Riverside Owner, LLC v. City of Richmond

Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims,
JJ., and Russell and Koontz, S.JJ.

RIVERSIDE OWNER, L.L.C., ET AL.

v. Record No. 100347

CITY OF RICHMOND
OPINION BY
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
June 9, 2011
CITY OF RICHMOND

v. Record No. 100703

RIVERSIDE OWNER, L.L.C., ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge

The City of Richmond’s Tax Abatement for Rehabilitated

Real Estate Program (Program) provides a partial exemption from

real estate taxes for qualifying rehabilitated property.

Richmond City Code§ 27-83(a). 1 To qualify for a partial

exemption, a property must increase in value by at least 40

percent because of rehabilitation no later than “December 31 of

the third calendar year following the year in which [its

owner’s] application [for the Program] is submitted.” City

Code § 27-83(b). The amount of the partial exemption is the

difference between the property’s “base value” (assessed value

1
In 2004, the City revised the Program and recodified it
in sections of Chapter 98 of the City Code. Because these
appeals concern the Program before its revision and
recodification, we cite the sections of former Chapter 27.
1
before rehabilitation) and its “initial rehabilitated assessed

value.” City Code § 27-83(b)-(c), (g).

Since 1981, the City Assessor’s office has determined a

property’s initial rehabilitated assessed value, not as of the

date its rehabilitation is completed, but as of the date its

owner’s application for the Program is submitted. The

principal question presented by these consolidated appeals is

whether that policy is consistent with the requirements of City

Code § 27-83 and its enabling statute, Code § 58.1-3221.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2000, City officials and a delegation of business

leaders met with representatives of The Cordish Companies, a

real estate development company, to propose several sites along

the City’s historic Canal Walk for rehabilitation. After

inspecting the proposed sites, Cordish selected a site located

on Brown’s Island, which consisted of two dilapidated power

plants. It then formed Richmond Power Plant, LLC to

rehabilitate the Brown’s Island site.

After nearly two years of negotiations, the City and

Richmond Power Plant entered into a development agreement

(Agreement) in 2003. The Agreement called for the construction

of, among other things, a mixed-use building with a parking

garage (Property). In exchange for Richmond Power Plant’s

rehabilitation of the power plants, the City promised, among

2
other things, that “the [Property] shall qualify for the full

benefit of the [Program].”

Richmond Power Plant applied for the Program in 2002. At

that time, the City Assessor’s office determined that the power

plants each had a base value of $500. Construction on the

Property began in 2003 and was completed two years later at a

cost of approximately $63.8 million.

In August 2005, the Property was sold to Riverside Owner,

L.L.C. for $85 million. One month later, the City Assessor’s

office conducted its final inspection of the Property and

determined that, based on the cost of the rehabilitation, its

office space had a value of $63.8 million. In May 2006, the

City Assessor’s office revised that amount to roughly $45.2

million for purposes of the Program. The difference in the two

amounts was due to the application of the “Chandler policy.”

In 1981, former City Assessor Richard A. Chandler

established a new policy for determining a property’s initial

rehabilitated assessed value under the Program. Pursuant to

the policy, he explained in an internal memorandum, “[t]he

final estimate of value for rehabilitation credit will be

determined as of the date of the application and computed only

on the information which was available at the time the base

value was established.” The purpose of the policy, he further

explained, was “to eliminate from the final estimate of value

3
any enhancement created by something other than rehabilitation

or physical improvement.” The policy was not published in the

Program’s materials until 2006.

So, in accordance with the Chandler policy, the City

Assessor’s office took the value of the Property’s office space

as of 2005, when the rehabilitation was completed, and

backdated it to 2002, when the Property’s former owner,

Richmond Power Plant, applied for the program. 2 Because of this

backdating, the value of the office space was reduced from

$63.8 million to approximately $45.2 million for purposes of

the Program.

