Present: All the Justices
DEBRA BATES, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF FANNIE MARIE BANKS, DECEASED
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 030396 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
March 5, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE
Edward L. Hogshire, Judge
This appeal arises from a wrongful death action filed by
Debra Bates (Bates), administrator of the estate of Fannie Marie
Banks (Banks), her deceased daughter, against the Commonwealth
of Virginia pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Code
§§ 8.01-195.1 through 8.01-195.9. The issue to be resolved is
whether Bates filed a notice of claim sufficient to comply with
the requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6 with regard to the
identification of the “place” at which Banks’ injury was alleged
to have occurred.
I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On July 21, 2000,
Banks was admitted as an inpatient at the University of Virginia
Medical Center1 in Charlottesville (the hospital). During the
1
During the relevant years, the hospital in question, which
provides inpatient medical care, was designated interchangeably
as the “University of Virginia Health Sciences Center” and the
“University of Virginia Medical Center.” Because the identity
course of her treatment at the hospital, Banks required the use
of a ventilator at various times to help her breathe while
sleeping. In the early morning hours of October 14, 2000,
Banks, although on a ventilator, was found asystolic and
unresponsive by hospital personnel. She suffered irreversible
brain damage and, after being removed from a life support
system, died in the hospital on October 21, 2000.
On August 14, 2001, Bates mailed a notice of claim by
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Attorney
General of Virginia in which she essentially asserted that the
medical personnel at the hospital had been guilty of medical
malpractice that proximately caused the brain damage and
ultimate death of Banks. The notice of claim contained
allegations that these personnel had negligently failed to place
the ventilator properly in service, failed to observe the
malfunction of the ventilator, or failed to observe that Banks
was not receiving proper oxygenation from the ventilator.
Pertinent to the issue presented by this appeal, the notice of
claim identified the “PLACE OF INJURY” as “University of
Virginia Health Sciences Center, Charlottesville, Virginia.”
of this hospital is not at issue here, we will refer to it in
this opinion as the University of Virginia Medical Center or
simply the hospital.
2
Thereafter, on March 15, 2002, Bates filed a motion for
judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville
(the trial court) against the Commonwealth of Virginia for the
wrongful death of Banks.2 In response, the Commonwealth filed
its grounds of defense, plea of sovereign immunity, and a motion
to dismiss pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act.
On November 19, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing
on the Commonwealth’s plea of sovereign immunity and motion to
dismiss. In order to address the issue of the Commonwealth’s
sovereign immunity, the focus of the hearing, which was
conducted on the pleadings, was whether Bates had sufficiently
identified in her notice of claim the place at which Banks was
injured. There was no dispute that the University of Virginia
Medical Center is a state-supported hospital and, while located
in Charlottesville, is composed of multiple buildings, which
contain multiple floors and multiple rooms. Relying principally
upon Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248, 252, 467 S.E.2d
783, 785 (1996), the Commonwealth maintained that the notice of
claim filed by Bates did not sufficiently identify the place
2
The University of Virginia was also named as a defendant
in Bates’ motion for judgment, but was subsequently dismissed as
a party by agreement. The Virginia Tort Claims Act provides for
the limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth
and does not waive the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth’s
agencies. The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia
v. Carter, 267 Va. 242, 246, 591 S.E.2d 76, ___ (2004).
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where Banks’ injury was alleged to have occurred at this
hospital to satisfy the requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6.
Consequently, the Commonwealth asserted that its plea of
sovereign immunity was well taken and its motion to dismiss
should be granted. The trial court ultimately agreed with the
Commonwealth and by final order entered on December 13, 2002,
relying principally upon Halberstam, dismissed Bates’ claim
against the Commonwealth with prejudice. We awarded this appeal
to Bates.
II. DISCUSSION
As noted by the Commonwealth in the present case and as we
have repeatedly held, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is
alive and well in Virginia.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264
Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002). “In the absence of
express statutory or constitutional provisions waiving the
Commonwealth’s immunity, the Commonwealth and its agencies are
immune from liability for the tortious acts or omissions of
their agents or employees.” Patten v. Commonwealth, 262 Va.
