PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice
MELVIN BRAY
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 982684 SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING
November 5, 1999
CHRISTOPHER K. BROWN, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
William G. Plummer, Judge Designate
In this appeal, we consider the prohibition against
holding multiple public offices contained in the following
constitutional and statutory provisions:
Article VII, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia:
[N]o person shall at the same time hold more than one
office mentioned in this Article. No member of a governing
body shall be eligible, during the term of office for which
he was elected or appointed, to hold any office filled by
the governing body by election or appointment. . . .
Code § 15.2-1534:
A. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of the
Constitution of Virginia, no person holding the office
of treasurer, sheriff, attorney for the Commonwealth,
clerk of the circuit court, commissioner of the
revenue, supervisor, councilman, mayor, board
chairman, or other member of the governing body of any
locality shall hold more than one such office at the
same time.
B. Subsection A shall not be construed to prohibit:
. . . .
3. A deputy sheriff of a county from serving as
appointed town sergeant of a town located in the
county;.
. . . .
6. The election of deputies of constitutional
officers to school board membership, consistent with
federal law and regulation.
In August 1998, there was a vacancy on the Town
Council of Dumphries in Prince William County. The
remaining members of the council were unable to agree upon
an appointment to fill the vacancy. Accordingly, the
judges of the Circuit Court of Prince William County
appointed Melvin Bray, a Prince William County deputy
sheriff, to fill the vacancy pursuant to the provisions of
Code § 24.2-228. The following day, Bray, purporting to
qualify as a council member, took the required oath of
office.
Thereafter, Christopher K. Brown and Claude C. Thomas,
Jr., the town's mayor and vice mayor, respectively, who are
also members of the Town Council (plaintiffs), brought this
declaratory judgment suit to determine whether Bray could
simultaneously hold both offices under the above quoted
constitutional and statutory provisions. The foregoing
facts were stipulated, counsel for the parties argued the
case, and the circuit court ruled that Bray could not hold
both offices concurrently. Bray appeals.
The plaintiffs contend that Article VII, § 6
encompasses a deputy sheriff within its prohibition against
a sheriff, as an elected constitutional official, holding
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multiple offices. They rely primarily upon the history of
these provisions and the rules of construction of ambiguous
language to support their contention. Bray responds that
the constitutional provision is unambiguous and that we
should apply it as written. We agree with Bray.
We find nothing in Article VII, § 6 which extends its
proscription against multiple public office holding beyond the
holders of the offices described or referred to therein. As
applied in this case, we think that the prohibition against
holding multiple offices contained in Article VII, § 6 is
clearly and unambiguously limited to persons who hold more than
one of the various offices expressly mentioned in Article VII,
§§ 4 and 5 of the Constitution of Virginia. Article VII, § 4
thereof mentions "a sheriff" and Article VII, § 5 mentions
"[members of] the governing body of each . . . town."
When the language of an enactment is plain and unambiguous,
as in this case, we apply its plain meaning. City of Winchester
v. American Woodmark Corp., 250 Va. 451, 457, 464 S.E.2d 148,
152 (1995) (statute); Southern Ry. v. City of Richmond, 175 Va.
308, 312, 8 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1940) (Constitution). Accordingly,
we take the words as written and do not resort to the history of
a particular enactment, extrinsic facts, or to general rules of
construction of enactments that have a doubtful meaning. Brown
v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985).
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The plaintiffs implicitly recognize that none of the
language in Article VII, § 6 expressly includes deputy sheriffs
within its scope. Nevertheless, they suggest that since prior
cases have considered sheriffs and their deputies as "one
person," we should apply the same concept here. The plaintiffs
rely upon Mosby v. Mosby, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 584, 604 (1853), and
Whited v. Fields, 581 F. Supp. 1444, 1456 (W.D. Va. 1984).
These cases discuss the liability of a sheriff for the acts of
his deputy, an entirely different issue than that involved here;
we are considering whether the multiple office disqualification
extends to the deputies of a constitutional officer. Thus, we
find no merit in this suggestion.
Next, plaintiffs argue that Bray is subject to the second
sentence of the quoted provision of Article VII, § 6 which
disqualifies a Town Council member from holding an office filled
by the council either by election or appointment during the term
of his service on the council. We reject this argument because
Bray was neither elected nor appointed as a deputy sheriff by
the Dumphries Town Council.
Nor do we agree with plaintiffs' contention that the
exceptions in Code § 15.2-1534 make it ambiguous and permit a
consideration of its legislative history and an application of
the rules of construction of ambiguous language. Even if the
statute supported this argument, the statute would not be valid
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because the legislature cannot create a disqualification for
public office that is not authorized in the constitutional
provision relied upon to support the statute. City of Richmond
v. Lynch, 106 Va. 324, 325, 56 S.E. 139, 139 (1907).
Finally, we reject the plaintiffs' claim that the following
constitutional provision authorizes their broad construction of
Code § 15.2-1534:
[N]othing in this Constitution shall limit the power of the
General Assembly to prevent conflict of interests, dual
officeholding, or other incompatible activities by elective
or appointive officials of the Commonwealth or of any
political subdivision.
Article II, § 5(c) Constitution of Virginia.
The difficulty with the plaintiffs' claim is that the
legislature did not rely upon this section of the Constitution
in adopting Code § 15.2-1534. Instead, the legislature
expressly stated that its enactment of Code § 15.2-1534 was
"[p]ursuant to Article VII, § 6." The term "'[p]ursuant to'
means 'in the course of carrying out: in conformance to or
agreement with: according to' and, when used in a statute, is a
restrictive term." Black's Law Dictionary 1237 (6th ed. 1990)
(quoting Knowles v. Holly, 513 P.2d 18, 23 (Wash. 1973)); E.P.
Paup Co. v. Director, 999 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1993).
Thus, given the legislature's deliberate reference to Article
VII, § 6, we cannot consider another provision of the
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Constitution as additional authorization for the enactment of
Code § 15.2-1534.
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the
trial court and enter final judgment here declaring that Bray is
entitled to serve as a member of the Town Council even though he
is a deputy sheriff in the same county.
Reversed and final judgment.
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