When Riverside Owner received its 2006 real estate tax

bill for the Property, it discovered that it had not been

awarded a partial exemption under the Program. The City later

acknowledged that error and issued a revised tax bill that

included a partial exemption based on the backdated value

called for by the Chandler policy. Disagreeing with that

value, Riverside Owner paid the revised tax bill under protest

and appealed to the City Assessor, challenging the Chandler

policy. The City Assessor denied the appeal, concluding that

the Chandler policy was consistent with Code § 58.1-3221 and

City Code § 27-83, and was therefore “correct and legal.”

2
To backdate a property’s value for purposes of the
Program, the City Assessor’s office uses “an indexing factor”
provided by Marshall & Swift, a cost estimation service.
4
 In 2008, Riverside Owner and the Property’s anchor tenant,

Troutman Sanders LLP (collectively, Taxpayers), filed a

“Complaint and Application for Relief from Erroneous

Assessments of Taxes Upon Real Property” (Application),

pursuant to Code § 58.1-3984. Among other things, they alleged

that the Chandler policy was “ultra vires and an improper

usurpation of legislative power by the City Assessor, and such

policy [was] an improper methodology for setting the assessed

value of rehabilitated improvements, and otherwise illegal.”

They sought a refund of the excess taxes that they paid because

of the application of the Chandler policy, interest on the

overpayments, and attorney’s fees.

The circuit court, in accordance with Code § 58.1-3984,

held a hearing on the Taxpayers’ Application. Because the

Taxpayers and the City agreed on the post-rehabilitation values

of the Property’s office and retail spaces if the Chandler

policy were applied and if it were not, the sole issue before

the circuit court was whether the policy was “not uniform in

its application, or . . . otherwise invalid or illegal.” Id.

During the hearing, the Taxpayers presented the testimony of

several witnesses, including Robert P. Englander, Jr., who,

over the City’s objection, was qualified as an “expert on real

estate valuation and development and on the application of the

[Program] to commercial and mixed use properties.”

5
 In a letter opinion, the circuit court held that the

Chandler policy “depart[ed] from the requirement[s]” of Code

§ 58.1-3221 and City Code § 27-83, because it “relie[d] on

values other than assessed ones” to determine the amount of the

partial exemption “due to the [Taxpayers].” 3 Accordingly, the

circuit court ruled in the Taxpayers’ favor.

At a later hearing on the final order, the Taxpayers

reminded the circuit court that it had not yet ruled on their

claim for attorney’s fees and asked that it do so. They argued

that, as the prevailing party, they were entitled to attorney’s

fees under Section 9.5 of the Agreement. The circuit court

disagreed, finding that the case was not brought pursuant to

the Agreement. It then entered the final order, awarding the

Taxpayers relief for both the Property’s office and retail

spaces for the tax years 2006 through 2008, in accordance with

the post-rehabilitation values that the parties agreed on if

the Chandler policy were not applied, but denying their claim

for attorney’s fees. These consolidated appeals followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The City’s Appeal

3
In its letter opinion, the circuit court states that the
Chandler policy departs from the requirements of “the
authorizing statute, Va. Code § 58.1-3984, and the ordinances
enacted pursuant thereto.” We assume this to be a
typographical error, since Code § 58.1-3221 is the enabling
statute for City Code § 27-83.
6
 The City assigns four errors. The first two concern the

circuit court’s decision not to apply the Chandler policy. The

third challenges the circuit court’s decision to admit the

testimony of the Taxpayers’ expert, Englander. The last

involves the circuit court’s decision to grant the Taxpayers

relief for the Property’s retail space. We address each of

these assignments of error in turn.

1. Chandler Policy

The City first contends that the circuit court erred in

holding that the Chandler policy was inconsistent with Code

§ 58.1 3221 and City Code § 27-83.

Whether the Chandler policy comports with the requirements

of Code § 58.1-3221 and City Code § 27-83 is a question of

statutory interpretation. As such, it “ ‘presents a pure

question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by

this Court.’ ” Warrington v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365, 370,

699 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 276

Va. 121, 124, 661 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2008)).