654, 658, 553 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2001). The Virginia Tort Claims
Act constitutes an express limited waiver of the Commonwealth’s
immunity from tort claims. Id. In this context and in
pertinent part, Code § 8.01-195.3 provides that:
Subject to the provisions of this article, the
Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for . . .
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
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wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting
within the scope of his employment under circumstances
where the Commonwealth . . ., if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss,
injury or death.
(Emphasis added).
The limitation upon the waiver of the Commonwealth’s
sovereign immunity emphasized above is expressly addressed in
Code § 8.01-195.6. In pertinent part, this statute provides
that:
Every claim cognizable against the Commonwealth . . .
shall be forever barred unless the claimant or his
agent, attorney or representative has filed a written
statement of the nature of the claim, which includes
the time and place at which the injury is alleged to
have occurred and the agency or agencies alleged to be
liable.
(Emphasis added).
In the present case, the parties agree that in the absence
of compliance with the mandate of Code § 8.01-195.6, the trial
court would lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of Bates’
claim against the Commonwealth because in such circumstances the
Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity is not waived. Filing and
receipt of the notice of claim are not at issue. The parties,
as they did in the trial court, dispute the sufficiency of
Bates’ notice of claim to identify the place at which Banks’
injury was alleged to have occurred as contemplated by the
above-emphasized provision of Code § 8.01-195.6. Their dispute
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is based upon their sharply contrasting interpretations of our
holding in Halberstam.
In Halberstam, the claimant fell and was injured when she
stepped into a pothole in a parking lot at George Mason
University, a state-supported university, as a result of the
alleged failure of the university to properly maintain the
surface of the parking lot. In her notice of claim, which was
admittedly received by the proper public official pursuant to
Code § 8.01-195.6, the claimant identified the place where her
injury occurred as “the school parking lot.” It was stipulated
that the university had “a number of parking lots and more than
one campus.”
We held that because the claimant did not specify in which
parking lot she was injured, her notice of claim was “in
essence, no notice at all.” 251 Va. at 250-51, 467 S.E.2d at
784-85. In holding that the claimant’s notice of claim did not
satisfy the requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6 with regard to the
place at which the injury occurred, we also held that actual
knowledge of that place by the Commonwealth does not obviate the
duty of the claimant to strictly comply with the notice
provisions of this statute. Id. at 252, 467 S.E.2d at 785.
With regard to the purpose of the statute, we observed that
“ ‘[u]nless explicit notice in writing of the time and place of
an accident is furnished the proper public official
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substantially in accordance with the statute, when there is a
claim of [the Commonwealth’s] negligence, the likelihood of
prompt attention to the matter to protect the interests of the
[Commonwealth] and the public is materially diminished.’ ” Id.
(quoting Town of Crewe v. Marler, 228 Va. 109, 113-14, 319
S.E.2d 748, 750 (1984)).
Bates contends that the trial court’s reliance upon
Halberstam was in error. She contends that this is so because
her case is distinguishable on a number of grounds. Initially,
Bates stresses that Halberstam was a premises liability case in
which the claimant asserted injury due to a defect in one of a
number of parking lots at a multi-campus state university. She
notes that only one hospital in Charlottesville is designated as
the University of Virginia Medical Center. Bates also asserts
that in a premises liability case the “precise location” of the
alleged defect is relevant to the determination of the owner’s
actual or constructive notice of the defect. She contends that
in a medical malpractice case the focus is upon the actions of
people and the specific location where the negligent conduct
occurs is irrelevant. Bates seems to suggest that a different
rule should apply to medical malpractice claims against the
Commonwealth for this reason.
In a similar vein, Bates contends that the claimant in
Halberstam initially had superior knowledge of the place where
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the alleged injury occurred. She argues that in her case it is
the hospital that has the superior knowledge because Banks was
an inpatient at the hospital for approximately three months, and
the hospital kept track of her location on a daily basis.
