State v. Meeks

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
May 28, 2008 Session Heard at Cookeville1

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RANDY LEE MEEKS ET AL.

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals
Circuit Court for Coffee County
No. 34,241 Jerry Scott, Senior Judge and L. Craig Johnson, Judge

No. M2006-01385-SC-R11-CO - Filed September 2, 2008

This appeal involves the warrantless search of a motel room containing an actively operating
methamphetamine laboratory. After the occupants of the room were indicted for manufacturing
methamphetamine and for possessing methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, they filed a motion
in the Circuit Court for Coffee County seeking to suppress the evidence found in the motel room.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment. The State appealed, and
the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence and
vacated the order dismissing the indictment. State v. Meeks, No. M2006-01385-CCA-R3-CO, 2007
WL 1987797 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2007). We granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11
application for permission to appeal to address more fully the principles applicable to warrantless
searches of actively operating methamphetamine laboratories when the State asserts that the officers
were acting to avert a serious and immediate risk of injury to themselves or others. Like the Court
of Criminal Appeals, we have determined that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress
and by dismissing the indictment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
Affirmed

WILLIAM C. KOCH , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J.,
JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and GARY R. WADE, JJ., joined.

Robert T. Carter and Eric J. Burch, Tullahoma, Tennessee, for the appellants, Randy Meeks and
Ernest L. Snyder, Jr.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Mark
A. Fulks, Senior Counsel; C. Michael Layne, District Attorney General; and Felecia Walkup,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

1
Oral argument was heard in this case in Cookeville, Putnam County, Tennessee, as part of this Court’s
S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students) project.
 OPINION

I.

At approximately 11:45 p.m. on March 6, 2005, one of the occupants of Room 109 of the
Park Motel in Manchester, Tennessee telephoned the Manchester Police Department to report a
strange odor in her motel room. When Officer Scott Peterson returned the call, the caller told him
that the odor appeared to be coming from an adjoining room and that the odor was causing her and
her mother to have burning eyes and headaches.

The caller also asked Officer Peterson “[w]hat does a meth lab smell like? What does
making methamphetamine smell like?” Officer Peterson informed her that an actively operating
methamphetamine laboratory has a distinct odor that is difficult to describe. After talking with the
caller for approximately five minutes, Officer Peterson decided to follow up on the call. Even
though the Manchester Police Department had received other similar calls that ultimately did not
involve a methamphetamine laboratory, Officer Peterson was aware that other methamphetamine
laboratories had been found at the Park Motel.

Officer Peterson met with the caller in Room 109 of the Park Motel. Upon entering the
room, he discovered that the odor, particularly in the bathroom area, was instantly recognizable and
unmistakable. The odor indicated that the occupants of Room 110 were manufacturing
methamphetamine. Officer Peterson also noted that the caller and her elderly mother were still
complaining of burning eyes and headaches – symptoms consistent with the effects of the toxic
fumes produced when methamphetamine is being manufactured.

Officer Stuart Caldwell arrived at the Park Motel shortly after Officer Peterson. Officer
Caldwell is certified as an expert regarding the production of methamphetamine. He has examined
more than two hundred laboratories making methamphetamine, and he has been involved in more
than one hundred and fifty methamphetamine prosecutions. Simply by standing in front of the door
to Room 110, Officer Caldwell “could smell what [he] knew to be a meth lab.”

Officers Peterson and Caldwell decided to knock on the door of Room 110 to speak with the
occupant or occupants of the room. The officers received no response to their knocks, but with every
knock, the odor intensified because the door was quite flimsy. In fact, the odor was so strong that
Officer Peterson was forced to stand beside, rather than directly in front of, the door in order to avoid
the fumes. While Officers Peterson and Caldwell were knocking on the door, they were joined by
Corporal Ronny Gray who also immediately noticed the extremely strong odors of the ongoing
manufacture of methamphetamine. The occupants of Room 110 did not respond to the officers’
knocking, but the officers heard someone’s voice inside the room and also heard the sound of
breaking glass.

The officers then discussed their next course of action in light of the intensity of the odors
emanating from Room 110. Officer Peterson understood that methamphetamine manufacturing

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created dangerous fumes and a risk of explosion. Officer Stuart was aware that the “presence of the
chemicals there are dangerous in themselves, but when you start mixing those chemicals, it starts
producing phosphine gas, hydrochloric gas, several gases that in just one part per million can kill
you.” He also feared the possibility of fatalities because the occupants of Room 110 and persons in
the vicinity of the room risked inhaling the toxic fumes, explosion, and fire. Corporal Gray agreed
that the situation posed a “threat.” Collectively, the officers agreed that they should enter Room 110
because of the dangers posed by manufacturing methamphetamine. The officers made this decision
approximately five to ten minutes after Officer Peterson first arrived at the Park Motel.

