Present: All the Justices
MEERA RAVINDRANATHAN
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 982473 September 17, 1999
VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Theodore J. Markow, Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court
erred in approving a university's decision to deny a student's
request for in-state tuition charges.
Meera P. Ravindranathan, then a first-year medical
student at the Medical College of Virginia of Virginia
Commonwealth University ("VCU"), filed a request for in-state
tuition benefits. She stated, in her "Application For Change
of Domicile for Virginia In-State Tuition Rates," that her
specific reason for changing her domicile from Illinois to
Virginia was because her "boyfriend" resided in Virginia. She
stated that her present intention was to remain in Virginia
indefinitely because she "like[d] living in Virginia. My
boyfriend will be settling in Northern Virginia so I also plan
to stay in Virginia."
Ravindranathan also included the following relevant facts
in her application. She is registered to vote in Virginia.
She possesses a valid Virginia driver's license. She owns a
car that is registered in Virginia. She has checking and
savings accounts with financial institutions in Virginia. She
filed a Virginia state resident income tax return the year
preceding the date of her application, and she did not file
any state income tax returns in any other state during the
period covering three years from the date of her application.
Brenda H. Jones, a residency officer at VCU, denied
Ravindranathan's application. Jones concluded that
Ravindranathan's primary reason for having moved from her
parents' home in Illinois to Virginia was to attend VCU.
Ravindranathan appealed the residency officer's decision
to VCU's Residency Appeals Committee. Ravindranathan appeared
before the Committee and reasserted the facts that were
contained in her application. The following additional facts
were established during that hearing.
Ravindranathan entered VCU as a freshman in August 1993.
At that time, she was a resident of Illinois. She was
admitted in a program which guaranteed her admission to VCU's
medical school upon completion of her undergraduate studies.
Ravindranathan completed the requirements for her
undergraduate degree a semester early, and she worked as a
full-time employee with a bank from February 1996 until June
1996.
Ravindranathan stated that she decided to make the
Commonwealth of Virginia her permanent residence before she
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began her first year of medical school. Her father, a
physician in Illinois, has obtained a license to practice
medicine in Virginia, and her parents intend to move to
Virginia upon his retirement from his medical practice in
Illinois. Ravindranathan testified that her father "cosigned
for a loan," and she used the proceeds to purchase a
condominium in Richmond.
The Residency Appeals Committee denied Ravindranathan's
request for in-state tuition benefits. The Committee stated,
in a letter to Ravindranathan:
"Based on your application, oral presentation and
documentation submitted, it was the judgment of the
Committee that there was not clear and convincing
evidence of your intent to make Virginia your
domicile. The Committee denied your request for in-
state tuition rates.
. . .
"The Committee's interpretation of the information
presented is that you came to Virginia for
educational purposes and that those purposes are
your primary reason for remaining in Virginia at
this time. It was the opinion of the Committee that
your actions to date do not provide sufficient
documentation to rebut successfully the presumption
that you came to Virginia for educational purposes."
Ravindranathan filed a "Petition for Recognition of
Virginia Domicile" in the circuit court. She alleged that the
Committee's decision was arbitrary and capricious. VCU
responded to the petition, the circuit court reviewed the
record, and considered argument of counsel. The circuit court
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held that the Committee's decision was not arbitrary and,
therefore, entered a judgment in favor of VCU. Ravindranathan
appeals.
Code § 23-7.4(B), which governs eligibility for in-state
tuition charges at state-supported colleges and universities,
states in relevant part:
"To become eligible for in-state tuition, an
independent student shall establish by clear and
convincing evidence that for a period of at least
one year immediately prior to the date of the
alleged entitlement, he was domiciled in Virginia
and had abandoned any previous domicile, if such
existed.
. . . .
"In determining domiciliary intent, all of the
following applicable factors shall be considered:
continuous residence for at least one year prior to
the date of alleged entitlement, state to which
income taxes are filed or paid, driver's license,
motor vehicle registration, voter registration,
employment, property ownership, sources of financial
support, military records, a written offer and
acceptance of employment following graduation, and
any other social or economic relationships with the
Commonwealth and other jurisdictions.
"Domiciliary status shall not ordinarily be
conferred by the performance of acts which are
auxiliary to fulfilling educational objectives or
are required or routinely performed by temporary
residents of the Commonwealth. Mere physical
presence or residence primarily for educational
purposes shall not confer domiciliary status. A
matriculating student who has entered an institution
and is classified as an out-of-state student shall
be required to rebut by clear and convincing
evidence the presumption that he is in the
Commonwealth for the purpose of attending school and
not as a bona fide domiciliary."
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Code § 23-7.4:3(A), which is also pertinent to our
resolution of this appeal, states in relevant part:
"Any party aggrieved by a final administrative
decision shall have the right to review in the
circuit court for the jurisdiction in which the
relevant institution is located. A petition for
review of the final administrative decision shall be
filed within thirty days of receiving the written
decision. In any such action, the institution shall
forward the record to the court, whose function
shall be only to determine whether the decision
reached by the institution could reasonably be said,
on the basis of the record, not to be arbitrary,
capricious or otherwise contrary to law."
Ravindranathan argues that the evidence that she
presented before the Residency Appeals Committee rebutted the
statutory presumption of nonresidency. Continuing, she states
that "there is no evidence in the record which could arguably
be said to support the decision of the Committee."
Ravindranathan asserts that the circuit court "erred by
treating the statutory presumption of nonresidency as evidence
of nonresidency."
We disagree with Ravindranathan. VCU was not required to
present evidence to demonstrate that Ravindranathan was not a
domiciliary of this Commonwealth. Rather, Code § 23-7.4(B)
requires that a matriculating student who has entered an
institution and is classified as an out-of-state student rebut
by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that the
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student is in the Commonwealth for the purpose of attending
school and not as a bona fide domiciliary.
Even though Ravindranathan presented evidence that she
registered to vote in Virginia, paid Virginia income taxes,
registered her automobile in Virginia, and possessed a
Virginia driver's license, the Residency Appeals Committee
concluded that she failed to present clear and sufficient
evidence of her intent to make Virginia her domicile. The
Committee stated: "The Committee's interpretation of the
information presented is that you came to Virginia for
educational purposes and that those purposes are your primary
reason for remaining in Virginia at this time."
The circuit court correctly refused to reweigh the
evidence considered by the Residency Appeals Committee and, as
required by Code § 23-7.4:3, the circuit court limited its
review to "whether the decision reached by the institution
could reasonably be said, on the basis of the record, not to
be arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to the law."
Code § 23-7.4:3. Upon review of the record, the circuit court
held that the Residency Appeals Committee's decision was not
arbitrary because the facts that Ravindranathan presented in
support of her petition "could be considered . . . auxiliary
to fulfilling educational objectives or are routinely
performed by temporary residents of the Commonwealth' and
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therefore do not constitute a change in domicile. Code § 23-
7.4."
On appeal, the sole issue that we may consider is whether
the circuit court was plainly wrong when it held that the
Residency Appeals Committee's decision was not arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise contrary to the law. Our review of
the record reveals that the facts upon which Ravindranathan
relies to support her purported Virginia domicile could also
be deemed auxiliary to fulfilling her educational objectives
or are routinely performed by temporary residents of this
Commonwealth. Thus, the Residency Appeals Committee's
decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and the circuit
court's judgment upon review of that decision was not plainly
wrong. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
Affirmed.
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