Jenkins v. Mehra

Present: All the Justices

JIMMIE D. JENKINS, DIRECTOR, FAIRFAX
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 092272 JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
January 13, 2011
RAJ MEHRA, ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Marcus D. Williams, Judge

This appeal challenges a trial court's judgment refusing to

hold a party in contempt after having found that the party

failed to abide by the terms of a prior order of the court

awarding injunctive relief. We will dismiss the appeal because

this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the

refusal to find civil contempt.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The events culminating in this appeal originated in 2005,

when the Fairfax County Department of Public Works and

Environmental Services (DPWES) issued notices to Raj Mehra and

Urvashi Mehra (the Mehras), advising them that certain

conditions on their real property located in Fairfax County

violated particular provisions of various Fairfax County

ordinances. 1 The notices asserted violations in regard to a

1
The specific Fairfax County ordinances at issue were the
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Ordinance, Fairfax County Code
§ 118-3-2(f), and the Erosion and Sediment Control Ordinance,
Fairfax County Code § 104-1-2, in addition to Fairfax County
Public Facilities Manual § 6-0202.4.
drainage system on the real property and an impervious area

greater than 18 percent of the total area of the Mehras' real

property. In the notices, DPWES ordered the Mehras to take

corrective actions to bring their real property into compliance

with the relevant ordinances.

In September 2007, Jimmie D. Jenkins, the Director of

DPWES, filed a complaint in the circuit court, alleging that the

Mehras had neither complied with the notices of violation,

requested reconsideration of DPWES' decision, nor appealed that

decision. Jenkins requested the circuit court to declare that

the Mehras' real property was in violation of the relevant

Fairfax County ordinances and to issue injunctive relief

requiring the Mehras to correct the violations on their real

property. The circuit court entered a consent order in

September 2008, which declared that the Mehras' real property

was in violation of particular ordinances and directed the

Mehras to bring their real property into compliance according to

a schedule set forth in the consent order.

Because the Mehras did not comply fully with the terms of

the consent order, Jenkins filed a motion for a rule to show

cause why the Mehras should not be held in contempt for

violating the order. The circuit court subsequently issued a

rule to show cause, and at a hearing on that rule, the Mehras

stipulated that they had not performed certain actions required

2
by the consent order. Urvashi Mehra, however, testified that

her husband had lost his job after the entry of the consent

order and that a lack of funds prevented the Mehras from

completing the work required by the order. The circuit court

held that "the terms of the Order of September 12, 2008 have not

been met, but that the violation is not willful and therefore

not contemptuous." Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the

rule to show cause.

Jenkins filed a motion to reconsider, arguing, inter alia,

that civil contempt does not require a finding of willfulness on

the part of the offending party. The circuit court denied the

motion, again finding that the Mehras' noncompliance "was not in

bad faith or willful disobedience" of the September 2008 order.

We awarded Jenkins this appeal, limited to two assignments

of error. In those assignments of error, Jenkins asserts that

the circuit court erred in dismissing the rule to show cause on

the basis that the Mehras did not willfully violate the consent

order because civil contempt does not require a finding of

willfulness. Assuming arguendo that willfulness is relevant,

Jenkins further contends the circuit court erred in refusing to

hold the Mehras in contempt because their failure to comply with

the consent order was "based on their own financial priorities."

In the order awarding the appeal, this Court, sua sponte,

directed the parties to address "whether, under the facts of

3
this case, the appellant [Jenkins] has standing to appeal a

judgment of the circuit court declining to hold a party in civil

contempt and, if so, whether the jurisdiction for appeal is

governed by Code § 19.2-318, requiring transfer of the appeal to

the Court of Appeals of Virginia, or by Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) or

(B)(3)." Jenkins v. Mehra, Record No. 092272 (March 16, 2010).

We will address only the jurisdictional issue because it is

dispositive. 2 See Parrish v. Jessee, 250 Va. 514, 520, 464

S.E.2d 141, 145 (1995) ("Jurisdiction is always a threshold

issue.").