Corporal Gray obtained a key to Room 110 from the motel manager. When the officers
unlocked the door, it still would not open completely because of a chain lock on the interior of the
door. However, a large cloud of fumes escaped from the room through the partially opened door.
The officers identified the fumes as a chemical cloud and concluded that the conditions in the room
were extremely hazardous. Officer Peterson indicated that the air inside the room was not something
that he “really want[ed] to be breathing” and that it posed a danger to others nearby. Officer
Caldwell noted that the chemicals were capable of creating a fire. The officers continued to identify
themselves in loud voices and to demand that the occupants of the room come to the door. Despite
these commands, the occupants of the room still did not comply.

After receiving no response, the officers kicked in the door to Room 110. A hot plate with
a glowing red heating element and bottles of peroxide and other unidentified liquids were near the
door. Two men were in the room. Ernest Snyder stood in the bathroom with one of his hands
behind his back. Randy Meeks was lying unconscious on the bed. When Mr. Snyder refused to
comply with their commands to put his hands up, the officers removed him from the room. The
intensity of the fumes in the room prevented the officers from re-entering.

Before removing Mr. Meeks from the room, Officer Caldwell and Corporal Gray donned air
suits they had obtained from the fire department. When they re-entered the room, Mr. Meeks was
still lying unconscious on the bed. The officers dragged him from the room, and paramedics were
able to resuscitate him. Mr. Meeks remained incoherent at the scene and was in intensive care for
an extended period of time. Mr. Snyder also required hospitalization. Approximately ten minutes
elapsed between the officers’ first entry into Room 110 and their removal of Mr. Meeks.

After Messrs. Meeks and Snyder were removed from the room, the officers called a
hazardous materials team to the motel and placed an exhaust fan in Room 110. The persons who
had been in the rooms adjacent to Room 110, including the person who placed the original telephone
call to the police and her elderly mother, were relocated to other motels in Manchester. Later, when
he was cross-examined regarding the decision not to evacuate the motel before entering Room 110,
Officer Caldwell conceded that failing to remove the other motel occupants was “poor judgment”
and that “[w]e should have done that first.”

Using the information obtained from their warrantless entry of Room 110, the officers
secured a search warrant. When the authorities searched Room 110, they found methamphetamine

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on the dresser, as well as evidence of a methamphetamine laboratory, including an HCL gas
generator, plastic tubing, aluminum foil, a bottle of iodine crystals, a bottle containing muriatic acid,
a Mason jar containing separating liquids, a plastic container of ephedrine, a gallon jug of iodine,
and disposable plastic gloves.

In April 2005, a Coffee County grand jury indicted Messrs. Meeks and Snyder for
manufacturing methamphetamine, possessing methamphetamine, and possessing drug paraphernalia.
In July 2005, Messrs. Meeks and Snyder filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Coffee County
seeking to suppress the evidence seized in Room 110 on the ground that the warrantless entry was
not justified by exigent circumstances. Following an October 10, 2005 hearing, the trial court
entered an order on November 9, 2005, granting the motion to suppress. Placing great significance
on the fact that the officers had not evacuated the occupants of the adjoining rooms before they
entered Room 110, the trial court concluded that the State had failed to demonstrate the existence
of the sort of exigent circumstances that would justify a warrantless search.

The State sought review of the trial court’s November 9, 2005 order by the Court of Criminal
Appeals. On July 10, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals filed an opinion reversing the trial court’s
suppression order and vacating the order dismissing the indictment. State v. Meeks, No. M2006-
01385-CCA-R3-CO, 2007 WL 1987797 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2007). Relying on one of its
unreported opinions,2 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the warrantless entry and search of
Room 110 was proper because the actions of Messrs. Meeks and Snyder “did indeed present an
immediate threat to public safety.” State v. Meeks, 2007 WL 1987797, at *8. The court also held
that the “probable cause to search was present and accompanied by exigent circumstances – the
dangers associated with the active production of methamphetamine in a hotel room.” State v. Meeks,
2007 WL 1987797, at *8.

Messrs. Meeks and Snyder filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal.
They assert (1) that the Court of Criminal Appeals violated their due process rights by invoking
Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) to permit the State to file a notice of appeal after the expiration of the thirty-
day deadline and (2) that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s
November 9, 2005 order granting their motion to suppress the evidence found in Room 110. We
granted Messrs. Meeks and Snyder permission to appeal to address more fully the principles
applicable to warrantless searches of actively operating methamphetamine laboratories when the
State asserts that the officers were acting to avert a serious and immediate risk of injury to
themselves or others.

II.

Messrs. Meeks and Snyder assert that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by permitting the
State to pursue its appeal from the trial court’s November 9, 2005 suppression order. They argue

2
State v. Castile, No. M2004-02572-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 W L 1816371 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2006) (No
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

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that the appeal is not timely and that the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision to permit the State to
pursue the appeal “in the interest of justice” violates their due process rights. The State, arguing in
the alternative, insists that its appeal was timely but, if it was not, that the Court of Criminal Appeals
properly invoked Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) to allow the appeal to proceed. We have determined that
invoking the relief provisions in Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) was unnecessary because the State filed a
timely notice of appeal.

A.

On July 11, 2005, Messrs. Meeks and Snyder filed a joint motion to suppress the evidence
seized in Room 110. Following a hearing on October 10, 2005, the trial court entered an order on
November 9, 2005, granting the motion to suppress. The order did not purport to dismiss the
pending indictments against Messrs. Meeks and Snyder.

