Present: All the Justices
CRAIG RICHARDSON
v. Record No. 980324 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
January 8, 1999
VALERIE BRAXTON-BAILEY
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Theodore J. Markow, Judge
Valerie Braxton-Bailey filed a motion for judgment
against Craig Richardson seeking $60,000 for injuries that she
allegedly sustained in an automobile accident caused by
Richardson's negligence. Following a jury trial, the trial
court set aside a $3,265 verdict in favor of Braxton-Bailey,
finding it "inconsistent with the law and the evidence," and
the case was retried on the issue of damages only. The second
trial resulted in a jury verdict of $1,270, which the trial
court also set aside as "contrary to the evidence and law" and
"inadequate as a matter of law." Following a third trial on
damages alone, the trial court entered judgment on a jury
verdict in the amount of $35,000. Richardson appealed,
asserting that the first two verdicts were not inadequate as a
matter of law and that the third verdict was excessive as a
matter of law. We will reverse the judgment of the trial
court because we conclude that the trial court erred in
setting aside the first verdict.
In reviewing the trial court's action in setting aside
the jury verdict of $3,265, we apply the following familiar
principles: (1) the amount of a verdict is within the jury's
discretion, and when arrived at upon competent and proper
instructions, is inviolate, Taylor v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,
224 Va. 562, 567, 299 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1983); (2) when
evaluating the amount of the jury verdict, all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the verdict rendered,
Hall v. Hall, 240 Va. 360, 363, 397 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1990);
and (3) if, based on the evidence, the jury was entitled to
believe that only a portion of the damages claimed were
reasonably related to the accident, then the verdict cannot be
set aside by the trial court as inadequate as a matter of law,
Brown v. Huddleston, 213 Va. 146, 147, 191 S.E.2d 234, 235
(1972).
Braxton-Bailey was injured when Richardson failed to stop
at a red traffic signal, and his vehicle hit the rear
passenger side of Braxton-Bailey's vehicle. The impact spun
her vehicle around, causing a flat rear tire. There was no
other damage to her vehicle.
The day after the accident, Braxton-Bailey, complaining
of soreness in her neck, shoulder blades, right wrist, and
right arm, went to see Dr. Leon J. Brown, Jr., a doctor
recommended by her attorney. Dr. Brown testified that
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Braxton-Bailey's injuries were caused by the accident. He also
testified that there were no objective symptoms of her
injuries and that his diagnosis was based solely on what
Braxton-Bailey told him. The injuries were muscular in
nature, did not involve nerve damage, and were not permanent.
Dr. Brown treated Braxton-Bailey with prescribed exercises,
heat packs, anti-inflammatory medication and electric
stimulation over the course of six weeks. Braxton-Bailey
introduced medical bills of $1,225 for Dr. Brown's services
and $45.59 for prescription medications.
Dr. Brown testified that he initially anticipated that
Braxton-Bailey could return to her work as a teacher
approximately two weeks after the accident, but that
"additional problems" prevented her from doing so. He
testified that "on several occasions we tried to get her back
to work," but that she did not finally return to work until
five weeks after the accident. Braxton-Bailey asserted that
she incurred $5,905.20 in lost wages.
The jury's verdict of $3,265 was clearly less than the
approximately $7,200 in special damages claimed by Braxton-
Bailey. * In setting aside the verdict on the basis that it was
*
Counsel for Richardson stipulated that the amounts
claimed by Braxton-Bailey were incurred subsequent to the
accident; however, the record does not support the conclusion,
asserted by Braxton-Bailey, that Richardson's counsel agreed
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"inconsistent with the evidence and law," the trial court did
not disagree with the jury's obvious conclusion that only a
portion of Braxton-Bailey's damages were reasonably related to
the accident. The trial court's action was based on its
belief that the amount awarded reflected "an award of the
medical expenses and two of the five weeks claimed for lost
wages" and that the jury thus made "[n]o allowance" for the
other damage elements such as pain, suffering, and
inconvenience which were contained in the jury instructions.
The trial court erred in setting aside the verdict based on
this assumption.
When the evidence permits a jury to conclude that only
some of the damages claimed resulted from the accident, a
verdict in an amount less than or approximating a portion of
the special damages does not justify the conclusion that the
jury failed to consider other damage elements such as pain,
suffering, and inconvenience. Walker v. Mason, 257 Va. ___,
___ S.E.2d ___ (1999)(this day decided); Doe v. West, 222 Va.
440, 446, 281 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1981). The quality of the
evidence is dispositive, not a comparison between the amount
of the verdict and the special damages claimed. See Doe v.
West, 222 Va. at 446, 281 S.E.2d at 852-53. Based on this
or stipulated that those damages were proximately caused by
the accident.
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record, we conclude that the jury was permitted to conclude
that not all the damages claimed by Braxton-Bailey were
incurred as a result of the accident. The verdict was not
based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence;
therefore, the trial court erred in setting it aside.
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial
court, reinstate the jury verdict of $3,265 in favor of
Braxton-Bailey, and enter final judgment here on that verdict.
Reversed and final judgment.
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