Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims,
JJ., and Carrico and Lacy, S.JJ.
ABIGAIL R. BELL, BY HER NEXT FRIEND, LISA BELL
v. Record No. 101004 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
September 16, 2011
JORDAN REBEKAH LYNN CASPER, BY HER NEXT FRIEND, ESTHER M.
CHURCH, ET AL.
JORDAN REBEKAH LYNN CASPER, BY HER NEXT FRIEND, ESTHER M.
CHURCH
v. Record No. 101012
CLAYTON DEVOY LYNN, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
L. A. Harris, Jr., Judge
In these appeals arising out of two cases consolidated in
the Circuit Court of Henrico County (the "trial court"), we
consider whether the trial court erred when it held that the
provisions of Code §§ 55-401 et seq. (Virginia's "Slayer
Statute"), in effect on the date of the decedent's death,
govern the distribution of the decedent's estate in this case.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 1
Sometime between June 29 and July 11, 2005, Collette Lynn
Lockard ("Lockard") was shot and killed by her only child,
Clayton Devoy Lynn ("Lynn") in Henrico County. On the date of
her death, Lockard was survived by Lynn, Lynn's daughters,
1
All material facts were undisputed and stipulated to by
all parties in a Consent Order entered by the trial court on
October 26, 2009.
Abigail R. Lynn Bell ("Bell") and Jordan Rebekah Lynn Casper 2
("Casper"), and her mother, Lena Rhelda Sanders-Howerton
("Lockard's mother"). Lockard's will identified Lynn as the
sole beneficiary of her estate, and identified no further
beneficiaries in the event that Lynn predeceased Lockard.
However, in June 2009, Lynn pled guilty and subsequently was
convicted of second degree murder for killing Lockard.
Thereafter, Bell, a minor child, brought an action by her
mother and next friend, Lisa Bell, seeking declaratory judgment
that Lynn, her biological father, be declared a "slayer" for
purposes of the Slayer Statute and that she and Casper be
declared the sole heirs of Lockard's estate. Casper, also a
minor child, filed her own declaratory judgment action by her
next friend, Esther M. Church, seeking identical relief. The
two actions were consolidated for trial by order of the trial
court in October 2009.
Code §§ 55-401 through -415 3 prevent Lynn, as Lockard's
"slayer," from receiving any property or benefit from Lockard's
estate and the parties do not contend otherwise. Specifically,
Code §§ 55-401 and -402 prohibit a "slayer," or one "who is
2
Bell does not concede that Casper is in fact Lynn's
biological daughter, but any dispute regarding this matter is
irrelevant given our opinion in this case.
3
Former Code §§ 55-401 through -406, -411, and -414 (2003)
were amended and reenacted in 2008. See 2008 Acts chs. 822,
830.
2
convicted of the murder" of the decedent, from acquiring "any
property or . . . any benefits as the result of the death of
the decedent." The parties disagree, however, regarding who
stands to inherit Lockard's estate.
Former Code § 55-402 (2003), in effect at the time of
Lockard's death provided that "[n]either the slayer nor any
person claiming through him shall in any way acquire any
property or receive any benefits as the result of the death of
the decedent." (Emphasis added.) However, the General
Assembly amended the Slayer Statute in 2008, after Lockard's
death but prior to Lynn's conviction of her murder, to provide
that "[a]n heir or distributee who establishes his kinship to
the decedent by way of his kinship to a slayer shall be deemed
to be claiming from the decedent and not through the slayer."
Code § 55-403 (emphasis added).
Bell and Casper argued that the 2008 version of the Slayer
Statute governs the distribution of Lockard's estate because
the Slayer Statute only applies once someone is determined to
be a "slayer" as a result of his conviction of the murder of
the decedent. Accordingly, Bell and Casper argued that they
are the rightful beneficiaries of Lockard's estate because,
under the 2008 version of the Slayer Statute, they may take
directly from Lockard, and not through Lockard's "slayer,"
Lynn. To the contrary, Lockard's mother argued that the
3
version of the Slayer Statute in effect at the time of
Lockard's death governs the distribution of Lockard's estate in
this case and, as a result she is the rightful beneficiary of
Lockard's estate, according to the laws of intestate succession
in effect at the time of Lockard's death.
Upon the parties' respective pleadings, memoranda of law
and argument of counsel, the trial court held that Lockard's
mother is the sole and rightful heir to Lockard's estate.