On November 17, 2005, the State filed a motion in the trial court seeking permission to
pursue an interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State asserted in this motion that
pursuing an interlocutory appeal was “necessary to prevent the State from suffering irreparable injury
in that the State would be unable to successfully maintain prosecution of the defendants unless this
motion is granted.”3 On March 2, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting the State permission
to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The court found explicitly in this order that “the suppression of
the evidence gathered in this case from room 110 of the Park Place Motel could present irreparable
harm to the State’s case in chief and is dispositive to the case.”

For some reason not apparent in this record, the State did not file an application for
permission to appeal with the Court of Criminal Appeals by the deadline in Tenn. R. App. P. 9(c).4
However, on March 14, 2006, the day following the deadline for filing the application for an
interlocutory appeal, the State, through an assistant district attorney general, asked the trial court to
place the case on its March 17, 2006 docket, apparently for the purposes of withdrawing the
application for an interlocutory appeal and dismissing the indictments against Messrs. Meeks and
Snyder. On May 19, 2006, the trial court filed an agreed order dismissing the cases against Messrs.
Meeks and Snyder “without prejudice.” In this order, the trial court reiterated its earlier finding that
“the suppression of the evidence gathered in this case from Room 110 of the Park Place Motel does
present irreparable harm to the State’s case in chief and is dispositive of the case.”

The assistant district attorney general thereafter filed a notice of appeal on June 16, 2006.
Despite the fact that the parties had agreed to the dismissal of the State’s interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9, this notice states that the State is seeking an appeal pursuant to Tenn.

3
This representation by the assistant district attorney general who prepared the Tenn. R. App. P. 9 motion
contradicts the assertion in the State’s brief filed in this Court that it was not until much later that the district attorney
determined that the suppression of the evidence would be fatal to the case against Messrs. Meeks and Snyder.

4
At this stage of the proceeding, the responsibility for pursuing the appeal shifted from the Office of the District
Attorney General to the Office of the Attorney General and Reporter. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-6-109(b)(2) (Supp. 2007).

-5-
R. App. P. 9, rather than Tenn. R. App. P. 3. The defendants detected this procedural anomaly.
They argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the State’s appeal was untimely and improperly
filed under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The Office of the Attorney General and Reporter treated the case as
a routine Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal and did not bother to address the argument that the appeal was
improperly filed under Tenn R. App. P. 9.

In its opinion filed on July 10, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial
court’s November 9, 2005 suppression order “had the substantive effect of dismissing the indictment
against the Defendants” and, therefore, that it was immediately appealable under Tenn. R. App. P.
3(c)(1). State v. Meeks, 2007 WL 1987797, at *4. The court also held that even though the State
should have filed its notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the November 9, 2005
order, it would waive this procedural deficiency “in the interests of justice” in accordance with Tenn.
R. App. P. 4(a) and consider the substance of the State’s appeal. State v. Meeks, 2007 WL 1987797,
at *4.

B.

Under the common law, as understood and applied in the United States, neither a state nor
the United States had a right to appeal in a criminal prosecution, unless the right is expressly
conferred by a constitutional provision or by statute. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 246
(1981); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892); State v. Reynolds, 5 Tenn. (4 Hayw.) 110,
110 (1817). A general grant of appellate jurisdiction does not satisfy this requirement. United States
v. Sanges, 144 U.S. at 322-23; State v. Reynolds, 5 Tenn. (4 Hayw.) at 110-11. When a statute
affords a state or the United States the right to an appeal in a criminal proceeding, the statute will
be strictly construed to apply only to the circumstances defined in the statute. Carroll v. United
States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 (1957); State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Tenn. 2002).

The first Tennessee statutes giving the State a right to appeal in criminal cases appeared in
1858.5 These statutes provided the state with a broad right to appeal from final orders, subject to the
double jeopardy protections in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Tennessee and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, this Court, construing these statutes
narrowly, concluded that they did not confer on the state the right to appeal from preliminary or
interlocutory orders in criminal cases. State v. Bonhart, 223 Tenn. 582, 590-91, 448 S.W.2d 669,
672-73 (1969).6

5
Code of Tennessee §§ 5244 to 5250 (Return J. Meigs & W illiam F. Cooper eds., E.G. Eastman & Co. 1858)
(later codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-3401 to -3404, 40-3409 to -3410 (1975) (repealed 1981)).

6
Tennessee’s courts later held that the State could obtain limited review of an interlocutory suppression order
using a petition for writ of common-law certiorari in cases where the suppression order had the effect of completely and
effectively ending the prosecution. State v. Johnson, 569 S.W .2d 808, 814-15 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Gant, 537 S.W .2d
711, 712-14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).

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 Tennessee’s statutes governing the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases were replaced by
the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which became effective on July 1, 1979.7 With regard
to the State’s appeal as of right, Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) provided:

In criminal actions an appeal as of right by the state lies only
from an order or judgment entered by a trial court from which an
appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals: (1)
the substantive effect of which results in dismissing an indictment,
information, or complaint; (2) setting aside a verdict of guilty and
entering a judgment of acquittal; (3) arresting judgment; (4) granting
or refusing to revoke probation; or (5) remanding a child to the
juvenile court.

