Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, Millette, and
Mims, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.
BENJAMIN AGUILERA
v. Record No. 091493 OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE
ELIZABETH B. LACY
JOHN ANDREW CHRISTIAN SEPTEMBER 16, 2010
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Craig D. Johnston, Judge
In this case we consider whether a party who is acting pro
se may authorize a person who is not licensed to practice law in
this Commonwealth to sign a complaint on behalf of the pro se
party.
I. FACTS
On November 12, 2008, Benjamin Aguilera filed a complaint
against John Andrew Christian for personal injuries sustained in
an automobile collision that occurred on November 13, 2006.
Aguilera did not personally sign the complaint but asked B.
Marian Chou, his neighbor and friend, to sign his name on the
complaint for him. 1 Chou signed Aguilera’s name on the complaint
and placed her initials “bmc” directly above the signature.
Christian filed an Answer and Grounds of Defense in
response to Aguilera’s complaint and propounded Requests for
Admission requesting that Aguilera admit (1) that the signature
1
Chou is an attorney licensed to practice law in
Washington, D.C., but Chou is not licensed to practice law in
the Commonwealth of Virginia.
on the complaint was not his signature; (2) that the complaint
was signed by a person other than himself; (3) that the
complaint was signed by Bwo Marian Chou; and (4) that the
complaint was signed by an attorney not licensed to practice law
in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Y. T. Hung, an attorney
licensed in Virginia, entered his appearance as counsel for
Aguilera 2 and filed an objection to Christian’s Requests for
Admission on the grounds of relevance and attorney-client
privilege.
Christian filed motions to deem the requests for admission
admitted and for summary judgment. At a hearing on those
motions, Aguilera stipulated that Chou signed Aguilera’s name on
the complaint. The court entered summary judgment in
Christian’s favor. Aguilera filed a motion for reconsideration
and on April 24, 2009, the trial court heard oral arguments on
Aguilera’s motion. At this hearing, Hung conceded again that
Chou signed Aguilera’s name on the complaint and that Chou
drafted the complaint for Aguilera. Hung argued that the
signature was valid because Aguilera authorized Chou to sign his
name to the complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint
by order holding that the complaint did not comply with Code
2
Hung also filed a motion to associate Chou pro hac vice
for the purpose of appearing and participating with Hung in
Aguilera’s litigation which the trial court declined to grant
because it appeared likely Chou would or could be called to
testify.
2
§ 8.01-271.1 because it was not signed by the plaintiff or by an
attorney licensed to practice law in Virginia and, therefore the
complaint was a nullity. Aguilera filed a timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Aguilera argues in this appeal that authorizing another
person to sign pleadings on his behalf as a pro se plaintiff
complies with the signature requirements contained in Code
§ 8.01-271.1 and Rule 1:4 and, therefore, the trial court erred
in concluding the signature was a nullity and dismissing the
complaint.
Code § 8.01-271.1 provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in §§ 16.1-260 and
63.2-1901, every pleading, written motion, and
other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record in his individual name, and the attorney's
address shall be stated on the first pleading
filed by that attorney in the action. A party
who is not represented by an attorney, including
a person confined in a state or local
correctional facility proceeding pro se, shall
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and
state his address.
Rule 1:4 provides in relevant part:
(c) Counsel or an unrepresented party who files a
pleading shall sign it and state his address.
Aguilera asserts that a signature “represents an endorsement or
approval of the document.” Thus, Aguilera continues, as long as
his signature was placed on the pleading with his permission and
with his intent “to authenticate it” as his act, he has complied
3
with the requirements of Rule 1:4(c) and Code § 8.01-271.1. We
disagree.
Both the statute and the rule unambiguously state that a
party not represented by an attorney “shall sign” a pleading.
Nothing in this language permits a person other than a licensed
attorney to sign a pleading on behalf of an unrepresented party.
The policy underlying this requirement is clear. Our legal
system allows parties in litigation to proceed either pro se or
through representation by a duly licensed attorney. 3 As we
explained in Kone v. Wilson, 272 Va. 59, 62-63, 630 S.E.2d 744,
746 (2006), the party with the cause of action may proceed on his
own behalf but pleadings signed by a person acting in a
representative capacity for the party with the cause of action
are a nullity unless such person is licensed to practice law in
this Commonwealth. See also Shipe v. Hunter, 280 Va. 480, 483,
699 S.E.2d 519, 520 (this day decided) (signing attorney must be
licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth), Wellmore Coal
Corp. v. Harman Mining Corp., 264 Va. 279, 283-84, 568 S.E.2d
671, 673 (2002) (notice of appeal signed by attorney not licensed
to practice law in Virginia invalid and has no legal effect).
Accordingly, in this case, Aguilera’s signature on the
complaint was invalid and a nullity because it was not signed by
3
Exceptions have been created by statute allowing non-
attorneys to file pleadings on behalf of another, but they are
not relevant here. See Code §§ 26-106, 16.1-260, 63.2-1901.
4
Aguilera, the party with the cause of action, or by an attorney
licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth. Therefore, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint and we will
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
5