As with any question of statutory interpretation, our

primary objective is “ ‘to ascertain and give effect to

legislative intent,’ ” as expressed by the language used in the

statute. Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418, 706 S.E.2d

879, ___ (2011) (quoting Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630,

702 S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010)). “ ‘When the language of a statute

7
is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that

language.’ ” Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, 281 Va. 543, 549, ___

S.E.2d ___, ___ (2011) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World

of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178

(2007)). Because the words of a statute are chosen with care,

“we will not read a legislative enactment in a manner that

renders any portion of that enactment useless.” Antisdel v.

Ashby, 279 Va. 42, 48, 688 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2010). Rather, “we

will apply an act of the legislature by giving reasonable

effect to every word used.” Id.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of

Code § 58.1-3221 and City Code § 27-83. As relevant here, Code

§ 58.1-3221 provides:

A. The governing body of any county, city or
town may, by ordinance, provide for the partial
exemption from taxation of real estate on which any
structure or other improvement no less than twenty
years of age, or fifteen years of age if the
structure is located in an area designated as an
enterprise zone by the Commonwealth, has undergone
substantial rehabilitation . . . subject to such
conditions as the ordinance may prescribe. . . . The
governing body of a county, city or town may
establish criteria for determining whether real
estate qualifies for the partial exemption authorized
by this provision and may require the structure to be
older than twenty years of age, or fifteen years of
age if the structure is located in an area designated
as an enterprise zone by the Commonwealth, or place
such other restrictions and conditions on such
property as may be prescribed by ordinance. . . .

B. The partial exemption provided by the local
governing body may not exceed an amount equal to the

8
 increase in assessed value resulting from the
rehabilitation . . . as determined by the
commissioner of revenue or other local assessing
officer.

City Code § 27-83, which was adopted pursuant to Code

§ 58.1-3221, in pertinent part, provides:

(a) Exemption authorized. Partial exemption
from real estate taxes is provided for qualifying
property rehabilitated . . . if eligible according to
the terms of the Constitution, the Code of Virginia
and the provisions of this section and Section 27-86.

(b) When deemed rehabilitated. For the purposes
of this section, commercial or industrial real estate
shall be deemed to be substantially rehabilitated
when a structure . . . has been so improved by
renovation, reconstruction or replacement as to
increase the assessed value of the structure by no
less than forty (40) percent. . . . Upon receipt of
an application for tax exemption, the Assessor shall
determine the assessed value (hereafter referred to
as base value) of the structure prior to commencement
of rehabilitation. Such assessment shall serve as a
basis for determining whether the rehabilitation
undertaken increases the assessed value of such
structure by at least forty (40) percent. The
application to qualify for tax exemption shall be
effective until December 31 of the third calendar
year following the year in which [the] application is
submitted. . . . When it is determined that a forty-
percent increase in assessed value . . . has
occurred, the tax exemption shall become effective
beginning on January 1 of the next calendar year.

. . . .

(g) Commercial or industrial structures in
enterprise zones. Commercial or industrial
structures that are . . . qualified under this
section shall be entitled to a fifteen-year period of
exemption in the full amount of the difference in
taxes computed upon the base value and the initial
rehabilitated assessed value of the property for each
year of the fifteen (15) years.

9
 According to City Code § 27-83(g), the amount of a partial

exemption awarded under the Program is to be determined based

on the difference between a property’s base value (assessed

value before rehabilitation) and its initial rehabilitated

assessed value. The City argues that “initial rehabilitated

assessed value” does not mean the first assessed value after

rehabilitation – or, in other words, the first value after

rehabilitation that is determined by an appraiser for tax

purposes. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1691 (9th ed. 2009)

(defining “assessed value” as “[t]he value of an asset as

determined by an appraiser for tax purposes”); see also DKM

Richmond Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 249 Va. 401, 408, 457

S.E.2d 76, 80 (1995) (“[T]he word ‘assessment’ in [the] context

[of City Code § 27-83] refers to the determination of the value

of the property as a result of an appraisal.”). Instead,

citing a parenthetical found in City Code § 27-86(b), the City

contends that the phrase means the “value attributable to

rehabilitation.”