In 1980, Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) was amended to state explicitly that the State was also entitled to an
appeal as of right from final judgments in habeas corpus, extradition, and post-conviction
proceedings.

With regard to the State’s right to an appeal from an interlocutory order in criminal cases,
Tenn. R. App. P. 9(g) explicitly states that both the State and the accused have a right to pursue an
appeal from an interlocutory order under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. Similarly, Tenn. R. App. P. 10(e)
explicitly permits both the State and the accused to pursue an extraordinary appeal under Tenn. R.
App. P. 10.8

Unlike other states, Tennessee does not have a statute or rule that specifically applies to
orders suppressing or excluding evidence.9 Thus, the courts and the litigants have been left to work
through the application of the Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c), 9, and 10 to orders granting an accused’s
motion to suppress or exclude evidence. The results have produced procedural confusion because
of the differing impacts that a suppression order can have.

An order suppressing or excluding evidence is not a final order or judgment because it does
not formally terminate the prosecution. While such an order may have the same practical effect as
an order of dismissal, an order suppressing or excluding evidence leaves the State with the option
of proceeding with the prosecution with its remaining evidence or of dismissing the indictment under
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 48. Under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), the State has an appeal as of right only when
the “substantive effect” of the order suppressing or excluding the evidence “results in dismissing an
indictment, information, or complaint.”

7
In 1981, the Tennessee General Assembly expressly repealed the statutes pertaining to the State’s right to
appeal in criminal cases. Act of June 3, 1981, ch. 449, § 1(13), 1981 Tenn. Pub. Acts 667, 669.

8
The grounds for seeking an extraordinary appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 10 are similar to the grounds for
seeking a common-law writ of certiorari. State v. Willoughby, 594 S.W .2d 388, 392 (Tenn. 1980).

9
7 W ayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 27.3(c), at 39-42 (3d ed. 2007) (“Criminal Procedure”).

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 Interpreting Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), the Court of Criminal Appeals requires only that the
suppression order have the “substantive effect of dismissing the indictment.”10 Thus, the Court of
Criminal Appeals holds that Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) does not require an order dismissing the
indictment, information, or complaint as a prerequisite to an appeal by the State. See, e.g., State v.
Holladay, No. E2004-02858-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 304685, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2006)
(No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); State v. Copeland, No. 03C01-9402-CR-00079, 1996 WL
368209, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 1996) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); State
v. Udzinski, No. 01C01-9212-CC-00380, 1993 WL 473308, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 1993)
(No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

The Court of Criminal Appeals’ interpretation of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) misapprehends
the plain language of the rule because it overlooks the word “results.” The State may appeal as of
right from an order suppressing or excluding evidence only when the substantive effect of that order
“results” in the dismissal of the indictment, information, or complaint. When used as a verb, the
word “result” means “[t]o arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion from some action, process,
etc.” or “to end or conclude in a specified manner.” 13 Oxford English Dictionary 761 (2d ed.
1989).11 Thus, to trigger Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), the order suppressing or excluding the evidence
must produce the entry of an order dismissing an indictment, information, or complaint.

Even though the entry of a final order dismissing the indictment, information, or complaint
is required for an appeal as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), it does not necessarily follow that
the State cannot appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence when an order of dismissal
has not been entered. In the absence of an order of dismissal, the State may still seek interlocutory
appellate review of a trial court’s order suppressing or excluding evidence using either Tenn. R. App.
P. 9 or Tenn. R. App. P. 10. These sorts of appeals from pre-trial rulings in criminal cases are not
favored. State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 612 n.2 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Gilley, 173 S.W.3d
1, 5 (Tenn. 2005). They address themselves to the courts’ discretion, and thus, it is incumbent on
the party seeking the appeal – in this case the State – to satisfy the court or courts that there are
appropriate grounds for an interlocutory appeal.

Notwithstanding the appellate courts’ disinclination to grant appeals under Tenn. R. App. P.
9 and Tenn. R. App. P. 10, the State should be able to carry its burden of persuasion in cases of this
sort with little difficulty. When an order suppresses or excludes evidence and thereby eliminates the
heart of the State’s case, requiring the State to proceed to trial without the suppressed evidence could
result in irreparable injury to the public’s interest if the accused is acquitted. In that circumstance,
the State could not obtain meaningful appellate review of the suppression order because the Double

10
See, e.g., State v. Saine, No. M2007-01277-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 W L 918511, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr.
4, 2008); State v. Copeland, No. 03C01-9402-CR-00079, 1996 W L 368209, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 1996)
(No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

11
See also The American Heritage College Dictionary 1164 (3d ed. 2000) (result means “[t]o come about as
a consequence” or “to end in a particular way”).

