PRESENT: All the Justices
MADELYN A. JENKINS, ET AL.
v. Record No. 071206 OPINION BY
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
June 6, 2008
SHARON JOHNSON, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY
Jeffrey W. Parker, Judge
In this appeal involving intestate succession to title to
real estate, we consider whether children born out of wedlock
are required to comply with the proof of paternity provisions
of Code § 64.1-5.1(4), relating to “the settlement of [a]
decedent’s estate,” in order to assert their rights as legal
heirs to real property owned by a decedent.
In October 1992, Joseph A. Jenkins (Joseph) died
intestate. At the time of his death, Joseph was married to
Madelyn A. Jenkins (Jenkins), and the couple had four children
who were born during the marriage. Before his marriage to
Jenkins, Joseph and another woman allegedly had two daughters
born out of wedlock, Sharon Johnson (Johnson) and Joann Lee
(Lee).
On the day that he died, Joseph owned two parcels of land
(the subject real property). In April 2005, before attempting
to sell a portion of the subject real property, Jenkins filed
an affidavit in the circuit court pursuant to Code § 64.1-134,
listing herself as Joseph’s sole heir. In March 2006, Johnson
filed an affidavit in the circuit court naming herself, Lee,
Jenkins, and Jenkins’ four children as Joseph’s heirs.
Also in March 2006, Johnson and Lee filed a complaint in
the circuit court, seeking to confirm their partial ownership
of the subject real property by intestate succession and to
obtain a partition of that property. Jenkins filed an answer
and motion for summary judgment, asserting that the claims
were barred by Code § 64.1-5.1(4), because Johnson and Lee had
failed to take action required by that statute to prove within
one year of Joseph’s death that he was their biological
father. The circuit court denied the motion for summary
judgment and referred the case to a commissioner in chancery.
After a hearing, the commissioner determined that Johnson
and Lee proved by clear and convincing evidence that Joseph
was their biological father and that they each owned a share
of the subject real property by intestate succession. 1 The
commissioner also concluded that the requirements of Code
§ 64.1-5.1(4) do not apply to a suit to partition real
property of a decedent who died intestate because in Virginia,
such real property does not pass through the “settlement of
1
This Court refused Jenkins’ assignment of error that the
commissioner and the circuit court erred in concluding that
Johnson and Lee had proven by clear and convincing evidence
that Joseph was their biological father. Thus, we do not
address that issue in this opinion.
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[the] decedent’s estate,” but passes by direct succession upon
death. Over Jenkins’ objection, the circuit court confirmed
the commissioner’s report and ordered a partition and sale of
the subject real property. Jenkins appeals. 2
Jenkins argues that the circuit court erred in holding
that the requirements of Code § 64.1-5.1(4) for asserting
claims of paternity do not apply to this action for partition
of real property. While Jenkins acknowledges that title to
real property vests in a decedent’s heirs at the moment of the
decedent’s death, she asserts that Code § 64.1-5.1(4) requires
that an heir born out of wedlock take certain action within
one year of the decedent’s death to establish “standing as an
heir” to the real property. According to Jenkins, our
decision in Belton v. Crudup, 273 Va. 368, 641 S.E.2d 74
(2007), supports her position because, in discussing the
requirements of Code § 64.1-5.1(4), we did not articulate an
exception to those requirements for cases involving title to
real property passing by intestate succession. We disagree
with Jenkins’ arguments.
2
Although a portion of the subject real property has not
been sold, we consider this appeal under Code § 8.01-
670(B)(3), which permits us to review interlocutory orders in
cases involving equitable claims that adjudicate “the
principles of a cause.”
3
Two particular statutes are relevant to this controversy,
Code §§ 64.1-1 and –5.1(4). Code § 64.1-1 provides, in
material part:
When any person having title to any real estate of
inheritance shall die intestate as to such estate, it
shall descend and pass in parcenary to such of his
kindred, male and female, in the following course:
First. To the surviving spouse of the intestate, unless
the intestate is survived by children or their
descendants, one or more of whom are not children or
their descendants of the surviving spouse, in which case
two-thirds of such estate shall pass to all the
intestate’s children and their descendants and the
remaining one-third of such estate shall pass to the
intestate’s surviving spouse.
The applicable portion of Code § 64.1-5.1 states:
If, for purposes of this title or for determining rights
in and to property pursuant to any deed, will, trust or
other instrument, a relationship of parent and child must
be established to determine succession or a taking by,
through or from a person:
. . . .
