ fees and remand
for reconsideration of reasonable attorneys’ fees in accordance
with the lodestar method and the Johnson factors.
4