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Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions12 would prevent the State from trying the
accused a second time. Thus, a suppression order that eliminates any reasonable probability of a
successful prosecution provides a basis for an interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1),
(3)13 or an extraordinary appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a).14

A second justification for granting Tenn. R. App. P. 9 or Tenn. R. App. P. 10 appeals from
suppression orders arises from the fact that the legal principles relating to searches and seizures and
interrogations fluctuate and are heavily fact-dependent. Giving the parties an opportunity for
immediate appellate review of suppression orders not only affords them with a chance to obtain
review of questionable rulings, but it also decreases the repetition of similar errors by law
enforcement officials before the challenged conduct can be reviewed by the courts pursuant to an
appeal as of right. Criminal Procedure § 27.3(c), at 39-40.

C.

The entry of the trial court’s suppression order on November 9, 2005 was not accompanied
by an order dismissing the indictment against Messrs. Meeks and Snyder. Accordingly, the State
was not entitled to an appeal as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) at that time. It was, however,
entitled to pursue a discretionary appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. This is precisely what the State
did. However, after the State obtained the trial court’s permission to request the Court of Criminal
Appeals to hear the interlocutory appeal, it did not file the required application with the intermediate
appellate court in the manner required by Tenn. R. App. P. 9(c). Instead, the State apparently
abandoned the interlocutory appeal and decided to request dismissal of the indictments against
Messrs. Meeks and Snyder and then to pursue an appeal as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1).

While the wisdom or necessity of the State’s tactics might reasonably be questioned, the
State’s decision to abandon the interlocutory appeal in favor of an appeal as of right does not
undermine the State’s right to pursue an appeal following the entry of the May 19, 2006 order
dismissing the indictments. The Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure do not contain an “election
of remedies” provision that causes an appellant to forego all other appellate remedies once it decides
to pursue one particular appellate remedy. Nor do the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure state
that persons who request a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal on a particular issue are not

12
U.S. Const. amend. V; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10.

13
Interlocutory appeals may be granted under Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1) or (3) to “prevent irreparable injury,
giving consideration to the severity of the potential injury, the probability of its occurrence, and the probability that
review upon entry of final judgment will be ineffective” and to address questions that “will not otherwise be reviewable
upon entry of final judgment.”

14
Extraordinary appeals under Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a) are permitted whenever they are “necessary for complete
determination of the action on appeal as otherwise provided in these rules.” If a trial court declines to grant a Tenn. R.
App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal following the entry of a suppression order that eliminates any reasonable probability of
a successful prosecution, the Court of Criminal Appeals may grant an extraordinary appeal if it determines that the State
would not otherwise have a meaningful opportunity to obtain appellate review of the suppression order.

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entitled to raise that same issue on an appeal as of right if they fail to follow through on the Tenn.
R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal.

After the State decided against pursuing the interlocutory appeal from the November 9, 2005
suppression order, it requested the trial court to dismiss the indictments against Messrs. Meeks and
Snyder, apparently because the District Attorney General had concluded that the suppression of the
evidence found in Room 110 eliminated any reasonable probability of a successful prosecution. In
its May 19, 2006 order dismissing the indictments, the trial court specifically found that “the
suppression of the evidence . . . does present irreparable harm to the State’s case in chief.” This
order is a final order, and, by its own terms, it resulted from the entry of the November 9, 2005
suppression order. Accordingly, following the entry of that order, the State was entitled to an appeal
as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1).

Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) requires that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after
the date of the entry of the judgment appealed from. The State filed its notice of appeal in this case
on June 16, 2006. This notice of appeal was timely because it was filed within thirty days after the
entry of the May 19, 2006 order dismissing the case against Messrs. Meeks and Snyder. In light of
the fact that the State’s notice of appeal was timely filed, this case did not require the Court of
Criminal Appeals to exercise its discretion under Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) to excuse the State from the
timely filing of a notice of appeal. Therefore, the arguments by Messrs. Meeks and Snyder regarding
the propriety of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ invocation of its power under Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a)
to excuse the State from filing a timely notice of appeal are without merit.

III.

Messrs. Meeks and Snyder also assert that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by reversing
the trial court’s November 9, 2005 suppression order. While they concede that the law enforcement
officers had probable cause on the evening of March 6, 2005 to enter Room 110 at the Park Motel,
they insist that the officers were not confronted with exigent circumstances sufficient to justify
entering the room before obtaining a search warrant. We disagree. The circumstances of this case
provide a textbook example of the sort of exigent circumstances that require immediate action by
law enforcement officers.

A.

In reviewing suppression rulings, the assessment of witness credibility, the weight and value
of evidence, and the resolution of evidentiary conflicts are entrusted to the trial court as a fact-finder.
State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d at 615. When a trial court makes findings of fact in the course
of ruling upon a motion to suppress, those findings are binding on appeal unless the evidence in the
record preponderates against them. State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007). A trial
court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo without any presumption of correctness. State v.
Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Tenn. 2006). The question of whether circumstances were sufficiently
exigent to justify a warrantless search is a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., United States

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v. Andrews, 442 F.3d 996, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1089 n.2
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002). Review of mixed
questions of law and fact is de novo without any presumption of correctness. Vaughn v. State, 202
S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 629 (Tenn. 2006).

B.

