Walker v. Mason

Present: All the Justices

MICHAEL J. WALKER

v. Record No. 980345 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
January 8, 1999
DEWAYNE K. MASON

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Randall G. Johnson, Judge

TAMARA S. WILLIAMS

v. Record No. 980568

SHONA R. SIMMONS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Walter W. Stout, III, Judge

DEVEATA ANITA WALKER

v. Record No. 980254

JACK CREASY

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY
J. Michael Gamble, Judge

The three appeals addressed in this opinion involve the

proper application of principles for determining whether a

jury verdict is inadequate as a matter of law. The trial

court in each of these cases set aside the jury verdict

relying on the principle enunciated in Bowers v. Sprouse, 254

Va. 428, 492 S.E.2d 637 (1997).

In Bowers, the jury returned a verdict in the exact

amount of the special damages introduced by the plaintiff.

The Court in Bowers reversed the trial court's denial of
plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, stating that "a

jury award in a personal injury action which compensates a

plaintiff for the exact amount of the plaintiff's medical

expenses and other special damages is inadequate as a matter

of law, irrespective of whether those damages were

controverted." Id. at 431, 492 S.E.2d at 639. The basis of

this rule is that a verdict for the exact amount of the

plaintiff's medical expenses and special damages indicates

that although the jury found the plaintiff was injured and had

incurred special damages, the jury, for whatever reason,

failed to compensate the plaintiff for any other items of

damage. Id., 492 S.E.2d at 638.

This bright line rule is limited, however, to those

factual situations in which the jury verdict is identical to

the full amount of the special damages. The rationale

underlying the rule does not extend to an award which deviates

from the amount of all the special damages claimed, even if

the amount of the verdict corresponds to an identifiable

portion of the special damages. In such case, the bright line

rule of Bowers cannot be applied.

I. Walker v. Mason, Record No. 980345

In Walker v. Mason, the plaintiff claimed special damages

of $4,431. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $230,

an amount equal to the amount of the hospital emergency room

bill. The trial court set the verdict aside, concluding that,

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even though the verdict was not in the exact amount of all the

special damages presented, the verdict was in the exact amount

of a portion of the special damages, and that, under Bowers,

"you just cannot have a verdict for the amount of specials."

The trial court, applying the additur statute, Code § 8.01-

383.1(B)(1994)(amended 1998), entered judgment for $7,730.

The trial court's application of Bowers was error for

reasons previously stated. The case of Doe v. West, 222 Va.

440, 281 S.E.2d 850 (1981), is instructive under the

circumstances presented here. In Doe, the plaintiff sought to

recover lost wages of $200 per week for 14 weeks. The jury

returned a verdict for $2,800 which the trial court calculated

as the exact amount of the lost wages claimed by the

plaintiff. The trial court set aside the verdict, finding

that it did not include any other items of damages that the

jury was required to consider under the instructions given.

In reversing the trial court, the Court in Doe stated that

[t]he failure of the jury to return, from
conflicting evidence, a verdict in a greater amount
than the trial judge's calculation of West's lost
wages does not justify the inference that the jury
failed to consider all the elements of damages
permitted under the court's instruction. We cannot
say that the verdict was based upon an unreasonable
interpretation of the evidence, which was
susceptible to different findings. Under these
circumstances, the trial court should not have set
aside the first verdict. See May v. Leach, 220 Va.
472, 473-74, 260 S.E.2d 456, 457 (1979); Brown v.
Huddleston, 213 Va. 146, 147, 191 S.E.2d 234, 235
(1972).

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222 Va. at 446, 281 S.E.2d at 853.

As in Doe, whether the verdict in Walker v. Mason was

inadequate depends on the evidence presented. Here, the

record shows that the extent of Walker's injuries was

controverted. His doctor, Leon J. Brown, Jr., testified that,

other than muscle spasms in Walker's neck, there were no

injuries which could be verified objectively. Mason's

injuries, as he described them to Dr. Brown, were pain and

tenderness in his neck, back, and knee. There were no

contusions or swelling in the knee. Dr. Brown prescribed an

anti-inflammatory medication, a muscle relaxer, an analgesic

cream and use of moist heat at home. Dr. Brown eventually

referred Mason to an orthopedic surgeon based on Mason's

complaints about his knee. Mason saw the surgeon on two

occasions over the course of two months. Physical therapy was

also prescribed, although Mason testified that he had missed

some of the appointments. The record also reflects that Mason

was playing basketball during this period.

This record is susceptible to varying interpretations

regarding the extent of the injuries and expenses proximately

caused by the automobile accident and, therefore, we cannot

say that the verdict was based on an unreasonable

interpretation of the evidence or a failure to consider

elements of damages under the court's instructions.

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Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court

and reinstate the jury verdict in the amount of $230.

II. Williams v. Simmons, Record No. 980568

In Williams v. Simmons, the plaintiff claimed special

damages of medical bills and lost wages totaling $1,386. The

jury returned a verdict of $560, the amount of the lost wage

claim. In reviewing the adequacy of the verdict, the trial

court stated that the amount of the jury verdict constituted a

finding by the jury that the plaintiff was "entitled to be

compensated for lost wages," which then "necessitated its

finding that the plaintiff had suffered from her injuries."

