PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1
GARY EARL NEIGHBORS OPINION BY
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE
v. Record No. 062460 September 14, 2007
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY
Daniel R. Bouton, Judge
Gary Earl Neighbors appeals from the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Orange County which denied his appeal from the
General District Court of Orange County’s refusal of his
petition for a writ of coram nobis. Neighbors contends the
circuit court erred when it ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction to consider his appeal and that a writ of coram
nobis was “not the proper vehicle to challenge” Neighbors’
guilty plea. For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse
the judgment of the circuit court in part, affirm the judgment
in part, and enter final judgment.
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Neighbors was arrested for violating Code § 18.2-479.12 but
entered an Alford plea to the reduced charge of resisting arrest
1
Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on
August 16, 2007.
2
Code § 18.2-479.1 states that “[a]ny person who
intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a law-enforcement
officer from lawfully arresting him, with or without a warrant,
is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”
in the General District Court of Orange County on June 14, 2004.3
Neighbors was convicted and fined $50. After the statutory
period to appeal his conviction to the circuit court had expired
under Code § 16.1-132, Neighbors filed a pleading styled
“Petition in Form of Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Motion to
Revoke/Vacate Plea” in the district court on September 30, 2004.
Neighbors contended in the petition that when he originally
entered his guilty plea, he “did not have the requisite capacity
to enter a plea” because he was “taking heavy doses of
medication at the time the plea was given.”
The general district court denied the petition by order
which stated that Neighbors’ “Petition for a Writ Coram Nobis
and Motion to Revoke/Vacate Plea does not lie within the
jurisdiction of the General District Court.” Neighbors timely
appealed the general district court’s order to the circuit court
which denied the appeal by an order dated August 25, 2006. The
circuit court’s order stated:
[T]he Circuit Court does not have appellate
jurisdiction of this matter under [Code §] 16.1-132
. . . as the time to perfect an appeal from the
General District Court in a criminal matter has
elapsed, the matter before the Court is civil in
nature, the matter is not an appeal of a bond
3
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (U.S.
1970) (An “Alford plea” is where a defendant asserts his
innocence but admits that sufficient evidence exists which could
likely convince a judge or jury to find the defendant guilty).
See also Parson v. Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 565, 636 S.E.2d 452,
454-55 (2006) (describing effect of Alford plea in Virginia).
2
forfeiture and other appeal rights conferred under
[Code §] 16.1-132 are applicable; and
[U]nder [Code §] 16.1-106 [Neighbors] does not
have a right to appeal an order or judgment from the
General District Court to the Circuit Court, as this
matter although civil in nature, is not a matter in
which the amount in controversy is of greater value
than fifty dollars;
[A] writ of coram nobis in the Commonwealth of
Virginia is not the proper vehicle to challenge the
insanity/incapacity of the defendant in regards to
their plea of guilt and that the Circuit Court has no
jurisdiction to correct errors in the record of the
General District Court of the matters and issues as
asked by [Neighbors] in [his] writ of coram nobis
. . . .
Neighbors assigned error to the circuit court’s judgment
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a general
district court under Code § 16.1-106 for the denial of a writ of
coram nobis. In addition, he assigned error to the circuit
court’s judgment that “a Writ of Coram Nobis is not a proper
method of challenging Neighbors’ incapacity at the time the plea
was entered.”4 We awarded Neighbors this appeal.
4
Neighbors also asserted a third assignment of error:
The Circuit Court erred when it stated the Circuit
Court could not correct matters on the record of the
General District Court because it is inherent in the
grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Circuit Court
that the Circuit Court would have the power to correct
matters of fact of the inferior tribunal especially
considering that civil matters on appeal to the
Circuit Court are ruled upon in de novo proceedings.
We do not need to reach this assignment of error because
our disposition of the other assignments of error is
dispositive.
3
II. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
In Dobie v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 762, 96 S.E.2d 747
(1957), we explained the genesis and function of a writ of coram
vobis.5
The writ of error coram vobis, or coram nobis, is
an ancient writ of the common law. It was called coram
nobis (before us) in King’s Bench because the king was
supposed to preside in person in that court. It was
called coram vobis (before you – the king’s justices)
in Common Pleas, where the king was not supposed to
reside. The difference related only to the form
appropriate to each court and the distinction
disappeared in this country when the need for it
ended. 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 311, p. 561, n. 28. Mr.
Minor says the proper designation here is coram vobis.
IV Minor's Inst., 3 ed., Part I, pp. 1052-3.