Both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Tennessee prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. Thus, as a
general matter, law enforcement officials cannot conduct a search without having first obtained a
valid warrant. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 365
(Tenn. 2008).

However, because the contours of these constitutional protections are shaped by the concept
of “reasonableness,” the courts have recognized exceptions to the general requirement of the
issuance of a warrant prior to conducting a search. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006); State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d at 616-17. Among the commonly recognized exceptions
to the requirement of a warrant are: (1) a search incident to an arrest, (2) the plain view doctrine, (3)
a consent to the search, (4) a Terry15 stop and frisk, and (5) the existence of exigent circumstances.
State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d at 104; State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005). Where a
warrantless search is conducted, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the search
was conducted pursuant to one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 34 (1970); State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tenn. 2006).

This appeal focuses on the exigent circumstances justification for a warrantless search.
Exigent circumstances arise where “the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Brigham City, Utah v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)). Given the
importance of the warrant requirement in safeguarding against unreasonable searches and seizures,
a circumstance will be sufficiently exigent only where the State has shown that the search is
imperative. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d
at 514; State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 641 (Tenn. 1997) (Reid, J., concurring). Although not
an exclusive list, the following are frequently-arising situations that have been found to be
sufficiently exigent to render a warrantless search of a domicile reasonable: (1) hot-pursuit, (2) to
thwart escape, (3) to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, (4) in response to an immediate
risk of serious harm to the police officers or others, and (5) to render emergency aid to an injured
person or to protect a person from imminent injury.16 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403;

15
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

16
Professor LaFave has counseled that “[t]hough this ‘emergency aid exception’ is one of many ‘community
caretaking functions’ of the police, it must be assessed separately and by a distinct test, as all such functions are not
‘judged by the same standard;’ moreover, they must be distinguished from ‘the exigent circumstances exception.’” 3
(continued...)

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Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 782 (6th Cir.
2006); State v. Adams, 238 S.W.3d 313, 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).

Exigent circumstances are those in which the urgent need for immediate action becomes too
compelling to impose upon governmental actors the attendant delay that accompanies obtaining a
warrant.17 Thus, in assessing the constitutionality of a warrantless search, the inquiry is whether the
circumstances give rise to an objectively reasonable belief that there was a compelling need to act
and insufficient time to obtain a warrant.18 The exigency of the circumstances is evaluated based
upon the totality of the circumstances19 known to the governmental actor at the time of the entry.20
Mere speculation is inadequate;21 rather, the State must rely upon specific and articulable facts22 and
the reasonable inferences drawn from them.23 The circumstances are viewed from an objective
perspective; the governmental actor’s subjective intent is irrelevant.24 The manner and the scope of

16
(...continued)
W ayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a) n.6, at 451 (4th ed. 2004). The United States Supreme Court, however,
in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart 547 U.S. at 402-03, embedded the emergency aid exception deep within the exigent
circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir.
2008); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).

17
State v. Inghram, No. M2006-00818-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 W L 2011132, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11,
2007) (No T enn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); see also, e.g., DeMayo v. Nugent, 517 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2008);
McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir.
1998).

18
State v. Davis, No. M 2004-03060-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 W L 2255968, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15,
2005) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); State v. McCall, 698 S.W .2d 643, 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); see
also, e.g., United States v. Bell, 500 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2007).

19
State v. Davis, 2005 W L 2255968, at *4-7; see also, e.g., United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 850 (6th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Maldonado, 472 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2006).

20
State v. Davis, 2005 W L 2255968, at *6; see also, e.g., United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 741, 745 (6th Cir.
2006); United States v. Hernandez Leon, 379 F.3d 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 2004).

21
Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1234
(10th Cir. 1998).

22
State v. Lovell, No. M2002-02379-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 W L 22142499, at *6 (Sept. 17, 2003) (No Tenn. R.
App. P. 11 application filed); see also, e.g., United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000); State v. Warren,
949 So. 2d 1215, 1225 (La. 2007).

23
State v. Inghram, 2007 W L 2011132, at *5; see also, e.g., United States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 543 (9th
Cir. 1985); State v. Eberly, 716 N.W .2d 671, 679 (Neb. 2006); Howe v. State, 916 P.2d 153, 159 (Nev. 1996).

24
See, e.g., United States v. Uscanga-Ramirez, 475 F.3d 1024, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007); State v. Shriner, ___
N.W .2d ___, ___, 2008 WL 2229490, at *4 (Minn. 2008).

The U nited States Supreme Court, interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
(continued...)

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the search must be reasonably attuned to the exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless
search, or the search will exceed the bounds authorized by exigency alone.25 Where the asserted
ground of exigency is risk to the safety of the officers or others, the governmental actors must have
an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there is an immediate need to act to protect
themselves and others from serious harm.26

C.