ANALYSIS

This Court's "jurisdiction is defined by the [C]onstitution

of the state and the laws passed in pursuance thereof." Forbes

v. State Council, 107 Va. 853, 855, 60 S.E. 81, 81 (1908); see

also Va. Const. art. VI, § 1 (subject to certain limitations,

the General Assembly has "the power to determine the . . .

appellate jurisdiction of the courts of the Commonwealth"). The

jurisdictional inquiry that we must undertake is twofold. We

must first determine whether Code § 19.2-318 governs this

2
Subsequent to the parties' filing their respective briefs
in this Court, the Mehras moved to dismiss the appeal on the
basis that the matter is now moot because they have taken the
required actions to comply with the consent order. In response,
Jenkins did not specifically dispute the Mehras' assertions but,
instead, asserted several reasons why the motion should be
denied. Because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive, we
will not decide the motion to dismiss.

4
appeal, in which case jurisdiction would lie in the Court of

Appeals of Virginia. If we answer that question in the

negative, then we must ascertain whether this Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Code § 8.01-

670(A)(3). 3

We begin our analysis by noting that "[t]he right of

appellate review from a finding of contempt or a refusal to find

contempt did not exist at all at common law." 4 Tyler v.

Baltimore Cnty., 259 A.2d 307, 310 (Md. 1969); see Cossart v.

State, 14 Ark. 538, 541-42 (1854); Cooper v. People, 22 P. 790,

795 (Colo. 1889); Hunter v. State, 6 Ind. 339, 340 (1855); New

England Novelty Co. v. Sandberg, 54 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass.

1944); Masonite Corp. v. International Woodworkers of Am., AFL

CIO, 206 So. 2d 171, 177 (Miss. 1967). Rather, when not

otherwise provided by statute, "the sole adjudication of

contempt, and the punishment thereof, belong[ed] exclusively,

3
The provisions of Code § 8.01-670(B)(3) are not applicable
because the order being challenged in this appeal is not
interlocutory. See Comcast of Chesterfield Cnty., Inc. v. Board
of Supervisors of Chesterfield Cnty., 277 Va. 293, 306, 672
S.E.2d 870, 876 (2009).
4
In fact, the common law tolerated no exception to a
court's contempt powers, rejecting even collateral attacks on
judicial findings of contempt. See Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S.
38, 43-45 (1822) (joining the English Court of Common Pleas in
rejecting an application for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that "no Court can discharge . . . a person that is in
execution by the judgment of any other Court" for contempt
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

5
and without interference, to each respective court." Wells v.

Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 500, 503-04 (1871) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Van Dyke v. Superior Court of

Gila Cnty., 211 P. 576, 588 (Ariz. 1922); Ex parte Senior, 19

So. 652, 653 (Fla. 1896); Masonite, 206 So. 2d at 177.

Appellate courts were thus without jurisdiction to review such

findings. See, e.g., Onomea Sugar Co. v. Austin, 5 Haw. 604,

606 (1888) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal of a

finding of civil contempt); Hunter, 6 Ind. at 340 ("Courts of

record have exclusive control over charges for contempt; and

their conviction or acquittal is final and conclusive."); Tyler,

259 A.2d at 311 (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal

of a denial of contempt); State v. Little, 94 S.E. 680, 681-82

(N.C. 1917) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal of a

finding of criminal contempt); see generally Cooper, 22 P. at

795 (discussing common law rule and statutory exceptions

thereto). This general rule applied to trial court rulings with

respect to both civil and criminal contempt. See, e.g., Austin,

5 Haw. at 606; Sandberg, 54 N.E.2d at 917.

Under the common law, the lack of appellate review from a

finding of contempt or the refusal to find contempt was

justified as necessary because

the power of the . . . courts over contempt is
omnipotent, and its exercise is not to be enquired
into by any other tribunal. This is the great bulwark

6
 established by the common law for the protection of
courts of justice, and for the maintenance of their
dignity, authority and efficiency, and neither in
England nor in the United States has this unrestricted
power been seriously questioned.

Senior, 19 So. at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted).

"[T]he power to punish for contempt was so absolutely essential

to the functioning and, indeed, the existence of courts that to

be effectual the power must be instantly available and

inevitable to the point of not being subject to change." Tyler,

259 A.2d at 310. To allow "a contumacious witness, juror, party

litigant, or counsel" to challenge a finding of contempt on

appeal would "effectually check the machinery of the court in

its operation, and frustrate the wholesome administration of the

law." Cossart, 14 Ark. at 541.