We disagree. As relevant here, City Code § 27-86(b)

provides: “The Director of Finance . . . shall cause to be

prepared a credit in an amount equal to the difference in taxes

as computed upon the base value and the initial rehabilitated

10
assessed value (i.e., value attributable to rehabilitation).” 4

Contrary to the City’s contention, the parenthetical in this

section does not define “initial rehabilitated assessed value,”

but rather describes what remains when the base value is

subtracted from the initial rehabilitated assessed value, which

is then used to calculate the amount of the tax credit to which

an owner is entitled under the Program. Accordingly, we read

“initial rehabilitated assessed value” to mean what it says:

the first assessed value after rehabilitation.

As noted earlier, the Chandler policy does not use the

first assessed value after rehabilitation to determine the

amount of a partial exemption. Instead, it uses a hypothetical

value based on backdating, which is employed only for purposes

of determining the amount of a partial exemption. The Chandler

policy thus effectively reads the word “assessed” out of City

Code § 27-83.

The City submits that the Chandler policy’s departure from

the language of City Code § 27-83 is permissible because Code

§ 58.1-3221(B) provides that “the increase in assessed value

resulting from the rehabilitation” is to be determined by the

“local assessing officer.” We find this contention

unpersuasive.

4
The amount of the tax credit is the amount of the partial
exemption multiplied by the City’s tax rate.
11
 Code § 58.1-3221(A) gives the City Council — and not the

City Assessor – the authority to establish by ordinance the

Program’s “criteria.” Among the criteria the City Council

prescribed pursuant to that authority was the methodology for

determining the amount of a partial exemption found in City

Code § 27-83(g) – which, as described above, employs a

property’s first assessed value after rehabilitation. The City

Assessor was thus obligated to follow that methodology, even if

he believed that a different methodology using a hypothetical

value based on backdating would better ensure that the amount

of a partial exemption did not exceed “the increase in assessed

value resulting from the rehabilitation.” Code § 58.1-3221(B).

The City also contends that, if the Chandler policy is not

applied, and the initial rehabilitated assessed value is

determined as of the date the rehabilitation was completed,

then the Taxpayers will receive a partial exemption that is

greater than the increase in the Property’s assessed value

resulting from the rehabilitation, in violation of Code § 58.1-

3221(B). That is so, it argues, because the partial exemption

will include market appreciation.

While it is possible that determining a property’s initial

rehabilitated assessed value as of the date the rehabilitation

is completed might give an owner a partial exemption that is

greater than the increase in assessed value resulting from the

12
rehabilitation, there is no evidence of that in this case.

Uncontroverted evidence established that the Property sold for

$85 million one month before the City Assessor’s office

conducted its final inspection. Instead of using the amount of

that contemporaneous sale to determine the Property’s initial

rehabilitated assessed value, the City Assessor’s office chose

to apply the cost approach to valuation, determining the

Property’s value in accordance with the cost of the

rehabilitation — $63.8 million. The difference between the two

amounts – almost $22 million – is, as argued by the Taxpayers,

attributed to market appreciation. Thus, based on the evidence

presented, the Property’s initial rehabilitated assessed value

was limited to the cost of the rehabilitation and did not

include market appreciation.

In sum, we hold that the circuit court did not err in

holding that the Chandler policy was inconsistent with City

Code § 27-83, because that ordinance requires that a property’s

first assessed value after rehabilitation be used to determine

the amount of a partial exemption. We further hold that the

Taxpayers were not given a partial exemption that was greater

than the increase in assessed value resulting from

13
rehabilitation, because the first assessed value after

rehabilitation did not include market appreciation. 5

2. Admission of Expert Testimony

The City next claims that the circuit court erred in

admitting the testimony of Englander, the Taxpayers’ expert on

real estate valuation and the application of the Program to

mixed-use properties.

“The admission of expert testimony is committed to the

sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will reverse a

trial court’s decision only where that court has abused its

discretion.” CNH America LLC v. Smith, 281 Va. 60, 66, 704

S.E.2d 372, 375 (2011) (quoting Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v.

Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465

(1995)). Hence, when reviewing a circuit court’s decision to

admit expert testimony, we apply an abuse of discretion

standard. Id.

Englander worked as a tax assessor in Texas for 4 years

and as a licensed real estate appraiser in both Texas and

Virginia for another 14 years. In 1995, he stopped working as

an appraiser in order to become a real estate developer, and

thus allowed his appraisal license to lapse.