Methamphetamine laboratories are regarded as highly dangerous. United States v. Purcell,
526 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002). In
2000, the United States House of Representatives explained:

The methamphetamine epidemic in America differs in kind
from the threat of other illegal drugs because methamphetamine can
be made from readily available and legal chemicals and substances,
and because it poses serious dangers to both human life and the
environment. Additionally, these chemicals and substances are
utilized in a manufacturing process that is unstable, volatile, and
highly combustible. Even small amounts of these chemicals, when
mixed improperly, can cause explosions and fires. For every one
pound of methamphetamine that is produced, approximately five
pounds of toxic and often lethal waste products may be left behind at
the laboratory site, or disposed of in rivers, kitchen sinks, or sewage
systems in an effort to conceal evidence of illegal manufacturing.
More disturbing is that most of these laboratories are situated in

24
(...continued)
determined that subjective motivation is irrelevant even with regard to the emergency aid exception. Brigham City, Utah
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404. Insofar as this exception can reach beyond criminal investigatory purposes to broader
“community caretaker” police activities, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has sounded a cautionary note. In
response to the State’s assertion that it was exercising its community caretaker function, Judge W illiams stated that
“[s]uch actions are justifiable and laudable so long as the aid is actually needed or sought by the citizen. Otherwise, it
is merely a guise for unwanted official intrusion into the privacy of the affected citizen.” State v. Waters, No.
M2006-01468-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 W L 2744996, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11
application filed). W hether the constitutional protections afforded by Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7 are any broader in terms
of not allowing police officers when acting in a community caretaker, rather than a criminal law enforcement, role to
knowingly and purposefully use the emergency aid exception as a criminal investigation tool is not an issue before this
Court but may in subsequent cases warrant consideration.

25
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25-26) (indicating that “a warrantless
search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation’”); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d
at 718, 720; Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 550 (6th Cir. 2003).

26
See, e.g., United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d at 951-52; United States v. Layman, 244 Fed. Appx. 206, 210 (10th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d at 783; United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 505 (6th Cir. 2003).

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 residences, motels, trailers, and vans, and often times are operated in
the presence of children.

H.R. Rep. No. 106-878, Part I, at *22 (Sept. 21, 2000).27 In addition to being highly combustible,28
the vapors or fumes that are generated in the production of methamphetamine pose further dangers.
For example, exposure to the toxic fumes or vapors produced during the manufacture of
methamphetamine, some of which are carcinogenic, can cause serious inhalation injuries to those
at the laboratory site and sometimes even to neighbors.29

The hazards posed by an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory are so significant
that a number of state and federal courts have determined that the discovery of an actively operating
methamphetamine laboratory, in and of itself, creates an exigent circumstance justifying immediate
action without the attendant delays that accompany obtaining a search warrant. See, e.g., United
States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2005); Williams v. State, No. CR-06-1752, 2008 WL
2223068, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. May 30, 2008); Barth v. State, 955 So.2d at 1118; State v. White,
886 N.E.2d 904, 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). Other courts that have recognized the dangers of
actively operating methamphetamine laboratories have stopped short of adopting a per se rule.
Rather, they have based their finding of exigency on the location of the particular laboratory. United

27
See http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp106:FLD010:@1(hr878) (last visited July 30, 2008). This
House Report was issued with regard to the Methamphetamine and Club Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 which was
enacted as Section 3612 of the Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101.

28
Approximately fifteen percent of all methamphetamine laboratories that are discovered in the United States
are found as a result of an explosion or fire. See Dep’t of Justice, Dangers to Children Living at Meth Labs, available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/pg5.html (last visited July 30, 2008) (“Dangers to
Children Living at Meth Labs”). The Tennessee General Assembly has even imposed a reporting requirement on
hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, doctors, physicians, surgeons, nurses, pharmacists, undertakers, embalmers, and other
persons called upon to render aid to persons suffering from any wound or other injury to report when the injury or wound
results from exposure to a methamphetamine laboratory or a methamphetamine laboratory-related fire, explosion, or
chemical release. Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-1-101(a) (2006). See also
http://www.methfreetn.org/meth101/recipe_for_disaster.php (last visited July 30, 2008) (“Making meth can be as
dangerous as taking it. Meth lab explosions shatter buildings, burning and incinerating everything in sight. W hy?
Meth’s ingredients contain a hazardous combination of poisonous and flammable chemicals, which are heated on a stove
or hot plate. A slight miscalculation with ingredients or cooking temperature, and meth becomes a deadly bomb.”)

29
See generally United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2003); Barth v. State, 955 So. 2d 1115,
1118 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006); Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Public Health Consequences Among First
Responders to Emergency Events Associated with Illicit Methamphetamine Laboratories - Selected States, 1996-1999,
49 Morbidity & Mortality W kly. Rep. 1021, 1023 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm4945.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2008); Dangers to Children Living at Meth Labs, supra note 32; W is. Dep’t of Health and Family
S erv s., C le a n in g U p H a za rd o u s C h e m ic a ls a t F o rm e r M e th L a b s, a v a ila b le a t
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/eh/ChemFS/fs/MethClnUp.htm (last visited July 30, 2008); W yo. Dep’t of Health, Cleaning
Up Hazardous Chemicals at Methamphetamine Laboratories, available at
http://wdh.state.wy.us/phsd/epiid/methcleanup.html (last visited July 16, 2008); Jean C. O’Connor et al., Developing
Lasting Legal Solutions to the Dual Epidemics of Methamphetamine Production and Use, 82 N.D. L. Rev. 1165, 1172
(2006); Anna S. Vogt, Note, The Mess Left Behind: Regulating the Cleanup of Former Methamphetamine Laboratories,
38 Idaho L. Rev. 251, 258-60 (2001).

