IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
October 14, 2009 Session
STEVE STAMSON,
CLERK OF JUVENILE COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE v.
DAVID LILLARD, ET AL.
Direct Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Shelby County
No. U6657 Charles M. Cary, Judge
No. W2009-00513-COA-R3-JV - Filed November 5, 2009
This appeal involves the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. to civil service positions
in Shelby County. The Juvenile Court entered a consent judgment on a salary petition filed by the
Juvenile Court Clerk pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. This judgment allowed the
Juvenile Court Clerk to fill certain civil service positions. When the positions were not filled, the
Juvenile Court Clerk filed a Petition for Contempt. Subsequently, the Juvenile Court entered
judgment on the Petition for Contempt. Finding that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to award relief pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq., we vacate its judgments
and dismiss the case.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Vacated and
Dismissed
J. STEVEN STAFFORD , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.,
and DAVID R. FARMER , J., joined.
Brian L. Kuhn and Robert B. Rolwing, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellants, David Lillard,
Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, Tennessee, and A.C. Wharton, Jr.,
Mayor of Shelby County, Tennessee.
David F. Kustoff, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Steve Stamson, Clerk of Juvenile Court
of Shelby County, Tennessee.
OPINION
Background
This case began on June 25, 2008, when Steve Stamson, Clerk of the Juvenile Court of
Shelby County (“Appellee”), filed a salary petition in the Juvenile Court of Shelby County. In this
petition, Appellee requested, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq., the authority to fill
five classified positions in his office. Appellee named as defendants to this petition David Lillard,
Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County and A. C. Wharton, Jr., Mayor of Shelby
County (“Appellants”). Appellants answered the petition on July 1, 2008.
Subsequently, the parties entered into a Consent Judgment on July 31, 2008. The Consent
Judgment states that the petition was properly filed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann § 8-20-101, et seq.,
and that there is a need to fill the requested positions. Additionally, the Consent Judgment states
that it does not serve as a waiver to the issue of whether the civil service positions are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101, et seq. Further, the Consent
Judgment required that all salaries be in compliance with the 2008-2009 Shelby County Salary
Policy. The referenced Salary Policy stated that the County Commission had established a select
oversight committee to administer the policy. This select oversight committee was established by
the Hiring Freeze Resolution adopted by the County Commission on June 2, 2008 to reduce
personnel costs by reducing employment through attrition. Under the Hiring Freeze Resolution, the
select oversight committee must determine that a vacant position is critical to the operation of county
government and authorize the position to be filled.
Appellant, prior to filing his petition, had sought permission from the oversight committee
to fill the positions at issue. Prior to being denied permission by the oversight committee on June
30, 2008, Appellee filed his petition in the Juvenile Court. Upon being denied permission by the
oversight committee, Appellee appealed to the County Commission’s Budget Committee in
accordance with the Hiring Freeze Resolution. After meeting on the issue on August 20, 2008, the
Budget Committee denied Appellee’s request. Appellee did not appeal this decision. Appellee had
the option of appealing the decision to the County Commission through a writ of certiorari. Tenn
Code Ann. § 27-9-101 et seq.
On September 22, 2008, Appellee filed a petition for contempt in the Juvenile Court based
on the Consent Judgment. In his petition, Appellee sought to have the Juvenile Court hold
Appellants in civil contempt for refusing to post the requested positions. The Juvenile Court heard
the petition on December 10, 2008 and entered an Order of Judgment on February 2, 2009. The
Juvenile Court found that neither the Appellants nor the Shelby County Government, which was not
a party, were in contempt of court. The court went on to hold that Shelby County civil service
employees were subject to the Civil Service Merit Act for Shelby County and that the five positions
at issue were civil service positions and not subject to the salary petition law. The trial court,
however, held that the consent order was valid as it was conditioned on the Civil Service Merit Act.
Additionally, the Juvenile Court went on to find that the oversight committee conflicted with the
Shelby County Civil Service Merit Act, that the Shelby County Government had failed to comply
with the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Act, and that the Appellee could fill the positions and
the county must fund the positions. Appellants appeal from this Order.
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On appeal, Appellants present the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in ruling about Shelby County civil
service employees under the Tennessee Anti-Fee Statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 80-20-101, et seq.?
2. Whether the trial court erred in enforcing a salary petition consent order, using the vehicle of a
petition for contempt?
3. Whether the trial court erred in granting enforcement of a salary petition order without the proper
parties before it?
4. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Shelby County Commission’s temporary hiring
Freeze Resolution unlawfully conflicts with the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Act, 1971 Tenn.
Priv. Acts, ch 110.
We review the trial court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness, unless
the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). No presumption of correctness,
however, attaches to the trial court’s conclusions of law and our review is de novo. Bowden v.
Ward, 275 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000).
Analysis
Appellants first contend that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear
this case. Appellants specifically assert that because the positions at issue are all civil service
positions, the salary petition law provided in Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq., is not applicable
but instead, the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Act controls.
“Courts derive their subject matter jurisdiction from the Constitution of Tennessee or from
legislative act, and cannot exercise jurisdictional powers that have not been conferred on them
expressly or by necessary implication.” Dishmon v. Shelby State Community College, 15 S.W.3d
477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)(citations omitted). This case originated with a salary petition filed
by Appellee as stated in his petition, “pursuant to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-20-101, et seq.”