The principal function of the writ is to afford
to the court in which an action was tried an
opportunity to correct its own record with reference
to a vital fact not known when the judgment was
rendered, and which could not have been presented by a
motion for a new trial, appeal or other existing
statutory proceeding. Black's Law Dict., 3 ed.,
p. 1861; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1606 b., p. 145;
Ford v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 718, 229 S.W.2d 470. It
lies for an error of fact not apparent on the record,
not attributable to the applicant’s negligence, and
which if known by the court would have prevented
rendition of the judgment. It does not lie for newly-
discovered evidence or newly-arising facts, or facts
adjudicated on the trial. It is not available where
advantage could have been taken of the alleged error
at the trial, as where the facts complained of were
known before or at the trial, or where at the trial
5
For purposes of this opinion, we will use the term coram
vobis, as recognized in Code § 8.01-677. Coram vobis shall be
deemed to include the term coram nobis and both shall be
considered to be the same proceeding in modern pleading and
practice.
4
the accused or his attorney knew of the existence of
such facts but failed to present them. 24 C.J.S.,
Criminal Law, § 1606 at p. 148; 49 C.J.S., Judgments,
§ 312 c., pp. 563, 567.
198 Va. at 768-69, 96 S.E.2d at 752. As a common law writ,
coram vobis has been substantially limited by the General
Assembly through Code § 8.01-677, which provides that “[f]or any
clerical error or error in fact for which a judgment may be
reversed or corrected on writ of error coram vobis, the same may
be reversed or corrected on motion, after reasonable notice, by
the court.” We recognized the restriction of a writ of error
coram vobis only to clerical errors and certain errors in fact
in Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S.E.2d 351 (1967), when we
reviewed the statutory predecessor to Code § 8.01-677:
Our statute is in simple, clear and unambiguous
language, and we read it to mean what it says. It does
not provide that it may be used to obtain a writ of
error, or an appeal, or for any purpose other than to
correct a “clerical error or error in fact.” It does
not supplant the writ of habeas corpus. If its
provisions should be widened, the enlargement should
be effected by the legislature.
208 Va. at 74, 155 S.E.2d at 356.6
With this historical and statutory background in mind, we
now turn to Neighbors’ assignments of error.
6
Blowe considered Code § 8-485 (1950), predecessor to
current Code § 8.01-677. The primary text of the two statutes
is nearly identical.
5
B. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
Neighbors contends on appeal that at the time of his
general district court plea on the resisting arrest charge, “the
various, medically prescribed medications he was taking rendered
him incompetent and thus unable to grasp the gravity of his
situation and to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter
a plea of guilt.” Although Neighbors contends the general
district court erred in holding it did not have jurisdiction to
consider the petition, the issue on appeal is whether the
circuit court erred in concluding that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the general district court.
Neighbors argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that
the writ of coram vobis was not a subject embraced by Code
§ 16.1-106 regarding civil cases for which an appeal lies from
the general district court to the circuit court.7 He contends
that Code § 16.1-106, when read in light of our decision in City
of Virginia Beach v. Siebert, 253 Va. 250, 483 S.E.2d 214
(1997), does bring a writ of coram vobis proceeding within the
ambit of Code § 17.1-513, which explicates the jurisdiction of
the circuit courts.
7
While a writ of coram vobis may be applicable in criminal
or civil proceedings, see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502,
507-09 (1954), the parties do not dispute that the petition for
the writ in this case is a civil proceeding.
6
The Commonwealth responds that because Code § 16.1-106 “on
its face does not remotely suggest that coram nobis is among the
categories of cases appealable from courts not of record to
circuit courts,” the circuit court was therefore without
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. We agree with Neighbors on
this issue.
Code § 17.1-513 sets forth the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts and provides, in pertinent part:
[Circuit courts] shall have appellate
jurisdiction of all cases, civil and criminal, in
which an appeal, writ of error or supersedeas may, as
provided by law, be taken to or allowed by such
courts, or the judges thereof, from or to the judgment
or proceedings of any inferior tribunal.
As Code § 17.1-513 recites, the circuit court would have
appellate jurisdiction in this case if the appeal on denial of a
writ of coram vobis is an appeal “as provided by law.” The
circuit court apparently reasoned in the case at bar that it
lacked jurisdiction over Neighbors’ appeal because “this matter
although civil in nature, is not a matter in which the amount in
controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars,” and thus
was not “as provided by law” for purposes of Code § 17.1-513.