-14-
States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 851 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007); State v. Chapman, 813 P.2d 557, 560-61
(Or. Ct. App. 1991). These courts have focused on whether there were people in the vicinity of the
actively operating methamphetamine laboratory, notably neighbors, law enforcement officials, and
those manufacturing the methamphetamine. United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d at 851; State v.
Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 273-74 (Iowa 2006); Bishop v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 567, 570
(Ky. Ct. App. 2007). Regardless of the approach taken, whether a per se rule or a determination
based upon the presence of others in the vicinity, the scope of a permissible warrantless search
remains limited to the scope of the exigency. United States v. Layman, 244 Fed. Appx. at 211; State
v. Bilynsky, 932 A.2d 1169, 1176 (Me. 2007); Coffey v. State, 99 P.3d 249, 252 (Okla. Crim. App.
2004).30

D.

There is no issue in this case regarding the law enforcement officers having probable cause
to believe that the occupants of Room 110 at the Park Motel were actively manufacturing
methamphetamine in their room on the evening of March 6, 2005.31 Messrs. Meeks and Snyder
concede that they did.

The undisputed facts clearly establish the sort of exigent circumstances that justified the
officers’ decision to enter Room 110 of the Park Motel without first obtaining a search warrant.
They knew that an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory posed a serious danger not only
to the persons in the room itself but also to all persons in the immediate vicinity. The distinct odor

30
This case does not require us to address the legality of a warrantless search of an actively operating
methamphetamine laboratory where the sole of risk of danger is to the persons who are actually manufacturing the
methamphetamine or where there is a significant delay between the time the law enforcement officers had probable cause
to believe they had discovered an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory and the time the officers conducted
the warrantless search. Neither of these circumstances are present in this case.

31
In addition to the existence of an exigent circumstance, the search generally must also be supported by
probable cause. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637 (2002); United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir.
2005); State v. Henning, 975 S.W .2d 290, 300 (Tenn. 1998); see also R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W .3d at 366 n.4 (noting that
one of the primary exceptions to the warrant requirement is “probable cause to search with exigent circumstances”).
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that “law enforcement officers may
enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from
imminent injury.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403. Notably, absent from the Supreme Court’s analysis
was any reference to the existence of probable cause. Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 569, 575 (2007); Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons From the H ighway and the Subway: A
Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 Rutgers L.J. 719, 778-79 (2007). The Supreme Court “failed to
conduct any traditional probable cause inquiry. Instead, the Court assumed that probable cause to associate the
emergency with the place to be searched exists whenever law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable basis
for concluding that an emergency is unfolding in that place.” United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d at 952; United States v.
Najar, 451 F.3d at 718 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Court did not “require probable cause in this type of exigent
circumstances”). In considering the emergency aid exception under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause is not a
necessary element. The inter-relationship between probable cause and the various permutations of the emergency aid
exception under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution is not before the Court in the present case but may
warrant consideration in future cases.

-15-
surrounding Room 110, the intensity and strength of the odor, the fumes emanating from Room 110,
and the effects of the odor and fumes on the inhabitants of Room 109 provided the officers with
enough facts to believe that the persons in Room 110 were actively manufacturing
methamphetamine. This conclusion provided the officers with an objectively reasonable basis for
concluding that there was an immediate need to act to protect themselves and others from serious
harm. The fact that the officers overlooked clearing the adjoining rooms before they entered Room
110 does not undermine the reasonableness of their decision to enter Room 110 without waiting for
a search warrant. Accordingly, the officers’ warrantless entry into and search of Room 110 was not
an unreasonable search under either the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee.32

IV.

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the trial court’s November 9, 2005
order suppressing the evidence found in Room 110 and vacating the order dismissing the indictments
is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because
Messrs. Meeks and Snyder are indigent, the costs of this appeal shall be paid by the State of
Tennessee.

______________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUSTICE

32
Messrs. Meeks’ and Snyder’s argument that State v. Carter, 160 S.W .3d 526 (Tenn. 2005) requires a finding
that this search was unreasonable is unpersuasive. State v. Carter did not require this Court to address the pivotal
question raised in this case – whether an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory provides a sufficiently exigent
circumstance to justify a warrantless entry into the place where the laboratory was located. In State v. Carter, the State
argued that destruction of evidence, an exigent circumstance created by the police officers themselves, justified the
warrantless entry. The State did not argue that the officers acted in response to the risk posed to the officers or others
from the methamphetamine manufacturing process. Nor did the State present evidence indicating that the officers were
aware at the time of entry of the dangers posed by the active manufacturing of methamphetamine. See generally State
v. Carter, 160 S.W .3d 526; State v. Carter, No. W 2002-00947-CCA- R3-CD, 2003 W L 22213225 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Sept. 24, 2003).

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