Subsequently, the trial court entered a consent judgment requiring the positions to be filled. When
they were not filled, Appellee brought a contempt petition asking that the Appellants be held in civil
contempt for failure to comply with the consent judgment.
This Court has previously addressed the issue of the application of the Shelby County Civil
Service Act and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-20-101, et seq., to civil service positions in Shelby County.
See Patterson v. Rout, W2001-01769-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1592674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). In
Patterson, we held “that Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101, et seq., is suspended by the [Shelby County
Civil Service] Act with respect to those employees governed by the Act.” Id. at *2. Section 8-20-112
of the Tennessee Code provides:
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In any county having a civil service system for the sheriff’s
department pursuant to Chapter 8, part 4 of this title or other
provision of general law or the provisions of a private act, or a civil
service system for all county employees pursuant to the provisions of
a private act, the employment or termination of employment of any
deputy or assistant in any office covered by the chapter shall be
pursuant to the provisions of such civil service system, and the
provisions of § 8-20-109 shall not apply to such county.
Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-20-112 (1993)(emphasis added). A civil service system for Shelby County
was created by the legislature with a private act. Tenn. Priv. Acts. Ch. 110 (1971). As stated by our
Supreme Court, “the creation of a civil service system for a local government is a legitimate
objective of the General Assembly, and one which it may accomplish within rather broad limits.
Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board v. Lively, 692 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Tenn. 1985). When a county
employee is governed by a civil service system, the civil service system governs all aspects of
employment, including terms of employment, promotion, discipline and termination. Id. at 16.
Because the Shelby County Civil Service Act governs classified employees, Id. at *5, and it is
undisputed that the positions at issue are classified positions, we find that they are governed by the
Shelby County Civil Service Act and that Tenn. Code. Ann. § 80-20-101 et seq., does not apply to
those positions.
In his brief, Appellee, citing to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-20-112(1993), argues that a county with
a civil service system is exempted only from the provisions of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-20-109, which
eliminates termination at will, and not the remaining provisions of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-20-101 et
seq. This, however, is the same argument made by the appellee in Patterson, which this Court
expressly disagreed with. Patterson, 2002 WL 1592674 at *3-4. The General Assembly amended
Tenn. Code Ann § 8-20-101 et seq., in 1984 by adding section 112. This section includes two
provisions, one that mandates that the employment of civil service employees be in accordance with
the civil service act which they are governed by, and a second that provides that section 109 shall
not apply to a county covered by a civil service act. Section 112 serves two purposes.
First, it requires that where a civil service system is enacted, terms of
employment for employees governed by the act “shall” be in
accordance with that system. Second, it specifically mandates that
contrary to the general provisions, employees governed by a civil
service act are not deemed terminable at will.
Patterson, 2002 WL 1592674 at *4. We have been provided with no reason to change our position,
and therefore must hold that the Shelby County Civil Service Act suspends all provisions of Tenn.
Code Ann § 8-20-101 et seq.
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Appellee has submitted that we should allow the trial court’s ruling to stand because the
parties entered into a consent order. However, “parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on
a trial or an appellate court by appearance, plea, consent, silence, or waiver.” Dishmon, 15 S.W.3d
at 480. Therefore, the parties actions of entering into a consent order are irrelevant to our decision
on subject matter jurisdiction. Further, Appellants expressly reserved their right to contest the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction in the Consent Judgment.
Appellee also argues that this Court should allow the Consent Judgment to stand as it is
similar to the consent agreement provided for in Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-20-102. Because the
positions at issue are civil service positions, Tenn. Code Ann. §8-20-101 et seq., including the
provisions for a consent agreement, are not applicable. Since Tenn. Code Ann § 8-20-101 et seq.
does not apply in this situation it is irrelevant whether the Consent Judgment is akin to the consent
agreement provided for by statute.
Accordingly, we hold that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
award relief pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. Finding that the Juvenile Court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction, we must also find that the Consent Judgment entered was a void
judgment.
A void judgment is one which shows upon the face of the record a
want of jurisdiction in the court assuming to render the judgement,
which want of jurisdiction may be either of the person, or of the
subject matter generally, or of the particular question attempted to be
decided or the relief assumed to be given.
New York Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 24 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tenn. 1930). “The question of whether
a judgment is void ‘is always one of jurisdiction, that is, whether the order, judgment or precess
under attack comes within the lawful authority of the court or judge rendering or using it.” Edwards
v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tenn 2008)(quoting State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d
284, 287 (Tenn. 1979) overruled on other grounds). The Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction
to award relief pursuant to a salary petition brought under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. See
Patterson v. Rout, 2002 WL 1592674 at *2. Therefore any judgment entered pursuant to this
petition is void on its face. Finding that the juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to award the relief pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq., we must find that both the
consent judgment and the order of judgment from the contempt petition are void. Accordingly, we
must vacate these judgments and dismiss the case. All other issues are pretermitted.
Conclusion
We hold that the juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental requirement
and dismissal is required whenever it is demonstrated that it does not exist. See Tenn. R. Civ. P.
12.08. “[W]hen an appellate court determines that a trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it
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must vacate the judgment and dismiss the case without reaching the merits of the appeal.” Dishmon,
15 S.W.3d at 480 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and
dismiss the case. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellee, Steve Stamson, Clerk of the Juvenile
Court of Shelby County, for which execution may issue if necessary.
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J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J.
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