5
In light of these holdings, we need not address the
Taxpayers’ assignment of cross-error regarding the City’s
alleged failure to give notice of the Chandler policy before
the Agreement was executed.
14
 As a developer, Englander rehabilitated numerous

commercial and residential properties in Richmond. In so

doing, he became familiar with the Program, applying for and

receiving a partial exemption for 7 or 8 of the properties he

rehabilitated. He was also appointed to a committee “charged

with making recommendations to City Council as to any changes

that should be made to the program, if any, and whether to

sunset the program altogether.” As a member of that committee,

he heard presentations from several City departments, including

the City Assessor’s office, which provided him and the other

committee members with an overview “as to what the program was

and how it was impacting the City.”

Englander testified that the City Assessor’s office had

not applied the Chandler policy uniformly. He explained that

with most of the properties he reviewed, the City Assessor’s

office determined an initial rehabilitated assessed value that

was within roughly 5 percent of the rehabilitation costs. But

with the Property, he continued, it determined an initial

rehabilitated assessed value that “originally was almost [a] 50

percent different[ial]” and that “is now down to about 20

percent.”

The City contends that the circuit court erred in

admitting Englander’s testimony because it “was speculative,

founded on assumptions that had no basis in fact, and/or failed

15
to consider all the variables that bore upon the inferences to

be deduced from the facts observed.” Moreover, the City

argues, Englander was unqualified to offer an opinion on

whether the City Assessor’s office had applied the Chandler

policy uniformly because he was no longer a licensed appraiser

in Virginia, had no experience as an assessor in Virginia, and

had not administered a tax abatement for rehabilitated real

estate program in Virginia.

“Expert testimony,” we have said, “is admissible in civil

cases to assist the trier of fact, if the testimony meets

certain fundamental requirements, including the requirement

that it be based on an adequate factual foundation.”

Countryside Corp. v. Taylor, 263 Va. 549, 553, 561 S.E.2d 680,

682 (2002); see also Code §§ 8.01-401.1 and -401.3. Expert

testimony is thus “inadmissible if it is speculative or founded

on assumptions that have an insufficient factual basis.” John

v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 320, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002).

Additionally, “expert testimony is inadmissible if the expert

fails to consider all the variables that bear upon the

inferences to be deduced from the facts observed.” Vasquez v.

Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 160, 606 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2005).

Assuming that the circuit court erred in admitting

Englander’s testimony, we conclude that the error was harmless.

Recently, in another erroneous assessment case, we held that,

16
“to the extent the circuit court erred in admitting [an

expert’s] testimony into evidence, such error was harmless”

because the testimony “could not have affected the result.”

County of Albemarle v. Keswick Club, L.P., 280 Va. 381, 390,

699 S.E.2d 491, 496 (2010).

So too here. As the City concedes, Englander’s testimony

was limited to whether the City Assessor’s office had applied

the Chandler policy uniformly. But the circuit court did not

address, much less decide, that issue in ruling in the

Taxpayers’ favor. Rather, as discussed earlier, the basis for

the circuit court’s decision was that the Chandler policy was

inconsistent with the requirements of Code § 58.1-3221 and City

Code §§ 27-83, and that therefore the assessment on the

Property was “otherwise invalid or illegal.” Code § 58.1-

3984(A). Thus, just as with the expert’s testimony in Keswick

Club, Englander’s testimony “could not have affected the

result.” 280 Va. at 390, 699 S.E.2d at 496. Accordingly, to

the extent that the circuit court erred in admitting it, the

error was harmless.

3. Inclusion of the Property’s Retail
Space in the Final Order

Finally, the City contends that the circuit court erred in

including the Property’s retail space (Parcel No. 1138) in the

final order because the Taxpayers allegedly failed to include

17
that space in the Application. To support its argument, the

City relies on our decision in Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works,

165 Va. 196, 181 S.E. 521 (1935), in which we said: “No court

can base its decree upon facts not alleged, nor render its

judgment upon a right, however meritorious, which has not been

pleaded and claimed.” Id. at 207, 181 S.E. at 525.