Specifically, the trial court concluded that the version of the
Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Lockard's death governs
the distribution of her estate, and "[a]lthough the conviction
of murder designates the killer to be the 'Slayer,' it
logically follows that he is determined to be the 'Slayer' at
the time of the killing." Accordingly, the trial court held
that, because Bell and Casper could only inherit from Lockard
through Lynn, according to the 2005 version of the Slayer
Statute, "the statutory scheme of intestate succession – as
modified by the 2005 'Slayer Statute' – precludes them from
taking anything . . . from [Lockard's] Estate." Therefore, the
trial court held that "the estate passes to the next living
person who is neither the Slayer nor making a claim through the
Slayer – in this case, [Lockard's mother]." Bell and Casper
timely filed their notices of appeal and we granted appeals on
the following assignments of error:
4
For Bell, Record No. 101004:
1. The trial court committed reversible error in finding
that Clayton Lynn is determined to be the "Slayer" as
of the time of the killing in 2005 in contradiction
to the express language of the Virginia Slayer
Statutes and thereupon ruling that Ms. Sanders-
Howerton is the sole and rightful heir to the estate
of the decedent and that the petitioners herein have
no valid rights or claims with respect to the
decedent's estate.
2. The trial court committed reversible error in finding
that the provisions of the Virginia Slayer Statutes
(Virginia Code Ann. § 55-401 et seq.) in effect on
the date of the decedent's death in 2005 control the
rights of the parties in these proceedings and
thereupon ruling that Ms. Sanders-Howerton is the
sole and rightful heir to the estate of the decedent
and that the petitioners herein have no valid rights
or claims with respect to the decedent's estate.
3. The trial court committed reversible error in failing
to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the
Virginia Slayer Statutes, § 55-401, et seq., with the
Virginia Anti-Corruption of Blood Statute, § 55-4.
For Casper, Record No. 101012:
1. The trial court erred in finding that the 2005
Virginia Slayer Act governs the distribution of the
decedent's estate, given that the Act has always
defined a slayer in plain language as anyone who is
convicted or judicially determined to have committed
certain acts resulting in the death of the decedent,
and the statute was not triggered until June 2009
when the decedent's murderer pleaded guilty to her
homicide.
2. The trial court erred by not reconciling the inherent
conflict between the Anti-Corruption of Blood
Statute, Virginia Code § 55-4, and the Virginia
Slayer Act in favor of the minor children.
5
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Whether the version of the Slayer Statute in effect at the
time of Lockard's death in 2005, or the amended 2008 version in
effect at the time of Lynn's conviction, is applicable to the
facts of this case is a question of statutory interpretation.
Accordingly, it "'presents a pure question of law and is . . .
subject to de novo review by this Court.'" Warrington v.
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365, 370, 699 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010)
(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 661 S.E.2d
412, 414 (2008)).
As with any question of statutory interpretation, our
primary objective is " 'to ascertain and give effect to
legislative intent,' " as expressed by the language used in the
statute. Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418, 706 S.E.2d
879, 882 (2011) (quoting Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630,
702 S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010)). Additionally, " '[w]hen the
language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain
meaning of that language.' " Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, 281 Va.
543, 549, 708 S.E.2d 846, 850 (2011) (quoting Conyers v.
Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639
S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007)).
6
B. Virginia's Slayer Statute
This Court previously has discussed the purposes of the
Slayer Statute, including the General Assembly's "legislative
recognition of a broad public policy against the acquisition of
property rights by murder," a policy which is in complete
agreement with the "common law maxim of ancient vintage, viz.,
that no person should be permitted to profit by his own wrong."
Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 235-36, 269 S.E.2d 787, 788-89
(1980). See Code § 55-414. Irrespective of which version of
the Slayer Statute applies, Lynn, as Lockard's "slayer," is
prohibited from receiving any property or benefit from
Lockard's estate.
Because Lockard's will identified Lynn as the sole
beneficiary of her estate, and identified no further
beneficiaries in the event that Lynn predeceased Lockard,
Lockard's will lapsed. The laws of intestate succession in
effect at the time of Lockard's death in 2005 govern the
distribution of her estate. See McGehee v. Edwards, 268 Va.
15, 20, 597 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2004); McFadden v. McNorton, 193
Va. 455, 457, 69 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1952); Mott v. Nat'l Bank of
Commerce, 190 Va. 1006, 1011, 59 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1950). See
also Schilling v. Schilling, 280 Va. 146, 150, 695 S.E.2d 181,
183 (2010). The determinative issue in this case is whether
the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of
7
Lockard's death in 2005 or the version in effect on the date of
Lynn's conviction in 2008 controls. If the version in effect
in 2005 controls, Lockard's mother stands to inherit Lockard's
estate. Former Code § 55-402 (2003); Code § 64.1-1. If the
amended 2008 version of the Slayer Statute controls, Bell and
Casper stand to inherit Lockard's estate. Code § 55-403.