The General Assembly has declared that in the Commonwealth,

"[t]he common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to

the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this

Commonwealth . . . continue[s] in full force [and is] the rule

of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly." Code

§ 1-200; see also Evans v. Evans, 280 Va. 76, 83-84, 695 S.E.2d

173, 176-77 (2010). Thus, because a trial court's ruling

regarding contempt was not appealable under the common law, we

must determine whether the General Assembly has abrogated the

common law rule to provide a right of appeal from contempt

proceedings, particularly a trial court's judgment refusing to

7
find civil contempt. In making that determination, this Court

must read the enactments of the General Assembly, which " 'is

presumed to have known and to have had the common law in mind in

the enactment of a statute,' " in conjunction with the common

law, giving effect to both " 'unless it clearly appears from

express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of

the statute was to change the common law.' " Isbell v.

Commercial Inv. Assocs., Inc., 273 Va. 605, 614, 644 S.E.2d 72,

75-76 (2007) (quoting Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215 Va.

274, 276, 208 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1974)). Abrogation of the common

law thus occurs only when "the legislative intent to do so is

plainly manifested," as "there is a presumption that no change

was intended." Id. at 613-14, 644 S.E.2d at 75 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

But, even where a statute's purpose is to abrogate the

common law, such statute is " 'to be strictly construed and not

to be enlarged in [its] operation by construction beyond [its]

express terms.' " Id. at 613, 644 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting

Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 181, 142

S.E.2d 514, 518 (1965)). Thus, " '[w]hen an enactment does not

encompass the entire subject covered by the common law, it

abrogates the common[] law rule only to the extent that its

terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule.' "

8
Id. at 614, 644 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236

Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988)).

Starting with Code § 19.2-318, its provisions, in relevant

part, state: "From a judgment for any civil contempt of court an

appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals. A writ of error

shall lie from the Court of Appeals to a judgment for criminal

contempt of court." The version of this statute in effect prior

to the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1984 provided in

pertinent part: "To a judgment for any civil or criminal

contempt of court a writ of error shall lie from the Supreme

Court of Virginia." Code § 19.2-318 (1984).

The first two enactments of what is now Code § 19.2-318

permitted a writ of error "in any judgment, for contempt,

rendered by any court other than the court of appeals [now the

Supreme Court of Virginia]." 1826 Acts ch. 18; see also 1848

Acts ch. 120 (enacting new Title III, Chapter 24, Section 6 of

the Criminal Code, pertaining to contempts). In addition to the

1848 act being part of the Criminal Code, both acts stated that

nothing therein "shall be construed to extend to any proceeding

by attachment to compel the performance of any decree or

judgment, or to enforce obedience thereto," i.e., the kind of

civil contempt at issue in this appeal. 1826 Acts ch. 18; 1848

Acts ch. 120. By enacting these provisions, the General

Assembly "plainly manifested" an intent to abrogate the common

9
law to allow an appeal from a judgment for criminal contempt.

See Isbell, 273 Va. at 613, 644 S.E.2d at 75. In the 1860 Code,

the statutory provision allowing a writ of error to a judgment

for contempt still excluded a judgment for civil contempt of the

type at issue here: "To a judgment against a free person for a

contempt of court, other than for the non-performance of, or

disobedience to, a judgment, decree, or order, a writ of error

shall lie." Code 1860, Ch. 209, § 4, p. 840 (emphasis added).

In 1898, the General Assembly enacted a statute providing

that in "any case of contempt[,] any judgment of conviction

therefor may be reviewed on [a] writ of error." 1898 Acts ch.

513; Code 1898, ch. 282, § 3768. In Trimble v. Commonwealth, 96

Va. 818, 32 S.E. 786 (1899), this Court applied former Code

§ 3768 to award a writ of error to a trial court's judgment for

contempt in a matter involving custody of a child. Id. at 820,

32 S.E. at 786. Finding that Code § 3768 allowed the appeal,

this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at

820-21, 32 S.E. at 787. In 1904, however, the General Assembly

repealed the portion of former Code § 3768 that allowed, on a

writ of error, review of a judgment of conviction in "any case

of contempt." 1904 Acts ch. 194. Following that repeal, the

1904 Code provided, in regard to appeals from contempt

proceedings: "To a judgment for a contempt of court, other than

for the nonperformance of, or disobedience to, a judgment,

10
decree, or order, a writ of error shall lie to the supreme court

of appeals." Code § 4053 (1904).