What the City fails to mention, however, is that the

circuit court made a factual finding that the retail space was

at issue:

[COUNSEL]: Your honor, only thing I would say
is that if you go back to [the Taxpayers’] Exhibit
42, [the City Assessor’s] spreadsheet that
memorialized the agreement [on values], there’s one
parcel number there, 1014 . . . . That’s one of the
two in our complaint. That’s for both spreadsheets,
the office area and the retail area. The evidence is
clear that it has always been the office area and the
retail area that was part of the agreement and at
issue in this case.

THE COURT: Well, I’m in agreement with that. I
think it’s the office area and the retail area that’s
indicated in the evidence and by the spreadsheet, and
so that should be included in the order.”

(Emphasis added.)

Factual findings of a trial court are entitled to the same

weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless they

are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Code

§ 8.01-680; Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. RBMW, Inc., 262 Va.

502, 510, 551 S.E.2d 313, 317 (2001). On the record before us,

we cannot say that the circuit court’s factual finding that the

18
retail space was at issue is plainly wrong or without evidence

to support it. In addition to Exhibit 42, uncontroverted

testimony from Neil Kessler, a Troutman Sanders partner,

established that the retail space was at issue and that it had

been included in the parties’ agreement on post-rehabilitation

values.

We therefore hold that the circuit court did not err in

including the retail space in the final order.

B. The Taxpayers’ Appeal

The Taxpayers assert that the circuit court erred in

denying their claim for attorney’s fees under Section 9.5 of

the Agreement. That section reads as follows:

If either the City or Developer brings suit or other
legal proceedings or arbitration proceeding to
enforce the provisions of this Agreement against the
other, then the party prevailing in such suit or
proceeding shall be reimbursed by the other for all
reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation and/or
arbitration costs and expenses incurred by the
prevailing party in connection with such suit or
proceeding.

The Taxpayers argue that they are entitled to an award of

attorney’s fees under this section because they were the

prevailing party in a “suit or other legal proceeding” to

enforce the provisions of the Agreement — in particular, the

provisions in which the City warranted that they would receive

“the full benefit” of the Program.

19
 We disagree. No doubt the Taxpayers make reference to the

Agreement in the Application. But that does not mean that they

brought this case under the Agreement. Indeed, in the very

first paragraph of the Application, they say otherwise:

“Pursuant to Va. Code § 58.1-3984, [the Taxpayers] apply to

this Court for relief from the erroneous assessments of taxes

by . . . the City.” What is more, in another paragraph of the

Application – which appears under the heading “Applicable

Relief” – they say:

This Court, pursuant to Virginia Code § 58.1-
3984, is empowered to correct the City’s erroneous
assessments and to order a refund of the excess taxes
paid by [the Taxpayers] as a result of such erroneous
assessments. In addition, the Court, upon finding an
overpayment of taxes in an action brought pursuant to
Virginia Code § 58.1-3984, shall award interest on
such overpayments, pursuant to Virginia Code § 58.1-
3916, at the same rate of interest charged by the
City on delinquent taxes.

It is not until the second-to-last line of the final paragraph

of the Application that they make any mention of their claim

for attorney’s fees. And even there, they do not invoke

Section 9.5 of the Agreement.

Simply put, this case was not brought and litigated as a

breach of contract case but as an erroneous assessment case

under Code § 58.1-3984. And it was so treated by the circuit

court. In fact, there is no mention of the Agreement in either

the letter opinion or the final order.

20
 Accordingly, the Taxpayers are not entitled to an award of

attorney’s fees unless Code § 58.1-3984 so provides. See

Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 400, 641 S.E.2d 494, 501 (2007)

(“[O]rdinarily, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable by a

prevailing litigant in the absence of a specific contractual or

statutory provision to the contrary.” (quoting Lannon v. Lee

Conner Realty Corp., 238 Va. 590, 594, 385 S.E.2d 380, 383

(1989))). Because it does not, we hold that the circuit court

did not err in denying the Taxpayers’ claim for attorney’s

fees.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of

the circuit court.

Affirmed.

21