Bell and Casper argue that Code § 55-401, in defining a
"slayer" as someone convicted of murder, dictates that the
Slayer Statute has no application in determining who inherits
the Decedent's estate until someone has been judicially
determined to be a "slayer" for purposes of the statute.
Accordingly, they argue that the version of the Slayer Statute
in effect on the date of the slayer's conviction controls any
distribution of the decedent's estate affected by application
of the Slayer Statute.
To the contrary, Lockard's mother contends that the trial
court correctly concluded that the distribution provisions of
the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of
Lockard's death, "like all laws related to the distribution of
property under Virginia's testacy and intestacy statutes,"
control the distribution of Lockard's estate.
As it existed at the time of Lockard's death in 2005, the
Slayer Statute defined "Slayer," in relevant part, as any
person "who is convicted of the murder of the decedent."
8
Former Code § 55-401 (2003). 4 Bell and Casper mistakenly rely
upon Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Tull, 524 F. Supp. 166,
171 (E.D. Va. 1981), for the proposition that the Slayer
Statute becomes applicable in determining the rights of those
who stand to inherit from a decedent only after the judicial
determination has been made in accordance with Code § 55-401.
In Tull, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia considered the application of the Slayer
Statute to a person who had been convicted of murder but whose
appeal had not yet been resolved by the Supreme Court of
Virginia. Tull, 524 F. Supp. at 168-71. In the case before
us, the conviction is final, and the issue is whether such an
adjudication is effective upon the date of the death of the
decedent or upon the date of adjudication of the slayer. We
agree with the trial court that "[a]lthough the conviction of
murder designates the killer to be the 'Slayer,' it logically
follows that he is determined to be the 'Slayer' at the time of
the killing."
Virginia has long recognized that the law in existence on
the date of a decedent's death governs the distribution of the
4
While inapplicable to the facts of this case, the Slayer
Statute also included in the definition of "Slayer," any person
who, "in the absence of such conviction . . . who is determined
by a court of appropriate jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence to have murdered the decedent." Former Code § 55-
401 (2003).
9
decedent's estate. See McGehee, 268 Va. at 19, 597 S.E.2d at
102 (recognizing that "the interests of beneficiaries accrue at
the testator's death"); McFadden, 193 Va. at 457, 69 S.E.2d at
446 (recognizing that "the right of an adopted child to inherit
is to be determined by the law in force at the death of the
person from whom the inheritance is claimed."); Mott, 190 Va.
at 1011, 59 S.E.2d at 100 (stating that "[t]he answer . . . as
to who were the heirs at law of [the decedent] is to be found
in the statutes of descents and distributions as supplemented
by the adoption laws in force at the time of his death."). See
also Schilling, 280 Va. at 150, 695 S.E.2d at 183 (declaring
that "a determination whether a writing offered for probate is
a valid will applies the law in effect on the date of the
maker's death.").
The Slayer Statute's historical placement in the Virginia
Code is instructive. Virginia's first Slayer Statute was
enacted as section 5274 of the Code of 1919. See Life Ins. Co.
of Virginia v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 412 (E.D. Va. 1962).
Within the Code of 1919, the Slayer Statute was in Title 46,
Chapter 213, entitled "Descents and Distribution." Former Code
§ 5274 (1919). Upon enactment of the Code of 1950, the Slayer
Statute was included in Title 64, Chapter 1, again entitled
"Descent and Distribution." Former Code § 64-18 (1950). Only
when a more comprehensive Slayer Statute was enacted in 1981 -
10
which applied to potential acquisitions of property by a slayer
in addition to those related to life insurance, wills, or
intestacy – was the statute moved to Title 55, entitled
"Property and Conveyances." Former Code §§ 55-401 et seq.
(1981). However, the fact that the Slayer Statute is now
placed in Title 55 does not change its effect upon estate
distribution when the decedent has been murdered by a potential
heir or legatee.
Significantly, the version of the Slayer Statute in effect
in 2005, by its own language, explicitly modified distribution
of a decedent's estate by providing that "[n]either the slayer
nor any person claiming through [the slayer] shall in any way
acquire any property or receive any benefits as the result of
the death of the decedent, but such property shall pass as
provided in the sections following." 5 Former Code § 55-402
(2003) (emphasis added).
The "sections following" former Code § 55-402 (2003)
provided both that "[t]he slayer shall be deemed to have
predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed
5
Additionally, the version of the Slayer Statute in effect
in 2005 unequivocally modified several provisions of Title
64.1, including descent and distribution, Code §§ 64.1-01 et
seq., the anti-lapse statute, Code § 64.1-64.1, and the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act, Code § 64.1-104.1 et seq. See former
Code §§ 55-403, -404, and -415 (2003).