Citing Bowers, the trial court concluded that, because the

jury found the injury compensable but did not return a verdict

reflecting the plaintiff's pain, suffering, inconvenience, or

medical bills, the verdict was inadequate as a matter of law.

Relying on the additur statute, Code § 8.01-383.1(B)(1994)

(amended 1998), the trial court entered judgment in favor of

Simmons for $2,500.

As indicated above, the trial court's reliance on Bowers

was misplaced. The amount of the jury verdict, although

equivalent to the lost wages claimed, does not of itself

justify the inference that the jury did not consider all the

elements of the damage instruction. In this case, while the

jury necessarily accepted the plaintiff's version of the

accident and defendant's negligence as a predicate for

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awarding any damages, the testimony regarding the seriousness

of the injuries and the damages suffered by the plaintiff as a

result of the accident was subject to conflicting

interpretations.

Although the plaintiff described the impact in the

accident as "pretty hard," the defendant maintained that it

was only "[a] light bump." Immediately following the

accident, the plaintiff did not complain of any injury or seek

medical care, but proceeded to attend a high school football

game. She testified that she had a stiff neck and back the

next morning and that her chest hurt. She took a non-

prescription pain medication and applied heat to the area of

soreness. The plaintiff testified that she went to a hospital

emergency room the day after the accident. She did not

request any damages relating to this hospital visit.

Eleven days after the accident, the plaintiff consulted

Dr. William R. Mauck. She did not tell him of her emergency

room visit. Dr. Mauck testified that the plaintiff had no

objective symptoms. He treated her for tenderness of the neck

and lower back muscles and "guarding of motion," which he

described as reluctance to move her neck and lower back to

their full range of motion. The chest pain of which the

plaintiff also complained was an aggravation of a pre-existing

chest condition. Dr. Mauck prescribed rest, wet heat, a

muscle relaxant, and electric heat treatment for the muscular

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soreness and pain described by the plaintiff. The plaintiff,

a child care provider, continued working for two weeks

following the accident, but did not work during the subsequent

two weeks while under the care of Dr. Mauck.

Based on this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude

that the plaintiff had not been injured as seriously as she

claimed and, accordingly, elected to award a monetary amount

commensurate with the damages it concluded were actually

incurred. While one may speculate as to the components of the

damage amount awarded on this conflicting evidence, such

speculation is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion, as a

matter of law, that the jury did not consider all the elements

of damage in reaching the amount of its verdict. Doe v. West,

222 Va. at 446, 281 S.E.2d at 853; see Richardson v. Braxton-

Bailey, 257 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1999)(this day

decided). We cannot say that the verdict was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the evidence.

Because the trial court erred in concluding that the

verdict was inadequate as a matter of law, we will reverse the

judgment of the trial court and reinstate the jury verdict of

$560.

III. Walker v. Creasey, Record No. 980254

Finally, in Walker v. Creasey, the jury returned a

verdict of $2,700, an amount that exceeded the special damages

claimed by approximately $86.00. The trial court set the

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verdict aside. It found that the jury had "rounded its

verdict to the next higher one hundred dollars," and that,

under the decision in Bowers, the verdict was inadequate as a

matter of law because it is "for the amount of the

compensatory medical expenses." The trial court thus

concluded that the jury failed to take into consideration

other elements of damage as instructed. Relying on Code §

8.01-383.1(B)(1994)(amended 1998), the trial court entered

judgment for $5,000 in favor of Creasy.

The facts of this case, however, do not bring it within

the ambit of the narrow rule promulgated in Bowers, and the

trial court erred in setting aside the verdict on that basis.

As pointed out by Walker, the facts in this case are similar

to Dinwiddie v. Hamilton, 201 Va. 348, 111 S.E.2d 275 (1959).

In that case, the jury verdict exceeded the claimed special

damages by $761. The Court in Dinwiddie affirmed the jury

verdict, stating that compensation for pain and suffering is

within the discretion of the jury and "no mere difference of

opinion of the trial judge, however decided, will justify an

interference with their verdict, unless it appears from the

record that the jury has been influenced by partiality or

prejudice, or have been misled by some mistaken view of the

merits of the case." Id. at 352, 111 S.E.2d at 278. There is

nothing in the record in the instant case which would support

a conclusion that the jury's verdict was the result of

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improper influence or a mistaken view of the merits of the

case.

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial

court and enter judgment reinstating the original jury verdict

of $2,700.

IV. Summary

In summary, we conclude that the trial court in each of

the cases improperly applied the rule set out in Bowers. When

the jury verdict is not in the exact amount of all the special

damages claimed, Bowers is not applicable, and the trial court

must review the evidence under traditional principles relating

to the adequacy of jury verdicts. See, e.g., Bradner v.

Mitchell, 234 Va. 483, 362 S.E.2d 718 (1987), and cases cited

therein. In light of our disposition of these cases, we need

not address issues raised with regard to the imposition of

additur under Code § 8.01-383.1(B).

Record No. 980345 — Reversed and final judgment.
Record No. 980568 — Reversed and final judgment.
Record No. 980254 — Reversed and final judgment.

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