The circuit court’s reference to an amount in controversy
requirement is set forth in Code § 16.1-106, which provides, in
pertinent part:
From any order entered or judgment rendered in a
court not of record in a civil case in which the
7
matter in controversy is of greater value than fifty
dollars, exclusive of interest, any attorney's fees
contracted for in the instrument, and costs, or when
the case involves the constitutionality or validity of
a statute of the Commonwealth, or of an ordinance or
bylaw of a municipal corporation, or of the
enforcement of rights and privileges conferred by the
Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et
seq.), or of a protective order pursuant to § 19.2-
152.10, there shall be an appeal of right, if taken
within ten days after such order or judgment, to a
court of record.
We have “interpret[ed] the monetary controversy provision of
Code § 16.1-106 as language intended to exclude a right of
appeal in those civil cases involving an insignificant monetary
controversy.” Siebert, 253 Va. at 253, 483 S.E.2d at 216.
However, the jurisdictional exclusion of cases involving a
monetary amount of less than $50 is not language which
forecloses the right of appeal for cases that are non-monetary
in nature. In that regard, Siebert is instructive in the
application of Code § 16.1-106 (and derivatively Code § 17.1-
513) to the case at bar.
In Siebert, the City of Virginia Beach appealed a general
district court judgment dismissing a charge of refusal to take a
blood or alcohol test by Siebert to the circuit court. 253 Va.
at 251, 483 S.E.2d at 215. The circuit court dismissed the
City’s appeal by concluding Code § 16.1-106 excluded a civil
refusal case from its jurisdiction because such a case was not a
monetary controversy for more than $50 or otherwise enumerated.
8
Id. at 251-52, 483 S.E.2d at 215. We reversed the circuit court
and held Code § 16.1-106 did not exclude the right of appeal in
civil cases from the general district court to the circuit
court, in part, because we read the monetary limitation to apply
only to cases involving money, not a categorical exclusion of
all non-monetary civil cases. Id. at 253-54, 483 S.E.2d at 216.
Thus, we know from Siebert that the circuit court’s
restriction of Code § 16.1-106 in this case to only monetary
cases was erroneous. There is no restriction to an appeal of a
petition for a writ of error coram vobis from the general
district court to the circuit court because it is a non-monetary
civil proceeding. Accordingly, the appeal of the denial of a
writ of coram vobis is within the jurisdiction of a circuit
court under Code § 17.1-513.
The circuit court thus erred in determining it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the judgment of the general
district court. However, notwithstanding the circuit court’s
holding, its judgment enunciated an alternative holding on the
merits of Neighbors’ claim, which we now review because that
holding is dispositive of this case.
C. Application of a Writ of Coram Vobis
Assuming the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his
appeal, Neighbors contends the circuit court also erred in
ruling his guilty plea could not be challenged by a writ of
9
coram vobis based on his claim of lack of capacity. The
Commonwealth responds that the circuit court was correct in this
regard because Neighbors had other remedies including a timely
appeal under Code § 16.1-132 or a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The Commonwealth also responds that our jurisprudence
in Dobie and Blowe recognizes Code § 8.01-677 has significantly
restricted the use of a writ of coram vobis.
Code § 8.01-677 makes clear that the limited purpose of a
writ of coram vobis is to correct only “clerical error” or
certain “error in fact.” As we noted earlier, this Court
explained in Blowe that the writ of coram vobis should not be
used “for any purpose other than to correct a ‘clerical error or
error in fact.’ ” 208 Va. at 74, 155 S.E.2d at 356. This
limited application has not been extended to serve as a writ of
error to bring the original judgment under review, Dobie, 198
Va. at 771, 96 S.E.2d at 753, or to permit a change of a
defendant’s plea after trial. Blowe, 208 Va. at 76, 155 S.E.2d
at 357-58. The purpose of the writ does not involve correcting
errors of fact “where the facts complained of were known before
or at the trial, or where at the trial the accused or his
attorney knew of the existence of such facts but failed to
present them.” Dobie, 198 Va. at 769, 96 S.E.2d at 752.
Neighbors’ general allegation that he suffered from some
undefined lack of capacity due to medication at the time of his
10
guilty plea is not a clerical error. Neither is it a claim of
an error in fact. Accordingly, under the record in this case, a
writ of coram vobis would not lie as a means by which Neighbors
could collaterally challenge his guilty plea. The circuit court
did not err in that portion of its judgment which determined the
writ of coram vobis was thus not available to Neighbors.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse that part of the
circuit court’s judgment holding Neighbors did not have a right
of appeal to the circuit court. We will affirm the judgment of
the circuit court that a writ of coram vobis would not lie in
this case to enable Neighbors to challenge his guilty plea, and
therefore we will enter final judgment in favor of the
Commonwealth.
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and final judgment.
11