11
from the estate of the decedent to the slayer under the
statutes of descent and distribution," and that
[t]he slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased
the decedent as to property which would have
passed to the slayer by devise or legacy from
the decedent, except that [Code] § 64.1-64.1,
preventing lapse of devises or legacies when the
person named in the will dies before the
testator, shall not apply.
Former Code §§ 55-403 and 55-404 (2003). The clear language of
the statutes forecloses the ability of Bell and Casper to
inherit Lockard's estate through the slayer. Former Code
§§ 55-402, -403, and -404 (2003).
Finally, this Court has recognized "the fundamental
principles of statutory construction that retroactive laws are
not favored, and that a statute is always construed to operate
prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is
manifest." Berner v. Mills, 265 Va. 408, 413, 579 S.E.2d 159,
161 (2003). See also Schilling, 280 Va. at 149, 695 S.E.2d at
183. Nothing in the amendments to the Slayer Statute made
after Lockard's death indicates that the General Assembly
intended such amendments to apply retroactively. See 2008 Acts
chs. 822, 830.
Accordingly, the Slayer Statute's interplay with Virginia
law governing descent and distribution and its longstanding
history as a law governing descent and distribution in
particular circumstances compel application of Virginia's well-
12
established policy that the law in existence on the date of a
decedent's death governs the distribution of the decedent's
estate. See McGehee, 268 Va. at 19-20, 597 S.E.2d at 102;
McFadden, 193 Va. at 457, 69 S.E.2d at 446; Mott, 190 Va. at
1011, 59 S.E.2d at 100. See also Schilling, 280 Va. at 150,
695 S.E.2d at 183. Consequently, we hold that the version of
the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Lockard's murder in
2005 controls the distribution of Lockard's estate in this
case. As a result, we hold that the trial court was correct in
concluding that under the laws of intestate succession at the
time of Lockard's death in 2005, as modified by the version of
the Slayer Statute in effect in 2005, Lockard's estate passes
to the next living person who is neither the "slayer" nor
making a claim through the "slayer."
C. Corruption of Blood
Bell and Casper contend that the version of the Slayer
Statute in effect at the time of Lockard's death in 2005, if
applied in this case, would violate Virginia law prohibiting
the "corruption of blood." Contrary to Bell's and Casper's
assertions, however, "corruption of blood" and "forfeiture of
estate" are not implicated by Virginia's Slayer Statute – even
as it existed in 2005.
Code § 55-4 provides that "[n]o suicide, nor attainder of
felony, shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of
13
estate." The United States Supreme Court has observed that, at
common law, "attainder generally carried with it a 'corruption
of blood,' which meant that the attainted party's heirs could
not inherit his property." United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 441 (1965) (emphasis added). Similarly, this Court has
stated that "corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate on
conviction of felony as at common law has been expressly
abolished by statute. So, in Virginia, the right of a person
to take, hold and dispose of his property, real and personal,
is not affected by his attainder of felony." Haynes v.
Peterson, 125 Va. 730, 734, 100 S.E. 471, 472 (1919) (citation
omitted; emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Slayer Statute, as it existed in 2005,
does not work a corruption of blood because it does not deprive
a "slayer's" heirs the right to inherit from the "slayer"
property properly belonging to the "slayer." Neither does it
work a forfeiture of estate because it does not require a
"slayer" to forfeit his property. Rather, former Code § 55-402
(2003) merely prohibited a slayer from acquiring additional
property rights as a result of his wrongdoing, which his heirs
could subsequently claim "through him."
In fact, we explicitly have held that the Slayer Statute
does not violate Code § 55-4 because it "do[es] not deprive the
murderer of any property rights, but prevent[s] his acquisition
14
of additional rights by unlawful and unauthorized means."
Sundin, 221 Va. at 240, 269 S.E.2d at 791 (emphasis added). In
so holding, we recognized that "one cannot suffer an unlawful
forfeiture of something he has gained contrary to law or the
terms of his own undertaking." Id. Accordingly, we hold that
the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of
Lockard's murder in 2005 neither implicates nor violates
Virginia's prohibition against "corruption of blood or
forfeiture of estate." Code § 55-4.
III. Conclusion
We hold that the version of the Slayer Statute in effect
on the date of Lockard's murder in 2005 controls the
distribution of Lockard's estate in this case. We also hold
that the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of
Lockard's murder in 2005 neither implicates nor violates
Virginia's prohibition against "corruption of blood."
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
15