4. No claim of succession based upon the relationship
between a child born out of wedlock and a parent of such
child shall be recognized in the settlement of any
decedent’s estate unless an affidavit by such child or by
someone acting for such child alleging such parenthood
has been filed within one year of the date of the death
of such parent in the clerk’s office of the circuit court
of the jurisdiction wherein the property affected by such
claim is located and an action seeking adjudication of
parenthood is filed in an appropriate circuit court
within said time.
This appeal requires us to determine whether Johnson and
Lee (collectively, the plaintiffs) established that they are
“children” of Joseph entitled to inherit from their father a
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share of the subject real property under the statute of
descents, Code § 64.1-1. Because we have refused Jenkins’
assignment of error challenging the circuit court’s holding
that the plaintiffs are Joseph’s biological children, we
consider only whether the plaintiffs were required to comply
with the provisions of Code § 64.1-5.1(4) to preserve their
interest under Code § 64.1-1 as Joseph’s legal heirs in the
subject real property.
In resolving this issue, we consider the language of Code
§ 64.1-5.1(4) under the settled principle of statutory
construction that courts are bound by the plain meaning of
statutory language. Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657
S.E.2d 142, 144 (2008); Young v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 528,
533, 643 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2007); Alliance to Save the
Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 439, 621 S.E.2d 78,
86-87 (2005). Under this principle, when the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, courts may not interpret
that language in a manner effectively holding that the General
Assembly did not mean what it actually stated. Hicks, 275 Va.
at 218, 657 S.E.2d at 144; Young, 273 Va. at 533, 643 S.E.2d
at 493; Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41,
630 S.E.2d 301, 303 (2006).
We hold that the language of Code § 64.1-5.1(4) is plain
and unambiguous. When a relationship of parent and child must
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be proved to determine succession, Code § 64.1-5.1(4)
provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that a claim of
succession by a child born out of wedlock will not be
recognized “in the settlement of any decedent’s estate” unless
an affidavit alleging parenthood is filed within one year of
the date of the parent’s death, and an action requesting an
adjudication of parenthood is filed within that same one-year
period. Id.
These statutory requirements, by their plain language,
apply only to “the settlement of [a] decedent’s estate,” and
do not apply to the determination of heirs to, and the
partition of, real property passing by intestate succession.
Under Code § 64.1-1, the title to Joseph’s real property
passed at the moment of his death to Jenkins and to Joseph’s
children, in their respective statutory shares. See Spinks v.
Rice, 187 Va. 730, 742, 47 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1948); 1 Page on
the Law of Wills § 1.4 at 18 (4th ed. 2003); 1 Harrison on
Wills and Administration § 1.03 (3rd ed. 1986). Thus,
although the plaintiffs were required to establish in the
present partition suit that they were Joseph’s “children” in
order to prove their title to the subject real property under
Code § 64.1-1, the plaintiffs were not bound by the
requirements of Code § 64.1-5.1(4) applicable to the
settlement of a decedent’s estate.
6
Contrary to Jenkins’ argument, our holding in Belton does
not affect the conclusion we reach here. In Belton, the
administrator of an estate had filed an amended list of heirs
that did not include a person alleging that she was the
decedent’s daughter born out of wedlock. Id. at 370-71, 641
S.E.2d at 75. The putative daughter claimed that she was
entitled to share in the decedent’s personal property, and
asserted that she was not bound by the requirements of Code
§ 64.1-5.1(4) for establishing the decedent’s paternity
because the administrator’s original list of heirs had
identified her as the decedent’s daughter. Id. at 370-372,
641 S.E.2d at 75-76. We rejected this argument, holding that
because the explicit language of Code § 64.1-5.1(4) does not
provide an exception applicable to these particular factual
circumstances, the putative daughter’s failure to comply with
the statutory requirements precluded her from sharing in the
settlement of the decedent’s estate. Id. at 373-74, 641
S.E.2d at 76-77.
Unlike the proceedings in Belton, the present case does
not involve the administration of an estate comprised of
personal property, but addresses the determination of title to
real property passing by intestate succession. Thus, our
holding in Belton is inapposite to the conclusion we reach
here, that the requirements of Code § 64.1-5.1(4) do not apply
7
when title to real property passes by intestate succession
under Code § 64.1-1. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit
court did not err in determining that the plaintiffs
established that they are legal heirs of Joseph entitled to a
share of the proceeds of sale of the subject real property.
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s
judgment and remand the case to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with the principles expressed in this
opinion.
Affirmed and remanded.
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