That statute, in particular the language "other than for

the non-performance of, or disobedience to, a judgment, decree,

or order," was at issue in Forbes. There, the defendants had

been adjudged in contempt for "disobeying, disregarding, and

evading" a trial court's decree. Forbes, 107 Va. at 854, 60

S.E. at 81. On appeal, this Court dismissed the writ of error

for lack of jurisdiction under the plain language of former Code

§ 4053 of the 1904 Code because the contempt was for disobeying

a lawful decree of the trial court. Id. at 857-59, 60 S.E. at

82. The Court explained that "the theory upon which section

4053 rest[ed], in providing that a writ of error shall lie to

this [C]ourt to all judgments for contempt other than for the

nonperformance of or disobedience to a judgment, decree, or

order, seems to be that in such case the parties to the cause

should either appeal from the judgment, decree, or order, if

they felt aggrieved by it, or, it if was a lawful decree or

order, that it should be obeyed." Id. at 858, 60 S.E. at 82.

Less than two months after the decision in Forbes, the

General Assembly amended former Code § 4053 to read: "To a

judgment for a contempt of court a writ of error shall lie to

the supreme court of appeals." 1908 Acts ch. 194. With that

amendment coming soon after Forbes, the General Assembly may be

11
understood to have intended, although it did not expressly

state, that appeals would lie from judgments for civil contempt.

The General Assembly made that explicit in 1979 when the

provision was amended to state: "To a judgment for any civil or

criminal contempt of court a writ of error shall lie from the

Supreme Court of Virginia." 1979 Acts ch. 649. Finally, in

1984, the General Assembly amended the statute to its current

form.

As this history makes clear, the provisions of Code § 19.2-

318 and its statutory predecessors, including the short-lived

§ 3768 of Ch. 282 of the 1898 Code, abrogated the common law

rule only with regard to judgments for contempt. Thus, the

question remaining is whether, in the instant case, the circuit

court's judgment refusing to find civil contempt is a "judgment

for any civil contempt." Code § 19.2-318.

Jenkins argues that because Code § 19.2-318 encompasses

only "a judgment for" contempt (emphasis added) and because the

circuit court's judgment did not find civil contempt, the

statute does not govern this appeal. Jenkins also asserts that

Code § 19.2-319, which allows a court to postpone the execution

of a "judgment for any civil or criminal contempt," makes clear

that the term "judgment for" does not include a trial court's

refusal to hold a party in civil contempt. Jenkins argues that

although Code § 19.2-318 does not govern the instant appeal,

12
this Court nevertheless has jurisdiction pursuant to Code

§ 8.01-670(A)(3).

The Mehras respond that Jenkins' position would result in

the "illogical and inconsistent jurisdictional arrangement" of

appeals from judgments holding persons in civil contempt lying

with the Court of Appeals but appeals from judgments refusing to

hold persons in civil contempt resting in this Court. The

Mehras contend that an equally faithful interpretation of Code

§ 19.2-318 is that a trial court's decision refusing to find a

party in civil contempt is simply not appealable. However, if

an appeal does lie from such a judgment, the Mehras contend that

the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to

Code § 19.2-318.

In interpreting the terms used by the General Assembly in

Code § 19.2-318, we are bound by the plain meaning of the

statutory language. Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657

S.E.2d 142, 144 (2008). "[I]f the language of a statute is

unambiguous, courts may not interpret the language in a way that

effectively holds that the General Assembly did not mean what it

actually expressed." Id. We agree with Jenkins that Code

§ 19.2-318 does not govern this appeal. The phrase "judgment

for any civil contempt" plainly means a judgment holding an

individual in civil contempt of court. If the General Assembly

intended to create appellate jurisdiction to review a judgment

13
refusing to hold a person in civil contempt, it would have used

a phrase such as "judgment concerning" or "judgment regarding"

any civil contempt. Furthermore, the second sentence in Code

§ 19.2-318 contains the same phrase with regard to a criminal

contempt: "A writ of error shall lie from the Court of Appeals

to a judgment for criminal contempt of court." (Emphasis

added.)