Furthermore, she argues that Banks was moved to different places
within the hospital during her stay, and there is no reason to
believe that Bates had any control over such moves. Bates
concludes that such superior knowledge held by the hospital
distinguishes Halberstam from her case.
Finally, Bates contends that this Court erred when it
recognized in Halberstam that the Virginia Tort Claims Act “is a
statute in derogation of the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity and, therefore, must be strictly construed.” Id. at
250-51, 467 S.E.2d at 784. She maintains that this Act should
be given a liberal construction so that it achieves its remedial
purposes.
The Commonwealth responds by asserting that Halberstam was
correctly decided and is indistinguishable from the present
case. As it did in the trial court, the Commonwealth notes that
in Halberstam there were multiple campuses and multiple parking
lots; in the instant case, there are multiple buildings, with
multiple floors and multiple rooms. In Halberstam, the claimant
did not specify the campus or parking lot in her notice of
claim; in the instant case, the claimant did not specify the
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building, floor, or room in her notice of claim. Thus, under
Halberstam, Bates has failed to provide notice under Va. Code
§ 8.01-195.6, and her suit was properly dismissed.
For the reasons that follow, we are of opinion that, under
the circumstances of this case, the notice of claim filed by
Bates sufficiently complied with the requirements of Code
§ 8.01-195.6 regarding the identification of the place at which
the injury to Banks was alleged to have occurred. In reaching
this opinion, however, we expressly reject a number of the
assertions related above by which Bates contends that her case
may be distinguished from Halberstam or, indeed, that Halberstam
was erroneously decided.
The degree of specificity sufficient to comply with the
requirement of notice of the place at which the injury is
alleged to have occurred contemplated by this statute is not
dictated or varied by whether the claimant asserts a premises
liability, medical malpractice, or some other cognizable tort
claim against the Commonwealth. Superior knowledge of that
place is also not a factor in determining the sufficiency of the
mandated notice. And most importantly, we continue to be of
opinion that the Virginia Tort Claims Act must be strictly
construed because it was enacted in derogation of the common law
of sovereign immunity. In short, Halberstam was correctly
decided, and we in no way retreat from our holding in that case.
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Because the Virginia Tort Claims Act constitutes a limited
waiver of the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity rather than a
blanket waiver, one obvious purpose of the requirements of Code
§ 8.01-195.6 is to provide notice to the Commonwealth of a
facially cognizable claim so that the Commonwealth is in a
position to investigate and evaluate that claim. The statute’s
mandate that the notice of claim include the “place at which the
injury is alleged to have occurred” contemplates the reasonable
identification of that place so that the purpose of the notice
to the Commonwealth is accomplished in a particular case.
The concept of reasonableness does not lend itself to a
bright-line test or dictate separate and distinct tests based on
the nature of the asserted claim. Rather, its proper analysis
and application is directed to the specific allegations of a
notice of claim in a particular case. Thus, in Halberstam, the
failure to identify the parking lot in which the claimant’s
injury was alleged to have occurred was not reasonably
calculated to give the Commonwealth notice of that place because
the university had a number of parking lots and more than one
campus where the claimant’s injury might have occurred.
In the present case, there is only one University of
Virginia Medical Center in Charlottesville. Bates’ notice of
claim identified that place and also stated that Banks was
admitted to that hospital and “while a patient” there was
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injured by the alleged medical negligence of the employees of
that hospital. In combination, these assertions reasonably
identified the place at which Bates alleged Banks was injured so
that the Commonwealth could investigate and evaluate the claim.
Under these circumstances, Code § 8.01-195.6 does not mandate
that Bates was required to identify the floor or room within the
hospital at which the alleged injury to Banks occurred because
that degree of specificity was unnecessary to accomplish the
purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in
sustaining the Commonwealth’s plea of sovereign immunity and
dismissing Bates’ claim with prejudice. The judgment of the
trial court will be reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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