In addition, as noted by Jenkins, Code § 19.2-319 utilizes

the same phrase in authorizing a court to postpone execution of

a "judgment for any civil or criminal contempt." Obviously,

postponement of a judgment refusing to hold a person in civil or

criminal contempt is unnecessary. Moreover, the General

Assembly has used the phrase "judgment for" in many instances

throughout the Code in which the phrase can only mean a judgment

awarding a certain type of relief. See, e.g., Code § 8.01-38.1

(if punitive damages award is above statutory cap, trial judge

is required to "enter judgment for such damages in the maximum

amount provided by this section"); Code § 8.01-446 (requiring

circuit court clerks to docket "any judgment for a specific

amount of money"); Code § 8.01-460 (stating that a "judgment for

support and maintenance" of a spouse or children is a lien on

the obligor's real estate). "It is a common canon of statutory

construction what when the legislature uses the same term in

separate statutes, that term has the same meaning in each unless

14
the General Assembly indicates to the contrary." Commonwealth

v. Jackson, 276 Va. 184, 194, 661 S.E.2d 810, 814 (2008).

Thus, we conclude that Code § 19.2-318 does not provide

appellate jurisdiction for either this Court or the Court of

Appeals to review the judgment of the circuit court dismissing

the rule to show cause and refusing to hold the Mehras in civil

contempt of court. Finding no abrogation of the common law rule

in the current or former versions of Code § 19.2-318 that would

give the Court jurisdiction of this appeal, we turn now to Code

§ 8.01-670(A)(3), which, according to Jenkins, allows the

instant appeal to this Court.

In its current form, Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) provides that

"any person may present a petition for an appeal to the Supreme

Court of Virginia if he believes himself aggrieved . . . [b]y a

final judgment in any . . . civil case." The origins of that

statute can be traced to the Revised Code of 1803, which gave

this Court jurisdiction over "writs of error . . . to and from

any final decree or judgment of the High Court of Chancery,

General Court, and District Courts." 1 Rev. Code 1803, ch. 63,

§ 14, p. 62. That provision gradually became more specific, as

the General Assembly limited its application to civil cases.

For example, in 1830, the General Assembly provided an appeal

for any person "aggrieved . . . by any judgment, proceeding or

order" of the circuit superior courts of law and chancery "in

15
any matter, cause or controversy, at common law, such matter,

cause or controversy, being civil and not criminal in its

nature, and such judgment, proceeding or order, being final."

1831 Acts ch. 11. In the 1860 Code, the provisions dealing with

civil appeals were codified in separate titles from those

governing criminal appeals. See Code 1860, Tit. 51, ch. 182

(civil cases) and Tit. 55, ch. 209 (criminal cases). The

pertinent statute, at that time, allowed an appeal or writ of

error "to any civil case wherein there is a final judgment,

decree or order." Code 1860, ch. 182 § 2. The current version

of Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) has been in existence since 1977. 1977

Acts ch. 617.

Considering, as we must, that the General Assembly "had the

common law in mind" when it first gave this Court appellate

jurisdiction to review final judgments in civil cases, we

conclude that the current and former versions of Code § 8.01-

670(A)(3) never abrogated the common law rule with respect to an

appeal from a trial court's judgment refusing to hold an

individual in civil contempt. First, it does not "clearly

appear[] from express language or by necessary implication that

the purpose of [Code § 8.01-670(A)(3)] was to change the common

law." Isbell, 273 Va. at 614, 644 S.E.2d at 75-76 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Merely stating that a party may

appeal from "any" final judgment in a civil case does not

16
"plainly manifest[]," see id. at 613, 644 S.E.2d at 75, an

intent to eliminate the "great bulwark established by the common

law" providing that judgments in contempt proceedings were

unassailable. Senior, 19 So. at 653 (internal quotation marks

omitted). 5 Furthermore, any suggestion that the word "any" can

be construed as an express abrogation of the common law to allow

an appeal from a refusal to find civil contempt is refuted by

the history of Code § 19.2-318.

As we have explained, Code § 19.2-318, at its inception,

permitted a writ of error only to a judgment for criminal

contempt and expressly excluded "any proceeding by attachment to

compel the performance of any decree or judgment, or to enforce

obedience thereto." 1826 Acts ch. 18. Prior to this enactment,

however, Code § 8.01-670's predecessor was already in existence

and allowed a writ of error "to and from any final decree or

judgment." 1 Rev. Code 1803, ch. 63, § 14, p. 62. If the

General Assembly intended for that language in the Code of 1803

to abrogate the common law rule so as to allow an appeal from a

judgment in a civil contempt proceeding, whether from a judgment

for contempt or the opposite, the subsequent enactment of the

1826 version of Code § 19.2-318 rendered the two statutes in

5
For an example of the kind of "plain[] manifest[ation]"
that suffices to abrogate the common law, see Doss v. Jamco,
Inc., 254 Va. 362, 368-72, 492 S.E.2d 441, 445-47 (1997).

17
conflict, the former allowing an appeal from a judgment in a

civil contempt proceeding and the latter excluding such.

Moreover, since the 1826 version of Code § 19.2-318 was enacted,

the former and current versions of Code §§ 8.01-670(A)(3) and

19.2-318 have continued to co-exist and would be in conflict

today if we construe Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) to allow an appeal to

this Court from a judgment refusing to find civil contempt.

Code § 19.2-318, being the more specific statute because it

explicitly addresses contempt, see Viking Enter. v. County of

Chesterfield, 277 Va. 104, 110, 670 S.E.2d 741, 744 (2009),

allows an appeal only from a "judgment for" civil contempt.

Further, if we interpret Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) to give this

Court jurisdiction of the instant appeal, there would exist the

anomaly of jurisdiction lying in the Court of Appeals from a

judgment holding an individual in civil contempt but

jurisdiction lying in this Court from a judgment refusing to

find an individual in civil contempt. We do not believe the

General Assembly intended such an anomaly. Thus, we conclude

that the General Assembly has abrogated the common law rule that

appellate review of contempt proceedings is not available only

with regard to judgments "for" contempt. Consequently, the

Court does not have jurisdiction under Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) to

hear this appeal.

18
 CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that it does not "clearly appear[] from

express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of

[Code § 8.01-670(A)(3)] was to change the common law" with

respect to appeals from judgments refusing to find civil

contempt. See Isbell, 273 Va. at 614, 644 S.E.2d at 75-76

(internal quotation marks omitted). The General Assembly has

yet to abrogate the common law rule to confer jurisdiction over

the appeal in this case. 6 While the former and current versions

of Code § 19.2-318 abrogated the common law so as to allow

appeals from judgments for civil contempt, this case does not

involve an appeal from such a judgment. 7

6
We are aware that appeals have been taken, though not to
this Court, when a party challenged a trial court's refusal to
hold the other party in civil contempt. See, e.g., Barnhill v.
Brooks, 15 Va. App. 696, 704, 427 S.E.2d 209, 214-15 (1993);
Wells v. Wells, 12 Va. App. 31, 36, 401 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1991);
Willis v. Spinner, Record No. 1004-99-2, slip op. at *5 (Oct.
19, 1999). It appears, however, that the issue of appellate
jurisdiction was not raised in those cases.
7
In this case, Jenkins asked the circuit court to enforce
its own order through the use of the court's inherent contempt
power. See Wells, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 503. There are certain
statutes, however, that address the power of contempt in
specific situations. See, e.g., Code § 2.2-2635 ("Any person
failing to comply with [a subpoena duces tecum] shall be subject
to punishment for contempt by the court issuing the subpoena.");
Code § 3.2-4726 ("All parties disobeying the orders or subpoenas
of the Commissioner [of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs] are
guilty of contempt and shall be certified to an appropriate
court for punishment."); Code § 8.01-407(A) ("Failure to respond
to [a summons to testify] shall be punishable by the court in
which the proceeding is pending as for contempt."); Code § 16.1-
252(J) ("Violation of any [preliminary removal] order [in cases

19
 For these reasons, we hold that the Court is without

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We will therefore dismiss the

appeal.

Dismissed.

of child abuse or neglect] issued pursuant to this section shall
constitute contempt of court."); Code § 26-13 (Fiduciary
refusing to file inventory after prior order "shall be deemed
guilty of contempt of court, and be dealt with accordingly.").
This appeal does not present, and today we do not address,
whether a court's decision declining to exercise its contempt
power pursuant to such provisions is reviewable on appeal.

20